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The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (1991) / Chapter Skim
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III. Prospects for Cooperative Security Arrangements and Nuclear Nonproliferation
Pages 19-24

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From page 19...
... the roles assumed by the new united Germany and the two European nuclear powers, France and Great Britain. Both the United States and the Soviet Union will have to agree that each other's participation in Europe is critical to successful cooperation in nuclear matters.
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From page 20...
... If Japan or China moved into a vacuum created by the drawing down of Soviet and American power, or if nuclear proliferation did take place in Korea, regional security would suffer. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union, in conjunction with major actors within the region, have a stake in helping to define collaborative security and arms control arrange
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From page 21...
... NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION As the U.S.-Soviet confrontation fades, the relative significance of the dangers associated with further nuclear weapons proliferation may increase. Therefore, the new environment should also induce the international community to undertake further cooperative measures to prevent proliferation and to reduce its consequences.
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From page 22...
... The greatest uncertainties concern North Korea, which remains unusually isolated from the rest of the world. The nuclear proliferation problem would be seriously complicated if the Soviet Union disintegrated into a large number of separate, potentially hostile entities, even though Soviet nuclear weapons would probably.all remain under the control and custody of the Russian Republic.
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From page 23...
... One measure, for which there was an apparent consensus at the NPT Review Conference in mid-1990, would be the extension of existing safeguard provisions to cover "suspect" nuclear facilities as well as the declared facilities currently inspected. Another measure, for which there was also strong support, would tighten export controls by requiring all NPT members to restrict exports of nuclear equipment and materials to nonnuclear weapons states that are willing to accept safeguards on all of their nuclear facilities and materials ("full-scope" safeguards)
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From page 24...
... India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, but it is not certain that the country has ever produced nuclear weapons. Pakistan is generally considered to possess all the necessary elements to produce nuclear weapons, but experts do not agree on whether it has a nuclear device.
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Key Terms

  • nonnuclear weapons
  • nuclear proliferation
  • arms control
  • soviet nuclear
  • european security

  • develop nuclear
  • undeclared nuclear
  • nuclear facilities
  • nuclear device
  • south africa

  • cooperative security
  • nonproliferation regime
  • security regime
  • nuclear powers
  • weapon states

  • fissionable material
  • experts agree
  • roles assumed
  • security incentives
  • economic considerations

  • previous pursuit
  • including argentina
  • formal arms
  • primary link
  • defense organization

  • energy agency
  • decide cooperatively
  • nuclear cooperation
  • review conference
  • institutions based


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