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I. Introduction: The Changing Political/Military Environment for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
Pages 6-13

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From page 6...
... A peaceful international environment and the maintenance of Soviet security at lower cost were necessary to the success of economic peres~oika. These goals required a radically reduced sense of the threat from NATO, the ending of the Afghanistan War, the acceptance of intrusive verification in order to achieve substantial arms reductions, increased trade and investment from the West, and eventually Western economic assistance.
From page 7...
... Treaty signed in November 1990; the scheduled withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the revolutions of 1989; and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has moved toward restructuring its military forces in a more defensive manner, has withdrawn a large fraction of its forces from the Far East, and has implemented the Inte~mediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
From page 8...
... Fears about instability and authoritarian trends in Soviet domestic politics, the specter of a disintegrating Soviet Union, and the harsh requirements of economic reconstruction now felt throughout Central Europe have become urgent political issues. Nonetheless, there is still a remarkable convergence of European, American, and Soviet interests in the creation of a different, more cooperative European security system.
From page 9...
... Moreover, the complexities and delays of negotiated arms control in the past have sparked new interest in the use of regular political dialogue to increase coordination and ensure transparency and confidence, whether the subject is force cuts, doctrinal differences, or comparative warning procedures. Most dramatically, Soviet withdrawals from Central and Eastern Europe and American unilateral assurances on the withdrawal of its shortrange nuclear forces foreshadow the elimination of all non-European groundbased nuclear forces in the foreseeable future.
From page 10...
... Current political and economic tasks, primarily the urgent daily adjustments to unification, leave few financial or political resources in the short run either for Eastern European economic reform or for expanded activity in the Soviet Union. For the United States, the emerging European security order will mean significant shifts in relations with its NATO allies, especially its proclaimed "strategic partnership" with Germany.
From page 11...
... Bilateral arrangements between regional actors and the United States or the Soviet Union or the autonomous exercise of power by states such as China have been the primary sources of security and insecurity. Among the avowed nuclear weapons states, China is the only power whose nuclear activities and plans remain outside any extant alliance or arms control framework.
From page 12...
... If the Chinese concluded that the prospects for long-term political and economic collaboration with the United States were problematic, their incentives for cooperation on international security and arms control (including restraints on ballistic missile sales) could diminish accordingly.
From page 13...
... In Chapter III, we examine prospects for developments In cooperative security arrangements in various parts of the world and assess the status of the efforts to stem nuclear proliferation. We discuss specific nuclear force levels and configurations for the United States in the postSTART era in Chapter IV, along with associated arms control measures.


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