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I The Relationship Between Safety Culture and Security Culture
Pages 7-20

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From page 7...
... Claudio Almeida. Why a Safety Culture Matters – Michael Corradini, University of Wisconsin Dr.
From page 8...
... Performance indicators should dictate a level of regulatory oversight beyond the baseline program. When people talk about nuclear safety defense-in-depth, they always think about physical barriers, such as containment, a vessel, or fuel rods.
From page 9...
... If the safety performance does not meet expectations, then this third party intervenes. It is important that the public be able to look at the regulator, look at almost everything the regulator is looking at, and come to some of their own judgments.
From page 10...
... Nuclear Security Culture – William Tobey, Harvard University Mr. Tobey's presentation covered factors influencing nuclear security culture, the definition of good nuclear security culture, and practical examples.
From page 11...
... Analysis of effective nuclear security culture has to be empirically based and has to depend on practical experience of operators. If it does not, it will be essentially dissociated from those operations and therefore less effective.
From page 12...
... Safety and Security Culture from a Regulatory Perspective – Claudio Almeida, Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN, National Nuclear Energy Commission)
From page 13...
... The IAEA Safety Standards today mention the physical security of fissile materials and radioactive materials of nuclear power plants where appropriate, but it is not treated in detail with supplements in the IAEA Safety Standards or agency documents addressing security. At the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the gathering of experts in nuclear safety, the Review Meeting of 2002 directly followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and there is one statement in the Review Meeting Summary that says, "In light of the events of 11 September 2001, the issue of assuring the security of nuclear installations from terrorist attacks was a matter of
From page 14...
... Then, in 2008, for the first time, security culture was mentioned in a document stating the objective and essential elements of a state's nuclear security regime. The definition shown by Mr.
From page 15...
... Any of three independent groups should have prevented this, and eventually the regulatory agency and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations came in to hold people accountable. At least in the United States, if it is not a public discussion, the public immediately starts thinking that something is being hidden.
From page 16...
... Therefore, while robust safety measures can help prevent against security problems, they are probably not sufficient. Because the chance of a human threat or human intervention is the key aspect of security, analysts would look at what the risk world would term common mode failures multiple safety measure that can be compromised by a single event.
From page 17...
... General Alston asked about the ability to measure safety and security, but not safety culture and security culture. He postulated that the next Chernobyltype disaster would have a summary assessment on whether its cause was principally a safety failure or a security failure; that words in that next failure report would point toward a summary appraisal of safety culture or security culture.
From page 18...
... He inquired as to whether in the continuum of intellectual development for evaluating cultural readiness, we are in the early stages and have a long way to go or we ought not to put energy here into expanding or developing our regulatory competencies. The discussion then shifted to value judgements about culture and distinctions between national or ethnical culture and corporate safety and security culture.
From page 19...
... He argued that we should not confuse national cultures and security and safety culture. Nations can have different cultures and have features in common with both their safety and security cultures.
From page 20...
... Security has a sphere of influence, safety has a sphere of influence, and there are interaction points. One interaction point after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, was that human interventions in a nuclear power plant had to be considered.


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