Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants Phase 2 (2016) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
3 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Lessons Learned for Nuclear Plant Security
3 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Lessons Learned for Nuclear Plant Security
Pages 75-87
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 75... ...
damage to safety and security infrastructure at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Written reports from the plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)
|
From page 76... ...
Nevertheless, the committee infers from TEPCO's written reports, as well as its own observations during a November 2012 tour of the Fukushima Daiichi plant, that security systems at the plant were substantially degraded by the earthquake and tsunami and the subsequent accident. There are three principal lines of evidence that support this inference: • Physical damage.
|
From page 77... ...
Such upgrades should include • Independent, redundant, and protected power sources dedicated to plant security systems that will continue to function independently if safety systems are damaged; • Diverse and flexible approaches for coping with and reconstitut ing plant security infrastructure, systems, and staffing during and followng extreme external events and severe accidents; and i • Training of security personnel on the use of these approaches.
|
From page 78... ...
(ii) During severe weather when the suspension of affected security measures is immediately needed to protect the personal health and safety of security force personnel and no other immediately ap parent action consistent with the license conditions and technical specifications can provide adequate or equivalent protection.
|
From page 79... ...
The security force assists in implementing site evacuations. The committee's recommendation calls for upgrading and/or hardening nuclear plant security infrastructure, systems, and training to cope with extreme external events and severe accidents.
|
From page 80... ...
This equipment would need to be sufficiently standardized so that it could be used across the U.S. nuclear plant fleet and adequately protected against extreme external events, severe accidents, and sabotage.4 Security personnel at U.S.
|
From page 81... ...
9) The USNRC uses the design-basis concept for regulating both the safety and security of commercial nuclear plants: • The USNRC uses the design-basis accident (DBA)
|
From page 82... ...
A waterborne vehicle bomb assault, which may be coordinated with an external assault; and (v) A cyber attack.
|
From page 83... ...
Government and sector coordinating councils have been established to share information and coordinate security strategies, activities, policies, and communications. The Government Coordinating Council comprises representatives from DHS, USNRC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy.
|
From page 84... ...
The committee's second observation concerns the applicability of the DBT concept to protecting nuclear plants against asymmetric threats.9 An adversary who lacks the strength, weaponry, and training of the nuclear plant's security forces might utilize attack strategies that do not require direct confrontations with those forces. For example, an adversary might choose to attack perceived weak points in the plant's support infrastructure (e.g., offsite power and water supplies, key personnel)
|
From page 85... ...
Detailed information about the evolution of the accident at the F ukushima Daiichi plant and its compromised safety systems is widely available on the Internet and in reports such as this one. This information could be used by terrorists to plan and carry out asymmetric attacks on nuclear plants in hopes of creating similar cascading failures.
|
From page 86... ...
3A.2 ROBUSTNESS AND RESILIENCE Physical protection systems must be hardened to withstand extreme natural and accidental events, as well as physical attack. Cameras, sensors, and other systems must be powered by an uninterruptable power source, independent of the power sources used for routine and emergency power for plant safety systems.
|
From page 87... ...
3A.4 READILY RECOVERABLE In the event of a catastrophic event or attack, security systems must be designed and installed to be quickly reconstituted. Hardened power and fiber optic cables must permit "plug-and-play" installation of replacements for inoperable equipment.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.