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Pages 1-12

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From page 1...
... nuclear forces, which cannot be ignored as part of the overall nuclear deterrent, have decreased substantially since the Cold War. While there is domestic consensus today on the need to maintain an effective deterrent, there is no consensus on precisely what that requires, especially in a changing geopolitical environment and with continued reductions in nuclear arms.
From page 2...
... Air Force Strategic Deterrence Mili tary Capabilities in the 21st Century Security Environment was mutually requested by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and En gineering and the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, the results are intended to inform the Air Force research enterprise as a whole, as well as the larger audience of stakeholders involved in is sues of deterrence and assurance generally and nuclear deterrence and assurance in particular. During this study of analytic tools, methods, and approaches for strategic deterrence and assurance of adversaries and allies, it became apparent that no single tool, method, or approach could address the array of deterrence and assurance challenges the Air Force and the nation will face in coming years.
From page 3...
... One of the results of this assumption has been that, until relatively recently, higher priority was given to developing tools, methods, and approaches for estimating physical effects of weapons than to the human perceptual aspects of deterrence and assurance.2 Well-founded understanding of adversary and ally perceptions, motivations, and decision processes is a critical precondition for producing the types of analyses needed to support planning for nuclear capabilities relevant to assuring multiple actors across a variety of international circumstances. As a consequence, this study focuses on tools, methods, and approaches for understanding human behavior and does not address assessments of physical effects and capabilities.
From page 4...
... The Air Force should focus work or may fail in the 21st century and the analytic enhancements in support of deterrence extent to which such failures might be averted and assurance assessment on the human and or mitigated by the proper choice of nuclear human organizational factors at the heart of systems, technological capabilities, postures, deterrence and assurance. and concepts of operation of American nuclear forces.
From page 5...
... In support of senior Air identifying the risks and benefits associated Force leadership guidance, including the Flight with different nuclear force postures, Plan for the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise,b structures, levels, and concepts of operation. the Air Force should develop and maintain a comprehensive strategic deterrence analysis plan to identify the tasks that produce information required to organize, equip, and train Air Force nuclear deterrence and assurance forces and support combatant commanders.
From page 6...
... Nuclear Strategy Framework Report, there is no way to correctly recommend specific approaches or tools without these details.c Recommendation 5. Air Force analysis supporting nuclear deterrence and assurance issues should draw from a suite of appropriate methods, including hybrid methods that combine and integrate different methods.
From page 7...
... , p. 93 be averted or mitigated by the proper choice of nuclear systems, technological capabilities, postures, and concepts of operation of American nuclear forces.
From page 8...
... Key Issues in 21st Century Deterrence and Assurance Analysis Item 1 of the terms of reference was addressed by extensive committee debate and by input from subject matter expert speakers in a variety of disciplines, rang ing from the new and eclectic, such as neurodeterrence, which combines advances in neurobiology and study of deterrence and threat behaviors, to more familiar political and technical experts with decades of experience in arms control and man agement of the nuclear enterprise. The "broad analytic issues and factors" gleaned from these sessions appear throughout Chapter 2, which suggests and discusses three broad categories into which recommended themes fall (see Table S-3)
From page 9...
... This will also provide a baseline set of regional deterrence and assurance environments that could help analysts assert how current and future leadership changes might affect the deterrence and assurance environment. Finally, the Air Force would ideally explore the notion of "deep uncertainty" in planning support analyses in order to expand analysts' awareness of future uncertainties and the types of circumstances most prone to significant unintended consequences.
From page 10...
... , and elsewhere; and, finally, to train a cadre of deterrence and assurance analysts conversant in multiple analytic methods and approaches.6 Such a program would benefit the Air Force directly by providing a guide for developing the types of robust analyses currently lacking, but necessary to underpin and defend Air Force capabilities. The recommended deterrence and assurance analysis program would also provide the means for coordinating and monitoring analytic projects across the Air Force, limiting both (1)
From page 11...
... Table 3-1 in Chapter 3 illustrates the general mixes of the methods reviewed for this study. For a thorough discussion of integrating multiple analytic techniques for deterrence analysis, see Office of the Secretary of Defense Multilayer Analysis Deterrence Subgroup A Report: Deterrence-Supporting Approaches and Comparative Analysis and Integration Recommendations, June 30, 2009.
From page 12...
... Instead, the Air Force would do well to focus on its people first. This will ensure that Air Force personnel are able to provide the most credible and analyti cally based perspectives in both Air Force and joint decision fora, and that the Air Force is able to provide leaders with informed and reliable reviews and critiques of alternative force structures, sizing, and deployment options.


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