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Lifelines
Pages 115-129

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From page 115...
... However, substantial damage was done to the infrastructure, which adversely affected general living conditions. As reported in a special section on Hurricane Hugo in the September 24, 1989, edition of the San Juan Star, "collapse of the isIand's infrastructure left a large percentage of the population without power, water, garbage collection and other basic services." ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS Electrical distribution systems were the lifelines that suffered the greatest damage in Hugo.
From page 116...
... Less than 100 m to the east, in the shadow of the hills, a satellite dish remained, undamaged, atop a building. At 0505 on Monday, September 1S, as Hugo was beginning to attack the main island of Puerto Rico, Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon had the power system shut down as a means of preventing severe damage.
From page 117...
... On October 29, 1989, a San Juan Star article reported that the damage to AEE poles and wires would cost $50 million to repair. Recovery in some areas of Puerto Rico was rapid, and much of San Juan was back on line within 48 hours.
From page 118...
... The Flooding of E' Carraizo Pumping Plant The other important failure of the disaster preparedness programs in Puerto Rico was the interruption of water services to the San Juan metropolitan area for 9 days as a result of the flooding of E1 Carraizo pumping plant, shown in Figure 5-5. The dam supplies San Juan's drinking water.
From page 119...
... _~ "-'a— _ if_ _3 _ Hi_ I_ FIGURE 5-3 WAPA Richmond facilities, Christiansted, St. Croix FIGURE 5-4 Kings Hill water storage tank, St.
From page 120...
... The dam's catchment area managed to withstand almost 2 inches of rain during Hugo. The situation at El Carraizo was similar to the tragedy on As Americas Expressway near the Coamo River on the sourthern coast of Puerto Rico.
From page 121...
... It is clear that the condition of the floodgates at El Carraizo Dam was known well before Hugo. An October 15 San Juan Star editorial noted that the government of Puerto Rico had known since April 1989 that the emergency generator was not working.
From page 122...
... The control tower, which sits on top of the terminal building, lost all of its cab windows, and much of the instrumentation and communications gear suffered water damage. Although the airport was open to light aircraft almost immediately after the passage of Hugo, it was 6 days before a temporary air traffic control tower was operational.
From page 123...
... Thomas, the damage to FAA facilities was much lighter, and limited air traffic control service was restored within 24 hours. The control tower shown in Figure 5-S lost some cab windows, probably as a result of windblown grave} from a parking lot on a nearby hill, and there was wind and water damage to antenna structures, signal and power cables, and control tower instruments.
From page 124...
... Thomas FIGURE 5-10 Cargo building, San Juan International Airport.
From page 125...
... The field team arrived in Puerto Rico just 3 days after Hugo. Many roads were still covered with debris, though main highways were open.
From page 126...
... A San Juan Star article in the September 24, 1989, special section on Hurricane Hugo mentioned that the school system was especially hard hit for three reasons: (~) physical damage to the buildings, (2)
From page 127...
... These water plants commonly get caught on bridge piers and pilings and increase upstream flooding, as well as causing structural damage to the bridges through blockage effects. After Hurricane David in 1979, the Dorado bridge over the Rio de la Plata was overpassed with water hyacinths and suffered a great dead of damage.
From page 128...
... Humcane Hugo SUMMARY In the Caribbean region, the electrical distribution system was the most seriously damaged lifeline during and after Hurricane Hugo. Others, such as communication systems and water pumping plants, suffered disruptions from the resulting lack of power.
From page 129...
... 1985. Federal Interagency Flood Hazard Mitigation Team Report for Puerto Rico, In Response to the October 10, 1985, Disaster Declaration.


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