The Neglected Dimension of Global Security A Framework to Counter Infectious Disease Crises (2016) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
4 Strengthening the Global and Regional System for Outbreak Preparedness, Alert, and Response
4 Strengthening the Global and Regional System for Outbreak Preparedness, Alert, and Response
Pages 47-68
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 47... ...
recognize the significance of its role by creating a ment of logistics and deployment of international medi- robust operational entity and contingency fund that cal teams (see Annex 4-1 for other essential functions can respond adequately to potential pandemics; needed for outbreak preparedness and response at the 2. improve its ability to coordinate and cooperate with international level)
|
From page 48... ...
governance for global health security that were presented The Commission proposes an approach based at a September 2015 Institute of Medicine workshop on mainly on Model B, with elements of Model C Ungovernance for global health.3 Details on these models der this approach, WHO would have a new center with are provided in Annex 4-3 and in the published report clear responsibility, resources, and capabilities to take the of the workshop, Global Health Risk Frameworks: Gov- lead on outbreak preparedness and response, while takernance for Global Health: Workshop Summary (NASEM, ing advantage of the UN system's assets and being held 2016)
|
From page 49... ...
effectively integrate functions and units -- across coun- Specifically, we propose that WHO should estabtry, regional, and headquarter levels -- that work on in- lish a Center for Health Emergency Preparedness and fectious disease outbreaks, on emergencies, and on risk Response (CHEPR)
|
From page 50... ...
The CHEPR staff should • Make recommendations to the DG, including have a variety of skills in areas such as management, when to call an emergency committee and declare health security, public health systems, epidemiologic a PHEIC (although the DG should still retain the surveillance, medical anthropology, risk communication, legal power to make final decisions on both of these clinical medicine, health information technologies, lo- matters)
|
From page 51... ...
For the purposes of estimatHealth Organization should create a Center for ing an aggregate level of funding required by the ComHealth Emergency Preparedness and Response -- in- mission's proposals, we have assumed that an increase tegrating action at headquarters, regional, and coun- in the core contributions from countries of 5 percent, try office levels -- to lead the global effort toward out- or roughly $50 million6 over 2016–2017, would sufbreak preparedness and response. This center should fice to cover the incremental operational costs involved be governed by an independent Technical Governing in the formation of the CHEPR.
|
From page 52... ...
This could either be on emergency health personnel, coordination of medi- the basis of actual cash contributions or via binding cal response and transportation of personnel and sup- contingent commitments to fund the CFE. In the plies, information technology and analytical support of event of the DG's triggering the contingency fund, emergency response efforts, and creation and operation WHO could raise money from banks immediately of field offices (WHO, 2015h)
|
From page 53... ...
Coordination mechanisms among WHO and other UN As we argued in Chapter 3, national capacities for disagencies should be strengthened to enhance outbreak ease surveillance and outbreak investigation and control preparedness and control. The Ebola outbreak showed are the first line of defense against potential pandemics.
|
From page 54... ...
and the Middle East Consortium on Infectious Disease Representatives from civil society could help WHO with Surveillance in the Middle East. These networks have reporting of cases, adapting and readjusting approaches built trust and developed formal and informal commu- during disease outbreaks, realigning priorities, and esnication flows that enable rapid and continuous commu- tablishing and disseminating standards, such as those renication when outbreaks occur and joint investigations lated to research.
|
From page 55... ...
serious health impact or unactors, including local and international civil society expectedly high rates of illness or death; (4) potential for interference with international travel or trade; (5)
|
From page 56... ...
Health Organization (WHO) should establish a To prevent travel bans, relevant stakeholders, such mechanism to generate a daily high-priority "watch as the International Air Transport Association and the list" of outbreaks with potential to become a Public World Trade Organization, should be engaged prior to Health Emergency of International Concern to nor- the next outbreak.
|
From page 57... ...
For many counholding governments publicly accountable for perfor- tries, the government's own contingency resources will mance under the International Health Regulations be the primary source of such funds; however, in situand broader global health risk framework, as detailed ations where challenges overwhelm domestic resource in Recommendation B.2, including: capabilities, international financing support is needed. • protocols for avoiding suppression or delays in The experience of Ebola demonstrated that mobilizing data and alerts, and such contributions can take time, so it makes sense to • protocols for avoiding unnecessary restrictions on have contingency financing arrangements in place to en trade or travel.
|
From page 58... ...
Creating a separate entity would the early phases of an infectious disease outbreak, this is simply add cost and bureaucracy. That said, it is clearly somewhat problematic.
|
From page 59... ...
As with insurance, for ity (RCF) to ensure it is clear that this facility is available pandemic bonds to be cost-effective as a funding mecha- to provide budgetary assistance for countries reporting nism for the PEF, it will be necessary to identify triggers infectious disease outbreaks.
|
From page 60... ...
arrangements is essential to ensure that a rapid and ef fective response is not hindered by lack of funds. Global CLOSING REMARKS actors together must carry out these critical functions Strengthening international coordination and capabili- to effectively prepare and respond to major infectious ties is vital to countering the threat of infectious diseases disease outbreaks.
|
From page 61... ...
of global public goods, particularly knowledge-related goods. In the context of infectious disease outbreaks, ANNEX 4-2 examples include defining and evaluating standards for WHO's Strengths and Weaknesses as the Global national core capacities and setting priorities for research Leader in Pandemic Prevention and Control and development of medical products, among others.
|
From page 62... ...
Mobilization of Provision of aid, including de- Provide financial support to low-income countries seeking to global solidarity velopment financing, techni- enhance national core capacities cal cooperation, humanitarian Provide financial and other resource support for failed states assistance, and agency for the dispossessed Develop and deploy emergency response funds NOTE: FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; GHSA = Global Health Security Agenda; IHR = International Health Regulations; OIE = World Organisation for Animal Health; PHEIC = Public Health Emergency of International Concern; R&D = research and development; UN = United Nations; WHO = World Health Organization. SOURCE: Framework adapted from Frenk and Moon, 2013.
|
From page 63... ...
Past successes in controlling initiatives and entities as relevant to play major roles several high-profile infectious diseases, including plague, in health cluster–related issues. WHO also engages in smallpox, and malaria, have made WHO a highly so- dialogue with all stakeholders involved in humanitarcially respected organization when it comes to dealing ian assistance and works to keep health high on the with disease outbreaks.
|
From page 64... ...
NOTE: IHR = International Health Regulations; PHEIC = Public Health Emergency of International Concern; WHO = World Health Organization. as a tradable commodity (Labonté and Gagnon, 2010)
|
From page 65... ...
Model B: WHO Plus15 This model proposes that WHO would continue to have Model D: A New, Separate Entity Under the UN operational responsibility for outbreak preparedness and This model assumes that the current mandate on global response but would significantly revamp its organizational health risks contained in WHO's constitution is either and operational capacity to deliver a complete emergency unclear or insufficient and that WHO cannot or should public health response. To achieve this, WHO would cre- not deal with global health risks.
|
From page 66... ...
. May can receive report to the WHO predictable Executive Board, funding WHA, and UNSG NOTE: DG = Director-General; ED = Executive Director; IASC = Inter-Agency Standing Committee; OCHA = UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; PHEIC = Public Health Emergency of International Concern; UN = United Nations; UNSG = UN Secretary-General; WHA = World Health Assembly; WHO = World Health Organization.
|
From page 67... ...
2015d. Global health emergency workforce.
|
From page 68... ...
2015h. WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.