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1 Introduction
Pages 1-4

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From page 1... ... workshop on pandemic financing aimed to illuminate the financing tools available to alleviate this tension, closing the gap between the infectious disease event and the response, and ways to fund the systems that could help prevent the outbreak in the first place. As part of the Global Health Risk Framework initiative described in Box 1-1, the Institute of Medicine convened a 2-day workshop on financing pandemic preparedness and response. Read the entire page →
From page 2... ... With encouragement and input from the World Bank; the World Health Organi zation; and the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and West African countries; and support from various international and national organiza tions (Ford, Gates, Moore, Paul G Allen Family, and Rockefeller Foundations; Dr. Read the entire page →
From page 3... ... Speakers will articulate roles for the private sector, especially the reinsurance industry, to bring together multiple financial backers to pool their risks against a global emergency. The workshop will also explore possible underwriting functions of banks, insurers, and investment houses, and analyze how these organizations could ease the financial shock of an epidemic and control the costs of response, including the cost of developing new drugs and vaccines. Read the entire page →
From page 4... ... 4 Inadequate Response to • Delay to recognize magnitude of outbreak Ebola Outbreak • Limited financial resources • Lack of coordination mechanisms between public and private International organizations • Absence of an easily mobilized reserve level of pooled funds Alert Alert Surveillance Response Generation Verification • Reluctance to recognize • Limited trained workforce Figure 3-1 Financing, broadside Country severity of outbreak • Limited infrastructure • Obstruction to early • Limited supplies and medicine level notification • Lack of coordination • Limited sharing of mechanisms information with other • Poor understanding of countries community culture and traditions • Mistrust of the government Community • Slow uptake of disease control measures (unsafe burial practices) level FIGURE 1-1 The response to the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak had inadequacies at the international, country, and community levels. Read the entire page →

From page 1...

... workshop on pandemic financing aimed to illuminate the financing tools available to alleviate this tension, closing the gap between the infectious disease event and the response, and ways to fund the systems that could help prevent the outbreak in the first place. As part of the Global Health Risk Framework initiative described in Box 1-1, the Institute of Medicine convened a 2-day workshop on financing pandemic preparedness and response.

Read the entire page →

From page 2...

... With encouragement and input from the World Bank; the World Health Organi zation; and the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and West African countries; and support from various international and national organiza tions (Ford, Gates, Moore, Paul G Allen Family, and Rockefeller Foundations; Dr.

Read the entire page →

From page 3...

... Speakers will articulate roles for the private sector, especially the reinsurance industry, to bring together multiple financial backers to pool their risks against a global emergency. The workshop will also explore possible underwriting functions of banks, insurers, and investment houses, and analyze how these organizations could ease the financial shock of an epidemic and control the costs of response, including the cost of developing new drugs and vaccines.

Read the entire page →

From page 4...

... 4 Inadequate Response to • Delay to recognize magnitude of outbreak Ebola Outbreak • Limited financial resources • Lack of coordination mechanisms between public and private International organizations • Absence of an easily mobilized reserve level of pooled funds Alert Alert Surveillance Response Generation Verification • Reluctance to recognize • Limited trained workforce Figure 3-1 Financing, broadside Country severity of outbreak • Limited infrastructure • Obstruction to early • Limited supplies and medicine level notification • Lack of coordination • Limited sharing of mechanisms information with other • Poor understanding of countries community culture and traditions • Mistrust of the government Community • Slow uptake of disease control measures (unsafe burial practices) level FIGURE 1-1 The response to the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak had inadequacies at the international, country, and community levels.

Read the entire page →

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1 Introduction Pages 1-4

1 Introduction
Pages 1-4