India-United States Cooperation on Global Security Summary of a Workshop on Technical Aspects of Civilian Nuclear Materials Security (2013) / Chapter Skim
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2 Systems Approach to Security at Civilian Nuclear Facilities
2 Systems Approach to Security at Civilian Nuclear Facilities
Pages 27-58
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From page 27... ...
No material is absolutely safe, and any material is vulnerable at some level. Nuclear security is a continuous, dynamic risk management job and requires constant and vigorous efforts.
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From page 28... ...
Exchange programs for students would be beneficial for both countries. Overview of Civilian Nuclear Security: A Systems Approach Robert Kuckuck drew upon his experience as a former director of a nuclear facility and a principal deputy director of the National Nuclear Security Administration to provide his views on security for civilian nuclear facilities from a systems perspective.
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From page 29... ...
These are very real concerns to a facility manager, and particularly to a government official. This continuous, dynamic risk management job, which is what Kuckuck calls nuclear security, requires constant and vigorous efforts.
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From page 30... ...
There are many other elements in the nuclear security program at a facility with attractive nuclear material, be it a reactor, a materials processing facility, or a storage facility. Kuckuck began by asking himself if the facility was robust.
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From page 31... ...
However, he observed that there are at least three very important elements that underpinned this sequence of protections just outlined. The biggest one is the human aspect of nuclear materials security.
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From page 32... ...
, which is established by government oversight organizations. Specifically, they define the threat that the facility has to use as the basis from which to build its nuclear security.
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From page 33... ...
Is there artificial intelligence that the guards can use to help them in their boredom so that they don't miss something on the camera? NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY AT CIVILIAN REACTOR FACILITIES Indian Perspective Ranjit Kumar shared his experience working with civilian nuclear facilities in India and the associated issues of nuclear materials security that he has encountered.
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From page 34... ...
There have been several terrorist incidents that cause concern about potential sabotage attempts on a nuclear power plant, other civilian nuclear facilities, or any nuclear facility. These concerns have led experts in India to look deeply at the security of these facilities including various analyses right after the attacks of September 11, 2001.
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From page 35... ...
Attacks can take place in three major ways: stealth, deceit, and force. Physical protection systems should address all three methods of attack.
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From page 36... ...
The physical protection system is designed based on the performance of the guard forces and the design basis threat (DBT)
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From page 37... ...
To establish these timelines, the first step is identification of the critical detection point, and a definition of the role of early detection. The security elements of detection, delay, response, and access control are the same for a nuclear facility as well as for nuclear materials.
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From page 38... ...
Several aspects of physical protection for civilian nuclear facilities are audited and reviewed by AERB regulations. The right mix of hardware, security personnel, and procedures have to be utilized for effective physical protection of nuclear facilities.
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From page 39... ...
Browne said that there are two ways to do this: protect against the malicious use of the nuclear material, and prevent the sabotage of nuclear facilities. At reactor facilities, nuclear security is implemented by using physical protections to control access, limiting access to those people who have a need to access the reactors, and the nuclear material accountancy system to keep track of the material and detect theft and potential misuse of the material.
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From page 40... ...
The flow of material is such that the fresh fuel goes in through the reactor containment building, goes past a series of radiation detectors or monitors, is loaded into the reactor, and then, when it is discharged, takes a separate path out past a core discharge monitor and then eventually into the spent fuel storage bay. How do these MBAs and KMPs work to form material accountancy for a CANDU facility?
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From page 41... ...
The UMS is usually designed according to the facility layout and what type of equipment is present to move the nuclear material such as cranes, entry points, exit points, and shielding. All of these items are factored in when designing an unattended monitoring system.
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From page 42... ...
If a facility was at a heightened security posture because of external circumstances, a very advanced accountancy system would be employed to maintain a high level of fidelity on the location of the nuclear material. In such a scenario, a twofold approach would be utilized.
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From page 43... ...
The data from this system was fed into two other systems, the nuclear material accountancy system, so that the operator knew, in real time, where the material was and could differentiate between the operations associated with the sources and the operations associated with the fuel. It was also fed into the physical protection system at the central alarm station.
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From page 44... ...
In the example above, this was done through time synchronization of all the data generated by sources at a location. Associated with sharing data between a nuclear material accountancy system and a physical protection is the need to ensure that there is a consistent time base when trying to determine what is happening.
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From page 45... ...
Browne concluded his remarks with the following highlights: Nuclear security relies on a well-developed, integrated combination of nuclear material accountancy and physical protection. A risk-based approach is best to ensure that the fidelity is right.
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From page 46... ...
, regulatory inspections, secured sources at various stages of management, training of concerned public officials, and an Emergency Management System. Thus far, there have been no reports of major security incidents of nuclear material diversion from fuel cycle facilities involving individuals or groups of a criminal nature.
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From page 47... ...
This has to be carried out at all stages of the plant from siting, design, to construction and operation. Site selection and design should take into account physical protection needs as early as possible and address the interface between physical protection, safety, and nuclear material accounting to avoid any conflicts and to ensure synergy among the three elements.
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From page 48... ...
Therefore, the need for automation of the fabrication process is driven both by security and safety requirements. Remaining challenges to the security of a fuel cycle facility include: the need for automation of the process operations and material accounting, new vulnerabilities from increased use of computers, cyber attacks on computer systems used for process control, nuclear material accounting, and physical protection systems.
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From page 49... ...
2 Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)
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From page 50... ...
nuclear material controls, which allow material accountancy and physical protection to work in a complimentary fashion
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From page 51... ...
command and control system integrating physical protection systems as a single command center operated by a protective force. Nuclear material controls may include: material surveillance systems, point sensors, vault-alarm sensors, two-person procedures, material tie-downs, and entry control measures such as nuclear detection portal monitors, metal detectors, and electronic access controls.
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From page 52... ...
Other U.S. universities with similar programs in nuclear security include the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Missouri, the University of New Mexico, and the University of Tennessee.
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From page 53... ...
The research question very roughly could be how to use software-based methodologies to achieve that integrity. The fourth and final example of a possible research collaboration is on consequence management training tools, such as the development of a plume simulator for handheld instruments, or even smartphone applications.
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From page 54... ...
So as far as the nuclear material at nuclear facilities are concerned, there is no guarantee that nothing will happen in the future but thus far there has not been any material breach of security. On the other hand, the same IAEA scientific community said that orphan sources are a breach of nuclear security, and over the 20-year period from 1987 to 2007, 16 deaths have taken place, and there were 28 earlier incidents with more than 200 deaths, which means that the breach of nuclear security in the case of radiological material is far more serious than anything that has been contemplated in the nuclear facilities, and, of course orphan sources means they come only from industrial or medical applications.
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From page 55... ...
A participant from the United States added that in the early 1990s, requirements were added to conduct vulnerability analyses on special nuclear material, including what was defined as radiologically toxic material located at a 3 Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Activities of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, ReportNo.
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From page 56... ...
Another participant added that sometimes regulations are prescriptive and not performance-based. An example would have been the requirement to have a Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS)
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From page 57... ...
In response, the participant replied that to the best of his memory, there was a congressional line item to do that upgrade, and the cost grew too large, so there was an independent analysis conducted. Another participant recalled the earlier discussion about how the design basis threat DBT can drive costs up and down.
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From page 58... ...
During the Washington and Seoul Summits the Indian government and 40 other governments have committed at the highest level to nuclear security. So if one is concerned with nuclear terrorism, then one is concerned with security of materials of all forms, i.e.
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