Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles (2013) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 5-14
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From page 5... ...
and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security requested that the National Academy of Sciences perform a study to understand the extent and limitations of technical analysis of proliferation risk of nuclear fuel cycles for use by nonproliferation policy makers and decision makers.
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From page 7... ...
and international decision makers take into account when making these decisions. The types of decisions that require an assessment of proliferation risk include peaceful international nuclear cooperation agreements and treaties, nuclear export control decisions, international safeguards, domestic regulatory decisions and domestic nuclear fuel cycle research.
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From page 8... ...
FOR ASSESSING PROLIFERATION RISK, BOTH FOR CONSIDERING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THESE FACILITIES DOMESTICALLY AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEPLOYMENT OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES. FINDING 2.1: Predefined frameworks have been developed and used to assess the proliferation resistance of partial or full nuclear fuel cycles.
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From page 9... ...
Therefore, the intrinsic details of the fuel cycles were the main focus of these evaluations with assumptions necessarily made about the type of future host state and the facility's future physical and operational details. Intrinsic attributes of proliferation resistance assessments do contain measures that can be considered robust, such as the expected decay rates of the radionuclides within the proposed fuels or required materials.
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From page 10... ...
TO HOST STATE PROLIFERATION RISK ASSESSMENTS -- INCLUDING BOTH QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES -- THEIR BENEFITS, LIMITATIONS, AND THE CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH ADAPTING THESE METHODOLOGIES TO PROLIFERATION RISK ASSESSMENT. FINDING 3.1: Some of the identified deficiencies in the implementation of the existing predefined frameworks for assessing proliferation resistance could be improved by adopting expert elicitation and data-gathering practices developed by other fields of risk assessment.
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From page 11... ...
However, two significant challenges exist in extending predefined framework methodologies' assessment of proliferation resistance to host-state proliferation risk assessment via the application of risk-based methodologies: 1) assessing host state factors such as motivations and intent and 2)
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From page 12... ...
Proliferation resistance assessments for potential future fuel cycles have limited information on technical design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements and safeguards measures. The cost and time of executing a predefined framework or any other detailed technical assessment to inform R&D decisions is difficult to justify.
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From page 13... ...
Predefined framework assessments can also be useful for training academics and nextgeneration policy makers on proliferation-relevant features of the nuclear fuel cycle, the role of international safeguards, and approaches to increasing proliferation resistance.
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From page 14... ...
RECOMMENDATION 5.1: To build trust and increase transparency with domestic and international stakeholders, policy makers and decision makers should refrain from technical jargon in communicating proliferation risk, refer to information available to all parties whenever possible, and always include discussion of the assumptions and limitations inherent in any assessment.
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