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IDR Team Summary 4: Design and fund a 3-year public/private initiative to better understand and bridge the perception/reality gap between the public and nuclear experts on the risks of the nuclear enterprise and to restore the public trust.
Pages 47-62

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From page 47... ... There is much to be learned by the public, but there is also much to be learned by the nuclear community about risk communication and the development of public trust. Today there is no operating repository for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste anywhere in the world. Read the entire page →
From page 48... ... • What do we know about risk communication writ large and how can these lessons be applied to the nuclear enterprise? • What can we learn from public acceptance of nuclear in other nations and in successful U.S. Read the entire page →
From page 49... ... Public beliefs, concerns and preferences regarding the management of used nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste. Report for The Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, February 2011. Read the entire page →
From page 50... ... Sedwick, University of Maryland • Kelly Servick, Science Magazine IDR TEAM SUMMARY -- GROUP 4A Kelly Servick, NAKFI Science Writing Scholar, Science Magazine IDR Team 4A was asked to create an initiative to restore the public's trust in nuclear technology in the face of a gap between public perception and scientific reality. Disasters such as the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine and, more recently, at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi plant, combined with the government's failure to clearly communicate risk, have perpetuated the aura of suspicion and dread around the terms "nuclear" and "radiation." Whether in the context of a medical treatment, an alternative to fossil fuel, or a new waste facility, these terms are highly charged, even in cases where the scientific community finds little or no human risk. Read the entire page →
From page 51... ... But beyond these broad examples, group members had more personal experiences with effective risk communication that offered guiding principles: One member served on a committee to explain the risk of contamination to a community in Colorado during the cleanup and closure of the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons facility. She witnessed a shift in attitudes as the community became less adversarial and grew to trust the visiting scientists on the committee. Read the entire page →
From page 52... ... The commission's 2012 report calls for an "independent federal corporation" in charge of responsible oversight of nuclear waste disposal decisions and communication. While this new center would not focus exclusively on waste disposal, its contribution to the Blue Ribbon Commission's goals might allow it to draw financial support from the Nuclear Waste Fund, which collects fees from utilities that own or operate nuclear facilities, and which has amassed roughly 25 billion dollars to date. Read the entire page →
From page 53... ... Based on a feeling that students lack a strong foundational understanding of the science behind nuclear technology, members suggested new ways to motivate students: For elementary and middle school groups, these could include dynamic video games or summer camps. At higher levels, students might take advantage of massive open online courses (MOOCs) Read the entire page →
From page 54... ... Whittaker, University at Buffalo The State University of New York IDR TEAM SUMMARY -- GROUP 4B Carolyn Crist, NAKFI Science Writing Scholar University of Georgia IDR Team 4B was asked to design and think about how to fund a 3-year public–private initiative to better understand and bridge the perception/reality gap between the public and nuclear experts about the risks of the nuclear enterprise and to restore the public trust in the use of nuclear technology. As part of this, the team outlined the various components of the "nuclear enterprise" -- energy, medicine, weapons, food irradiation, and Read the entire page →
From page 55... ... The Pilot The team would like to encourage more positive public perception and support of the nuclear enterprise by either or both: • A targeted energy and nuclear technology module in K-12 education, • An outreach initiative designed to spark engagement and public discourse, most likely through a public relations campaign. This approach is based on the idea that people get their information through multiple channels. Read the entire page →
From page 56... ... The evaluation tool would include a literature review, which would investigate the effective strategies used in other countries, such as positive public perception of nuclear energy in France, and successful communication campaigns employed in other fields in the United States, such as smoking cessation and the mandatory use of bicycle helmets. As part of this, the team noted the importance of "rebranding" the image of nuclear technology to emphasize its benefits and clearly stating the true costs and risks associated with the technology. Read the entire page →
From page 57... ... For instance, Bill Gates is a highly visible public figure in technology and philanthropy, and Homer Simpson is a well-known cartoon character who works at a nuclear plant. The idea is that Gates-like figures appeal to the current acceptance of "nerdy intellectualism" while Homer-like characters can use humor and sarcasm to turn around the images burned in our minds from the past in relation to nuclear technology. Read the entire page →
From page 58... ... Most of all, messages should find a way to give the audience a "why and how," or a call to action, to move forward with their new knowledge or favorable understanding of nuclear technologies. Depending on the community in the pilot program, this could be safety information for those who live near a nuclear power plant or a detailed but easy-to-understand brochure for a mother considering nuclear diagnostic tools and imaging tests for her child. Read the entire page →
From page 59... ... First the team rephrased its challenge that supports a more inclusive objective to better reflect the broad nature of nuclear technology. "How might we better understand and bridge the gap in perception between the public and nuclear experts on the nuclear enterprise." With this newly phrased task at hand, the team devised a 3-year time line centered on four stages: information collection and analysis, identification of a pilot project, pilot project execution, and project analysis. Read the entire page →
From page 60... ... In keeping with its goal of objectivity the team decided to not use words such as "risk" or "benefit" when discussing nuclear energy with the public because it considers both words to be inherently subjective. Information Collection and Analysis Statistics from national surveys disclose the percentages of the public's opinion for or against the nuclear enterprise. Read the entire page →
From page 61... ... The team would promote their guide to scientists at universities and national labs. The team thought that a best-practices guide would be a successful pilot project for scientists looking to educate the public about their work, which would help scientists learn to better communicate to the public. Read the entire page →
From page 62... ... The team would conduct a failure/success analysis according to defined metrics to determine which pilot project worked best. The most successful pilot projects would then be put forth as a case study for other organizations looking to increase public awareness of the nuclear enterprise as well as help scientists understand public opinion on their work. Read the entire page →

From page 47...

... There is much to be learned by the public, but there is also much to be learned by the nuclear community about risk communication and the development of public trust. Today there is no operating repository for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste anywhere in the world.

IDR Team Summary 4: Design and fund a 3-year public/private initiative to better understand and bridge the perception/reality gap between the public and nuclear experts on the risks of the nuclear enterprise and to restore the public trust. Pages 47-62

IDR Team Summary 4: Design and fund a 3-year public/private initiative to better understand and bridge the perception/reality gap between the public and nuclear experts on the risks of the nuclear enterprise and to restore the public trust.
Pages 47-62