Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants Phase 2 (2016) / Chapter Skim
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to conduct a technical study on lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident for improving safety and security of commercial nuclear power plants1 in the United States. The complete study task is given in Sidebar 1.2 in Chapter 1.
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that nuclear plant operators and their regulators upgrade and/or protect nuclear plant security infrastructure and systems and train security personnel to cope with extreme external events and severe accidents. The committee judges that the following three actions are needed: 1.
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plants would need to be trained on the use of this equipment if it were different from existing equipment at their plants. TASK 2: LESSONS LEARNED FOR SPENT FUEL STORAGE5 Spent fuel was stored in eight locations at the Fukushima Daiichi plant on March 11, 2011: in spent fuel pools in each of the six reactor units (Units 1-6)
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As water levels decrease below about 1 m above the top of the fuel racks, radiation levels on the refueling deck and surrounding areas will increase substantially, limiting personnel access. Moreover, once water levels reach approximately 50 percent of the fuel assembly height, the tops of the rods will begin to degrade, changing the fuel geometry and increasing the potential for large radioactive material releases into the environment.
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that understanding of security risks at nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage facilities can be improved through risk assessment. Risk assessment can help to broaden scenario identification, including cyber and asymmetric attack8 scenarios; account for the performance of plant security personnel in responding to the identified scenarios; identify potential onsite and offsite consequences of such scenarios, ranging from radioactive releases to psychological impacts; and better characterize uncertainties.
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If pool water is lost through an accident or terrorist attack,10 then the stored fuel can become uncovered, possibly leading to fuel damage including runaway oxidation of the fuel cladding (a zirconium cladding fire) and the release of radioactive materials to the environment.
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that the USNRC has not analyzed the potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to the specific terrorist attack scenarios identified in NRC (2004)
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on whether "earlier movements of spent fuel from pools into dry cask storage would be prudent to reduce the potential consequences of terrorist attacks on pools at some commercial nuclear plants." The committee's critiques of the Spent Fuel Pool Study and Expedited Transfer Regulatory Analysis are intended to strengthen the quality of future technical analyses of spent fuel pool storage risks to support sound decision making by the USNRC and nuclear industry.
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