Cybersecurity Dilemmas Technology, Policy, and Incentives: Summary of Discussions at the 2014 Raymond and Beverly Sackler U.S.-U.K. Scientific Forum (2015) / Chapter Skim
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3 International Relationsand National Security
3 International Relationsand National Security
Pages 20-28
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From page 20... ...
Moreover, just as information tech nologies can be used to conduct crimes, they can be used as weapons to instigate or escalate conflicts and crises. Threats exist in such areas as cyber security attacks, electronic warfare, information operations, and psychological operations, with malevolent actors ranging from criminals and terrorists to entire nations.
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From page 21... ...
Though rarely used in the past, these provisions are now used frequently. Government funds national intelligence agencies to protect national security, including the protection of armed forces operating overseas, countering proliferation, and uncover ing state-sponsored cyberattacks.
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From page 22... ...
and in government have traditionally been quite different. Applying lessons learned about network effects in the IT industry to international security and surveillance could prove fruitful and might illuminate strategic policy questions about surveillance, information sharing, and international affairs.
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Two main statutes affect the disclosure of information in the United States. The first is the Stored Communications Act, which prohibits communications companies from sharing or disclosing data except in certain situations.
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They also will not necessarily advance the eco nomic and social interests of those countries, since they erect what is essentially a tariff barrier, making it more expensive to offer digital services in that country while facilitating censorship and social control. Companies will continue to struggle with the competing demands from differ ent nation-states, but network effects will press against the desire to establish separate, closed Internets.
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From page 25... ...
• yberpreemption and damage limitation – reducing the capability of the forces C that an adversary might use. • yber arms control – can entail workable agreements with potential adversaries C to reduce the likelihood of hostile cyber operations and reducing damage should hostile operations occur.
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From page 26... ...
And com municating during crises, differentiating espionage from attack, cooperating against third party provocateurs, or declaring cyber ceasefires could prevent inadvertent escalation. Making Progress on International Issues The international dimensions of cybersecurity will have a profound impact on the future of IT.
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From page 27... ...
The main objective of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is to create a common policy for protecting society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international cooperation. This first international treaty addressing Internet and computer crime had been ratified by 46 states as of June 2015.
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From page 28... ...
As pointed out in Chapter 1, the potential of technology to protect bad actors remains a point of contention, as systems that offer extremely strong protection become increasingly available. Yet the use of unusually strong protections also could heighten the surveillance of the people who chose to use them.
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