Currently Skimming:
DEEP BASING CONCEPT (HORIZONTAL EGRESS)
DEEP BASING CONCEPT (HORIZONTAL EGRESS)
Pages 46-72
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 46... ...
In other words, we are driven to underground system concepts that can operate relatively independent of surface support after attack, and that spatially distribute target value to make a nuclear attack on the system as unrewarding as possible to the attacker. For a combination of reasons, both technical and nontechnical, we also should avoid dependence on deception of the potential attacker regarding the exact underground locations of critical fixed system assets.
|
From page 47... ...
Merritt just presented in the way of weapon effects testing, and particularly vulnerability testing, of various cavity lining systems and that sort of thing gives us some basis for constructing analytical models of deep basing system vulnerability in the gross structural sense. What I will show you, I believe, will illustrate how that type of information can be used in at least the very preliminary stages of a system design.
|
From page 48... ...
Returning to the question of postattack egress, we believe the uncertainties (primarily in the nature of crater-related damage to such a site) tend to drive you to consider the idea of creating entirely new egress paths after attack and avoiding the immediate locale that was attacked.
|
From page 49... ...
Now, I have a series of four or five illustrative charts here which tend to start, as you see in Figure l0, with an external view of an idealized site. The surface relief shown here probably is physically unrealizable, but the point is that a base such as you will see described would have very little observable signature on the surface.
|
From page 50... ...
will have to be given significant attention in the design of deep underground survivable basing systems. The previous figures have shown you a few of the critical subsystems, and I particularly want to point out that, as we are all aware, the postattack egress issue is the first one that people will ask about in considering this type of concept.
|
From page 51... ...
If, for example, the designer felt he had a system that was reasonably survivable against l00 megatons detonated on a particular surface aim point, the attacker (at least if he uses targeting philosophies that we believe he would) would be convinced that he had to put 800 megatons on that aim point to ensure a high confidence in destroying the deep tunnel target location.
|
From page 52... ...
Acquisition costs are just the costs of actually producing and installing all the necessary equipment, plus providing the necessary base facilities, including underground cavities. Out of acquisition costs, just for curiosity, we display how much of that in our estimate was occupied by the cost of excavating tunnels and other cavities.
|
From page 53... ...
The first one is that producing redundant shelters in which to house missiles, particularly in this deep based example, would be extremely expensive. While it might enhance survivability, the costs quickly get out of hand, and just from an economic standpoint we feel it would hinder feasibility of the idea.
|
From page 54... ...
I say so because I believe that the nuclear survivability of a properly designed deep underground system will not be sensitive to changes in the enemy's threat, or even to some very substantial changes in his threat. SPEAKER: Your presentation was based on a prototype site.
|
From page 55... ...
Through the several years that our organization has been looking at this particular problem there has been a distinct paucity of specific requirements. We have had to postulate what that system might be required to do, and it appears that in this program there is going to be a deliberate approach which says that we want to see what is possible before we start laying any specific requirements on the system.
|
From page 56... ...
56 then, perhaps denial of surveillance or at least interference with postattack surveillance on the part of the adversary may also be a requirement for systems like this.
|
From page 57... ...
57 ts> +*
|
From page 59... ...
59 0) c c 3 D> C £ « .2 ° "CD Q CO f to I Hill iliiii co LU Q£ ^)
|
From page 60... ...
60 13 J2 C 0> |
From page 63... ...
s co 1S3 O m M C 5 ' ?
|
From page 66... ...
66 a 1 oR s LU oe
|
From page 68... ...
68 CVJ ce.
|
From page 70... ...
O HUJ Z t_ tjt *
|
From page 71... ...
71 c I ta § LD ^H LU Ul
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.