Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

6 The Emerging Science of Nuclear Forensics
Pages 105-116

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 105...
...  No single technique provides the needed information for all or even any material.  Nonproliferation nuclear forensics requires a focused international co operative effort.
From page 106...
... It is an emerging science because even though nuclear forensic analysis was first applied in the United States in 1949 to diagnose the first Russian nuclear explosion, nuclear forensic analysis as we apply it today really began only in the mid 1990's, and in an international context it has really been applied only within the past 10 years. It is an imperfect science because even though analysts can use sophisticated analytical equipment to characterize material such as interdicted highly enriched uranium (HEU)
From page 107...
... FIGURE 6-1 Interdictions of weapons grade materrial from 1992 to 201 12. SOURCE: Hutcheeon, 2012.
From page 108...
... The keey for nuclear forensics f is to understand hoow these signaatures are creatted and how they are mo odified so that if material froom the back ennd of the nucleear fuel cycle is interdicted, the history can be reconsttructed and cann help to identify where the material wasw taken from m lawful use. B But there is no silver bullet: N No single signature iden ntifies nuclear material.
From page 109...
... It turned out that the answer is yes, and this was determined by comparison of results from similar analyses by the DOE and the French Commissariat à l'énergie Atomique: uranium isotopic composition, trace elements, determined material production age, and estimated irradiation history of the sample. There is a match for each characteristic, so both organizations independently concluded that the two samples represent material from the same production batch in the former Soviet Union, circa in the early 1990's.
From page 110...
... Nonproliferation nuclear forensics requires a focused international effort. No single country can take this on alone and international engagement on nuclear forensics supports agreed international efforts to counter nuclear terrorism as discussed, such as the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)
From page 111...
... Venugopal noted that many of the samples contained sand or a resin or tail portions of uranium used as counterbalance; none ever contained uranium that exceeded 0.7% U-235. Doing this work for the Indian courts taught Venugopal that not only must the analyses be done correctly, but the interpretation and communication of the results are critically important because the audiences are not necessarily technically trained.
From page 112...
... and high resolution inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry, gives very precise and accurate measurements of the isotopic composition or mass abundance of uranium, plutonium, and other materials. The isotopic composition can also give indicators of the history and provenance of the material.
From page 113...
... Destructive analysis showed the uranium content was about 80 percent and using isotope dilution mass spectrometry, wherein the sample solution was spiked with uranium-236 and thorium-233, analysts found the sample to be enriched to about two percent. The constituents were separated and by comparing the abundances of parents and daughters in the uranium decay chain, the age of the uranium was found to be 12.6 years.
From page 114...
... While the focus of the workshop is on fissile material, the question was raised whether nuclear forensics can determine the provenance of radiological sources that are found, interdicted, or used in an incident. Venugopal described analyzing a sealed source of cesium-137 in what turned out to be a moisture density gauge, which was handled without difficulty.
From page 115...
... Finally, an audience member asked how to ensure that natural uranium used for armor penetrating munitions does not cause occupational hazards for those working with the uranium. Several experts answered that the major hazard from depleted uranium is not radiological, but the chemical hazard as a heavy metal.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.