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8 Implementing Systems Approaches to Security at Civilian Nuclear Facilities
Pages 129-140

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From page 129...
...  The balance between research and security interests is at times difficult to define and maintain. Promising Topics for Collaboration Arising from the Presentations and Discussions These promising topics for collaboration arising from the presentations and discussions do not reflect a consensus of the participants, but are rather a selection of those topics offered by individual participants throughout the presentations and discussions.
From page 130...
... In the security domain, sometimes responsible parties cannot be transparent. Access in knowledge in databases is provided on an "as and when by whom basis." In nuclear security, the organizations remain, but the repository of information is with the individual people; they are very different and that is important to decision making.
From page 131...
... These issues need to be well understood by people because in a disaster or accident scenario there is no time to really teach people what to do, unless they were prepared well in advance. Decision making in an unexpected emergency situation would involve multiple players, each with their own expertise and motivations: very powerful individuals (prime ministers and presidents)
From page 132...
... Perhaps where nuclear safety and security are concerned, key technologies could be made available. A paradigm shift will require that every country do a lot of work to ensure fresh ideas and fresh thinking to move forward and to continue to question each other to make and sustain changes.
From page 133...
... There are certain expectations about social behavior in democratic institutions or democratic countries. How are these accommodated?
From page 134...
... As India demonstrates leadership with the fast breeder reactor program and fuel recycling facilities, some of these methods should be used to set guidance for the rest of the world, working with others, because that guidance does not exist. With regard to DBT, law enforcement agencies, engineers, and subject matter experts come together and assess what is likely to happen from a threat perspective.
From page 135...
... There is also a difference between materials associated with light water reactors and heavy water reactors. Experts in India may undertake a similar process and distill the information for others so that they can evaluate options, for example, for treating spent fuel or separated plutonium.
From page 136...
... The moderator then asked for suggestions of materials that might offer a helpful introduction to the science of risk in addition to the book entitled, Normal Accidents, by Charles Perrow.1 Another participant recommended Scott Sagan's work on nuclear safety.2 A participant referred to Raj's inclusion of incorporating culture into nuclear security issues as well as the importance of communicating effectively with the public about acceptable levels of radiation for decontamination. How could Indian and American experts actually start to work on these issues?
From page 137...
... But one can test the sensitivity of the conclusions relative to those cultural factors; sometimes they may not be quite as sensitive. Another workshop participant commented that it is not easy to convince people who are going to invest human and financial resources into nuclear safety and security based on validating models with mathematics and a vector.
From page 138...
... But over time, it builds confidence in what one says and people have supported him, for which he is thankful. A workshop participant from the United States relayed some of his own professional experiences over the years working internationally.
From page 139...
... There is a slight difference between nuclear event scenarios and natural event scenarios because in natural event scenarios, one can heavily rely on tradition and knowledge. Unless one relies on and captures their wisdom and knowledge base, responses in nuclear event scenarios will be a failure.
From page 140...
... With regard to training people or courses for communicating complex issues to the public, another participant remarked that the many communication courses available to him and his colleagues focused on good communication skills in general, including how to make a limited number of points clearly, and not be too complex. A class specifically on how to communicate scientific uncertainties without causing panic would be helpful to develop.


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