Hurricane Hugo, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Charleston, South Carolina, September 17-22, 1989 (1994) / Chapter Skim
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Emergency Planning and Response in Puerto Rico
Emergency Planning and Response in Puerto Rico
Pages 63-81
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From page 63... ...
Finally, elements in the disaster-response system that did not work well- i.e., sheltering, long-term emergency housing, and lifeline protection are analyzed. OPERATIONS OF THE WEATHER SERVICE FORECAST OFFICE IN SAN JUAN Local WSFO operations during Hurricane Hugo were successful (NOAA, 1989~.
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From page 65... ...
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From page 66... ...
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From page 68... ...
transmitted directly from the headquarters of WSFO at San Juan's Luis Munoz Marin International Airport throughout the period of the emergency until 1900 AST on September 17. Other local TV stations~hannels 4, I1, and 2= also did top-of-the-hour special reports on Hurricane Hugo.
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From page 69... ...
For example, it worked closely with the civil defense offices of the commonwealth and the San Juan metropolitan area in determining the evacuation times and local areas at risk of high winds-and flooding. The WSFO and these two civil defense offices (in addition to at least two other municipalities adjacent to San Juan that the reconnaissance team visited)
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From page 70... ...
In San Juan, civil defense officials encountered initial resistance from the residents in the coastal area of Las Perlas, near E1 Morro Castle, and from close to 1,000 members of a religious sect called Los Mitas. These people eventually evacuated during the afternoon and evening of September 17 as the weather conditions deteriorated.
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From page 71... ...
About 150 persons were also evacuated from Los Penas because of fear of high winds. In the municipality of Catano, the majority of the evacuations performed by civil defense occurred on the western shores of Bahia de San Juan, in an area from Bay View to Puerto Catano.
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From page 72... ...
Thirty-~ve municipalities were left without electric power, and the San Juan metropolitan area suffered from lack of water for 9 days. The president of Puerto Rico Management and Economic Consultants, Inc., in general agreement with independent estimates provided by commonwealth officials, established the total losses to households, industrial plants, commercial and service establishments, and the government infrastructure at $2 billion (reported in San Juan Star, October 29, 1989, p.
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From page 73... ...
sector Airport, port, highways, roads Electric Power Authority Aqueduct & Sewer Authority, others Losses to Flora arid Fauna Household Losses (200,000 households, averaging $1,000 each) TOTAL L055ES Source: San Juan Star, October 29, 1989, p.
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From page 74... ...
This means that the sheltering function depended on effective cooperation and coordination between the municipal civil defense officials, commonwealth agencies, and a private organization; unfortunately, it was not effective in this case. An indication of the failure of this part of the disaster-preparedness program was the well-publicized intervention of the governor on behalf of the occupants of the shelters in which he ordered the shelters fumigated, obtained water and other provisions from various commonwealth agencies, and threatened to fire commonwealth officials if they did not perform their assigned responsibilities (E!
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From page 75... ...
. A technical summary of the San Juan evacuation study and the experiences with Hurricane Hugo mentions that the practice of using school buildings as shelters may work for riverine floods, but would be less appropriate during intense storms accompanied by high winds.
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From page 76... ...
~~ ail ~ ~ -I ::? ~~ # _:~.SSSSS':' HOURS 3-1 Vo=[lon~ Stool ~ F4ardo, Puerto R1= Hod ~ a sboltor Dow nurcl~no Hum.
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From page 77... ...
76) , the effective sheltering of evacuees depended on cooperation and coordination among municipal civil defense officers, commonwealth agencies, and a private organization.
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From page 78... ...
to provide water after the occurrence of Hurricane Hugo is described more completely in Chapter 4. As is not unexpected in the aftermath of a disaster, the efforts by the Puerto Rican government and congress centered on the identification of the AAA officials responsible for the lack of upkeep of E} Carraizo Dam.
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From page 79... ...
O , a. one remaining question is the extent to which the San Juan WSFO is connected with civil defense offices in municipalities from the San Juan metropolitan area.
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From page 80... ...
the engineering readiness of buildings used for shelters in Puerto Rico and their appropriateness for a variety of natural hazards, (2) the relative accessibility and potential demands for shelters in different areas, and (3)
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From page 81... ...
Hurricane Hugo, September 15-22, 1989. December I, 1989.
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