Skip to main content

Performance Metrics for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Abbreviated Version (2013) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:

2 GNDA Background
Pages 15-26

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 15...
... According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) , the GNDA is "a worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and personnel, with the supporting information exchanges, programs, and protocols that serve to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials that are out of regulatory control."1 The GNDA is a complex system of systems involving many U.S.
Read the entire page →
From page 16...
... means.2 The GNDA is often described as having a defensein-depth structure organized by groups of nuclear detection capabilities distributed across three geographical layers (a layer external to the United States; a transborder layer; and an interior layer) and a fourth crosscutting layer (such as intelligence, coordination, and communication functions)
Read the entire page →
From page 17...
... .3 Within this spectrum, the GNDA's scope can be considered as being analogous to "bell ringer" systems, such as the worldwide tsunami detection system, that serve to discriminate between false alarms and actual events and provide warnings of real threats to the appropriate partners in actionable time frames (NTHMP, 2013)
Read the entire page →
From page 18...
... is provided directly to GNDA participants usually as part of funding for a larger mission. Since there is no central GNDA budget, there is no central budgetary authority or oversight control.6 2.1.2 GNDA Structure There are two main views of the GNDA structure.
Read the entire page →
From page 19...
... • "The exterior layer comprises the foreign origin, foreign transit and foreign departure sub-layers. We improve radiological and nuclear material detection abroad through efforts that encourage foreign nations or regions to develop and enhance their nuclear detection architectures."9 Under the SAFE Port Act, DOS, DOE, and DOD are responsible for implementation of the exterior portion of the GNDA consistent with international agreements and laws.
Read the entire page →
From page 20...
... These elements streamline existing capabilities, improve overall coordination and ultimately seek to enhance radio logical and nuclear detection at the federal, state, territorial, tribal and local levels."10 In the geographical, three-layered view of the GNDA, transportation pathways and detection capabilities are grouped into modalities (e.g., land, air, sea for pathways; passive radiation portals, or handheld sensors for detection capabilities) with combinations of modality pathways and capabilities considered against known aspects of the terrorist threat.11 The other view of the GNDA structure is an operational view (OV)
Read the entire page →
From page 21...
... Actual costs for activities can be difficult to estimate because detection and reporting of radiological and nuclear material out of regulatory control are part of larger missions executed by many partners. This introduces uncertainties and inconsistencies in the annual reported budget values.
Read the entire page →
From page 22...
... The scope of the GNDA mission is detection of materials out of regulatory control (see Figure 2-1) ; the mission boundary to the left is "material security," and the mission boundary to the right is "interdiction." In the 13  The four federal agencies are: Federal Emergency Management Agency (http://www.fema.
Read the entire page →
From page 23...
... Material Security Boundary The committee notes that significant progress has been made by the FBI and NNSA on providing training and exercises to secure materials at domestic facilities housing potential radiological dispersion device (RDD) threat material.16 Box 2-1 has a detailed discussion on the differences between radiological and nuclear attacks.
Read the entire page →
From page 24...
... . Preventing nuclear attacks puts an emphasis on securing foreign facilities and detecting nuclear materials en route to the United States.
Read the entire page →
From page 25...
... 2.3 committee's observations The following observations are made to highlight potential challenges in implementing the committee's findings and recommendations which appear elsewhere in this report: Observation 1: There is no clear lead architect or single entity to make final decisions about or to be held accountable for the design and operation of the GNDA. Furthermore, there is no centrally controlled GNDA budget; GNDA-related detection and reporting activities are intertwined with diverse mission activities across the GNDA federal agencies and do not have specific lines of funding.
Read the entire page →
From page 26...
... When considering how to address and define the GNDA strategy and goals, focusing solely on the detection and reporting mission may limit wider U.S. government actions that span multiple components of the NCT mission space.
Read the entire page →

Key Terms

  • detection capabilities
  • radiological materials
  • nuclear materials
  • nct mission
  • regulatory control

  • nuclear material
  • nuclear attacks
  • mission boundaries
  • interior layer
  • layered nuclear

  • nuclear security
  • radiological sources
  • safe port
  • critical activities
  • port act

  • analysis framework
  • national nuclear
  • nuclear attack
  • federal mission
  • gnda budget

  • confirmed detection
  • mission space
  • mission boundary
  • exterior layer
  • national planning

  • multiple agencies
  • threat materials
  • span multiple
  • threat material
  • tory control


    • This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
    More information on Chapter Skim is available.