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The Future of Advanced Nuclear Technologies Interdisciplinary Research Team Summaries (2014) / Chapter Skim
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IDR Team Summary 3: Develop innovative approaches to make special nuclear materials (SNMs) more easily monitored and more detectable if stolen.
Pages 41-46

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From page 41...
... CHALLENGE SUMMARY The United States, as well as several other countries, expends considerable resources to protect stored special nuclear materials (SNMs) , as well as to detect such materials if stolen or transported internationally.
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From page 42...
... • Given the grave consequence of a failure to manage the risk, are efforts in training specialists adequate? Suggested Reading IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security.
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From page 43...
... Greer, Caltech • Jie Lian, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute • Jessica Morrison, Freelance Writer • Shriram Ramanathan, Harvard University • William C Regli, Drexel University • Kenan Unlu, Pennsylvania State University IDR TEAM SUMMARY -- GROUP 3 Jessica Morrison, NAKFI Science Writing Scholar Freelance Writer, Washington, DC IDR Team 3 considered innovative approaches that would make special nuclear materials (SNMs)
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From page 44...
... • Active interrogation by imaging or detection of high-energy gamma radiation is expensive, limited in availability, and may pose privacy and public health concerns. • Current detection technology doesn't provide enough information efficiently and there is no integration with other critical sources of information, like geospatial tracking devices.
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From page 45...
... " The group focused on increasing the sensitivity of detection, identifying transformational uses of current technologies, and tracking motion with lasers and infrared. Specific actions included moving away from detection via alpha and/or gamma particles or creating a detection method that would excite or amply these traditional signals; improving existing and developing new technologies to better detect shielded material using thermal and imaging methods; and integrating detection systems with cell phones using thin-film technology.
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From page 46...
... Expected Impact An integrated approach to protecting, detecting, and identifying SNMs that considers materials, technology, and systems is expected to create a more complete operational picture of material status and those adversaries who would attempt theft, transport, sale, or unauthorized use of SNMs. Improving existing infrastructure by the addition of enhanced sensors, remote detection, specially designed shielding containers that respond to motion, and a networked systems approach would make better use of existing resources, enhance detection, and reduce costs.
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Key Terms

  • nuclear materials
  • special nuclear
  • explosive devices
  • specific actions
  • team summary

  • nuclear explosive
  • improving existing
  • widely distributed
  • grand challenge
  • energy agency

  • trafficked snms
  • radioactive materials
  • innovative approaches
  • actions included
  • border crossings

  • safeguards agreements
  • worldwide background
  • false alarms
  • integrated approach
  • international atomic

  • easily monitored
  • background radiation
  • iaea safeguards
  • enhance detection
  • illicitly trafficked

  • gather background
  • create nuclear
  • cial nuclear
  • nuclear nations
  • intentional nuclear


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