The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (1991) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
V. Controlling Strategic Force Operations
V. Controlling Strategic Force Operations
Pages 40-44
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 40... ...
As a result, existing U.S. and Soviet strategic command systems are prepared to perform their critical functions within the few minutes 30 or less that would elapse between detection of the launch of a major intercontinental strategic attack and the initial nuclear explosions resulting from it.
|
From page 41... ...
The United States and the Soviet Union have devised weapons design principles and organizational procedures to assure both themselves and their opponents that deployed nuclear weapons will not operate unless instructed to do so. They have also deployed multiple warning systems designed to preclude any misjudgment by central political authorities.
|
From page 42... ...
nuclear weapons or weapons systems in order to provide additional assurance against their unauthorized launch.2 The rationale for exempting the sea-based leg of the strategic triad rested on concerns that incorporating a PAL would compromise the dependability of our most survivable force by adding dependence on a communications link that a sophisticated adversary mi ,ht be able to interrupt. It also recognized the unique nature of the SLBM weapon system, which requires the active cooperation of much of the submarine's crew in order to launch a missile.
|
From page 43... ...
The plan also controls the relative sequence and timing of force operations in order to minimize mutual interference among the retaliating weapons and to assure that penetrating bomber missions are supported by prior missile strikes on air defense installations. The plan offers a wide variety of attack options within the context of a single menu.
|
From page 44... ...
The high priority given to destroying an opponent's strategic weapons also gives substantial impetus to rapid reaction since these missions must be accomplished before the opposing weapons are launched. The integrated targeting plan itself does not at present contribute to the inclination for rapid retaliation, however, since current strategic forces substantially exceed the numbers required for effective retaliation.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.