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1 Overview of Analysis and Findings
Pages 8-43

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From page 8...
... In responding to the task, the committee assessed the historically stated rationales for human spaceflight as rigorously as possible given the available knowledge base with the intent of identifying a set of "enduring questions" akin to the ones that motivate strategic plans for scientific disciplines. The committee also sought to describe the value and "value proposition" of the program, to solicit and interpret stakeholder and public opinion, and to provide conclusions, recommendations, and decision rules that can guide future human spaceflight programs pursued or led by this country.
From page 9...
... • A program of human space exploration beyond LEO that satisfies the pathway principles defined below is not sustainable with a human spaceflight budget that increases only enough to keep pace with inflation. As shown in Chapter 4, the current program to develop launch vehicles and spacecraft for flight beyond LEO cannot be sustained with constant buying power over time, in that it cannot provide the flight frequency required to maintain competence and safety, does not possess the "stepping-stone" architecture that allows the public to see the connection between the horizon goal and near-term accomplishments, and may discourage potential international partners.
From page 10...
... Section 1.4 summarizes the enduring questions and rationales for human spaceflight offered over time and is followed by a summation of the opinions of the U.S. public and stakeholders in human spaceflight.6 Section 1.6 discusses strategic approaches to a sustainable human spaceflight program beyond LEO that is based on what the committee calls a pathways approach, The chapter concludes by summarizing the requirements for undertaking such an effort and the consequences of embarking on a new program of deep-space exploration without adequate funding.
From page 11...
... Early space exploration was driven largely by competition between nations. The program's effective birth can be traced back to the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which was signed on July 29, 1958, and led to the formation of NASA.9 In response to the shock of the launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite on October 4, 1957, U.S.
From page 12...
... . The original plan featured a balanced program of science, applications, and human space exploration with the possibility of human flight to the Moon "beyond 1970."11 Hopes for a long and stable space policy were, however, thrown into doubt with the continuing successes of the Soviet space program, in particular, the launch of the first human being into space in 1961.
From page 13...
... administration lacked enthusiasm for the station and the Mars option proved too ambitious and expensive, leading NASA officials believed, in the words of space-policy scholar John Logsdon, as follows: NASA had to get a go-ahead for the shuttle in 1971 if NASA were to maintain its identity as a large development organization with human spaceflight as its central activity. The choice of whether or not to approve the space shuttle thus became the de facto policy decision on the kind of civilian space policy and program the United States would pursue during the 1970s and beyond.16 (Two decades later, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board [CAIB]
From page 14...
... In its later years, the space shuttle served as a ferry vehicle (both up and down) for crews and supplies for the Russian space station Mir and later the ISS.
From page 15...
... OVERVIEW OF ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 15 FIGURE 1.3  Space shuttle concepts. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA; available at http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4219/Chapter12.html.
From page 16...
... 16 PATHWAYS TO EXPLORATION FIGURE 1.4  Space shuttle Columbia launch. SOURCE: Courtesy of NASA.
From page 17...
... would begin by increasing our capabilities in transportation and technology -- not goals in themselves, but as the necessary means to achieve our goals in science and exploration." With a focus on capabilities for the first time, the goal for the United States would once again be human missions to the Moon and Mars to be carried out individually or in collaboration with other nations. The objective was unequivocally stated: "There is no doubt that exploring, prospecting, and settling Mars should be the ultimate objective of human space exploration.
From page 18...
... Bush, in a major speech, outlined a plan to extend the "human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations." 27 Despite considerable investments in the new initiative, called Project Constellation, it did not enjoy across-the-board support. A new Augustine Commission conducted a major review of human spaceflight and issued a report, Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation, in October 2009 that noted that the Constellation program, as defined, could not be executed without substantial increases in funding.
From page 19...
... •  Seek partnerships with the private sector to enable safe, reliable, and cost-effective commercial spaceflight capa bilities and services for the transport of crew and cargo to and from the ISS. The National Space Policy offers general guidelines, but de facto work on human spaceflight relies on the considerations laid out in three consecutive NASA Authorization Acts issued in 2005, 2008, and 2010, each of which added to, clarified, and updated many of NASA's immediate goals in light of the winding down of the Space Shuttle Program, the end of construction of the ISS, and plans for human exploration beyond LEO.
From page 20...
... Congress, International Partnerships in Large Science Projects, 1998. It is worth noting that all the attendees at a roundtable for the leading space agencies -- among them NASA, the European Space Agency, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, and the Canadian Space Agency -- held in late 2013 noted the benefits of international collaboration but cautioned that cost was not one of them.
From page 21...
... The official Department of State announcement on the ISEF noted that "many of the spaceflight achievements of the past half-century would not have been possible without international collaboration" but conceded that "competition-driven innovation at the industrial and scientific levels is also an important element for the evolution of space exploration."35 Discussions about future cooperative missions, including missions beyond Earth orbit, are ongoing. One of the major forums for these discussions is the International Space Exploration Coordination Group, the work of representatives of 14 space agencies, which in August 2013 published an updated version of The Global Exploration Roadmap (GER)
From page 22...
... However, building on decades of space station activity, Russia continues to advance conceptual studies for follow-on programs, including proposals for human activity beyond LEO.40 In a space-policy statement issued by the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) in April 2013, the Russian government noted that "space activities are one of the primary factors determining the level of development and influence of Russia in the modern world."41 Despite that acknowledgement, Russia has struggled to expand its human spaceflight program beyond the ISS, and robotic missions to the Moon and planets have been almost nonexistent in the last 20 years.
From page 23...
... , "Key Technology of Manned Lunar Surface Landing, Liftoff and O ­ perating," IAC-13.A5.1.3; Yang Liu (Beijing Special Engineering Design and Research Institute) , "Study on Technical Approach for Manned Deep-Space Exploration," IAC-13.A5.4-D2.8.6; Li Guoai (China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology)
From page 24...
... ESA maintains its own independent astronaut corps, ground infrastructure, and science experiments program centered on the ISS. ESA has not developed an independent capability to deliver humans into orbit, but its capabilities and accomplishments ensure that the agency -- led by the leading partners, France, Germany, and Italy -- will have a place in any large international endeavor in human spaceflight beyond the ISS, although its contribution will rely on partners that have an independent capability, such as the United States and Russia, and possibly in the future on China.52 ESA has recently committed to developing a service module based on the ATV for NASA's Orion MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle for at least one mission of the Orion, set for 2017, with a possibility of a second one.
From page 25...
... Japan also provides the HTV, a robotic spacecraft to deliver supplies to and remove waste from the ISS. Japan maintains a small astronaut corps and, like ESA, is unlikely to engage in any human spaceflight program that is independent of an international framework or agreements at the corporate level, such as the one that provides the proximity operations system for Orbital Sciences Corporation's Cygnus cargo capsule.55 India has collaborated with the United States for many years in space, as well as with other international space agencies.
From page 26...
... 57 India has been considering a human spaceflight program for some time and has initiated basic research studies although as of early 2014 it has yet to commit to the program officially.58 The committee has several findings related to the future of international collaborations beyond LEO: • It is evident that near-term U.S. goals for human exploration are not aligned with those of our traditional international partners.
From page 27...
... , and shared human destiny and the aspiration to explore. The first five of these rationales can be considered pragmatic in that human space exploration is seen as benefiting a goal outside its mission of exploration.
From page 28...
... The effectiveness of public programs in achieving a broad set of objectives forms the core of value-proposition analysis as applied to public-sector activities. The committee's review of the value-proposition analyses of public agencies in ­general -- and of NASA's human space exploration efforts in particular -- reveals that such a value approach lacks clear definition of objectives and lacks the formulation and tracking of appropriate metrics to measure the performance of any public agency along the path to meeting these objectives.
From page 29...
... The GSS questions do not mention cost, but the resulting data show that in comparison to other spending priorities, space exploration ranks near the bottom. 1.5.1.3  Trends in Support for Human Spaceflight Missions Despite its reservations about increased funding for space exploration, the public has consistently reported positive views about specific human spaceflight missions, including the Space Shuttle Program, the Moon landing, and sending astronauts to Mars (see Figure 1.8)
From page 30...
... 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 SHUTTLE ‘WORTH CONTINUING' MOON LANDING ‘WORTH IT' SHUTTLE ‘GOOD INVESTMENT' FAVOR ‘SENDING ASTRONAUTS TO MARS' FIGURE 1.8  Public support for the space shuttle, Moon landing, and Mars mission, 1979–2011. SOURCE: Shuttle continuation: CBS/NYT (1987, 1988)
From page 31...
... Another survey conducted by CNN/ORC at almost exactly the same time, July 2011, found just 38 percent saying that it was very important for the United States "to be ahead of the Russians and other countries in space exploration."62 Few recent surveys have explored international collaboration in depth, but the available data suggest that the public is generally positive about international collaboration. There is little in the survey literature about the public's views on the roles of government and the private sector in the exploration of space or human spaceflight, and this reflects both the low salience of space exploration and the relatively recent emergence of private space activities.
From page 32...
... Those trends -- generally positive views of space exploration and human spaceflight but low support in terms of funding and low levels of public engagement -- have held true over the past few decades, during a time when the nation developed, flew, and retired a winged, reusable space vehicle and led a consortium of nations in building a large, orbiting research facility. 1.5.2  Stakeholder Views The Public and Stakeholder Opinions Panel conducted a survey of key stakeholder groups.
From page 33...
... human space exploration program might work toward over the next 20 years. They were presented with a list of possible projects that NASA could pursue and asked to indicate how strongly they favored or opposed each of them.
From page 34...
... If the nation does not decide soon whether to embark on human space exploration beyond LEO, it will de facto begin ramping down its human spaceflight activities in the early 2020s as preparations for the closeout of ISS begin. More important, because major new spaceflight programs have lead times of years (sometimes a decade)
From page 35...
... Missions to various destinations within those operational theaters could provide the necessary challenges, adventures, and diverse patterns of activity and use to sustain a program that addresses the enduring questions. The challenges of human spaceflight beyond LEO are created in part by increased requirements for propulsive energy and by longer mission durations.
From page 36...
... generated by NASA and the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (Human Spaceflight Exploration Framework Study, NASA, January 11, 2012, Washington, DC, http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/509813main_Human_Space_Exploration_ Framework_Summary-2010-01-11.pdf; Human Space Flight Architecture Team (HAT) Technology Planning, Report to NASA Advisory Council March 6, 2012, Washington, DC, http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/629951main_ CCulbert_HAT_3_6_12=TAGGED.
From page 37...
... The committee has concluded as follows: NASA can sustain a human space exploration program with meaningful milestones that simultaneously reasserts U.S. leadership in space and allows ample opportunity for substantial international collabora tion when that program •  as elements that are built in a logical sequence.
From page 38...
... Therefore, as its highest-priority recommendation, the committee recommends as follows: NASA should adopt the following pathway principles: I. Commit to designing, maintaining, and pursuing the execution of an exploration pathway beyond low Earth orbit toward a clear horizon goal that addresses the "enduring questions" for human spaceflight.
From page 39...
... E. If there are human spaceflight program elements, infrastructure, or organizations that are no longer contributing to progress along the pathway, the human spaceflight program should divest itself of them as soon as possible. 1.6.4  Two Examples of Futures for Human Spaceflight: The Fiscal Challenge Ahead The committee provides here examples derived from Chapter 4 to demonstrate the fiscal challenge that the United States faces in any exploration program beyond LEO.
From page 40...
... BUDGET-DRIVEN ENHANCED EXPLORATION ANNUAL COST (THEN-YEAR $) Earth-Moon Asteroid in Martian Moons Mars Surface Human Spaceflight L2 Native Orbit Budget Increasing with Inflation (2.5% per year)
From page 41...
... . 1.6.5  Risk Tolerance in a Sustained Program of Human Space Exploration A sustained human exploration program beyond LEO, despite all reasonable attention paid to safety, will almost inevitably lead to multiple losses of vehicles and crews over the long term.
From page 42...
... Nevertheless, the committee has concluded as follows: If the United States decides that the intangible benefits of human spaceflight justify major new and enduring public investments in human spaceflight, it will need to craft a long-term strategy that will be robust in the face of technical and fiscal challenges. Together with the highest-priority recommendation to adopt the pathways approach, the committee offers the following prioritized recommendations as being those most critical to the development and implementation of a sustainable human space exploration program: NASA should 1.
From page 43...
... Americans have continued to fly into space not so much because the public strongly wants it to be so but because the counterfactual -- space exploration dominated by the vehicles and astronauts of other nations -- seems unthinkable after 50 years of U.S. leadership in space.


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