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7. Final Thoughts and Future Considerations
Pages 87-92

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From page 87...
... There are also those who believe it is time to begin developing the next generation of manned space transportation systems and that Shuttle operations should be curtailed or eliminated once a new system is operational. In either case, the Committee believes it is imperative that the Lessons learned" to this point in the current Shuttle program be used as a guide, whether for future operation of the Shuttle or for preparing the development, assurance, and maintenance procedures for other space programs.
From page 88...
... If, instead, these programs are allowed to continue in the same manner as the Shuttle program, there will almost certainly be another committee, similar to this one, convened sometime in the future and asked to investigate the adequacy of the SSF or EOS software development and upgrade processes without adequate documentation. Because the Shuttle flight software is, for a while at least, unique within NASA in its size and years of use, the Committee believes that NASA would do itself, and the nation, a great service if it were to capture these lessons learned and make them available to the SSF program and other planned, or potential, manned programs.
From page 89...
... A related issue is He reluctance shown by the ShutHe program to fully implement the recommendations of the Rogers Commission, the earlier NRC committee, the GAO, and NASA's own Aerospace Safetr Advisory Panel, particularly in regards to the recommendations for fully independent V&V. In He Commi~e's opinion, NASA has not been as aggressive as it should have been in implementing the recommendations given to it by the various outside panels and committees in the area of software oversight.
From page 90...
... These are the same concerns expressed by this committee regarding the Shuttle software process, and much the same as were expressed by He Rogers Commission, the earlier NRC Committee, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and the GAO. While this present committee had access to several documents that were not available to previous inves~gabons, if NASA had had art effective mechanism in place for educating program managers on He benefits of software 2 The U.S.
From page 91...
... the committee believes that the impomnce of software to the success of future NASA programs will only increase; NASA should underprice an effort to keep pace by increasing its in-house expertise both at He working level and among those expected to manage future programs and choose the contractors that will do the work. Ultimately, the responsibility for the safety and functionality of the software that is put in place on future systems, including future Shuttle flight software upgrades, belongs to NASA.
From page 92...
... Recommendation #22: NASA should upgrade its wor~orce and management practices to make it a leader in software engineering and software quality. NASA should maintain as much in-house capability as possible to reeve its dependence on contractors and to provide proper assurance that contracted work is done on time and with as much aversion to safety and other qualities as future systems require aru]

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