Transit Security Update (2008) / Chapter Skim
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40 CHAPTER SIX CASE STUDIES Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Boston, Massachusetts) , 40 Bay Area Rapid Transit (San Francisco, California)
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SUMMARY TRANSIT SECURITY UPDATE This report, an update of the original TCRP Synthesis of Transit Practice 21: Improving Transit Security (1997) , addresses terrorism, which was not included in the original study along with ordinary crime.
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2 of Transit Watch, or a similar employee and passenger awareness and outreach program; provision of security training to frontline employees and counterterrorism training to police and security personnel. Transit agencies have increased the number and hours of security personnel; conducted threat and vulnerability assessments; received intelligence information from federal agencies; and increased local and regional coordination and outreach efforts through counterterrorism committees and intelligence information sharing with local responders and neighboring transit agencies.
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3 Regional coordination – among transit agencies, emergency responders, local departments of transportation, and other relevant agencies enhances security initiatives and agency preparedness. Training transit police and security personnel – enhances the preparedness of transit systems.
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TSA's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response – teams have been deployed at hundreds of transit systems throughout the country. These teams augment security in the systems, expanding the agencies' capabilities to implement random, unpredictable security activities to deter both terrorism and crime.
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5 Transit agencies, with the technical assistance provided by DHS/TSA and FTA, have been striving to meet these challenges and have, in varying degrees, enhanced the preparedness of their police force and security personnel, educated their passengers, and hardened their transit systems as terrorist targets. Immediately after September 11, counterterrorism efforts were implemented in a reactive and piecemeal manner, but more recently transit agencies have been incorporating security practices into their core mission, strategic plans, and daily operations.
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6 attack in the United States has occurred since 9/11, these events reflect the continued persistence and desire of terrorists to inflict harm on innocent civilians and their proclivity to choose transit systems as targets. Transit Vehicles Transit vehicles are primary targets because they contain large numbers of passengers and also can damage surrounding or nearby infrastructure.
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7 cause accidents and derailments. Parking lots and structures are potential targets, especially when they are located beneath or above a transit terminal or station.
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8 Technical Approach to the Project The objectives of the project were met by the following tasks: Conducting a literature review of relevant materials, • Developing and distributing a survey to 120 large and • small transit agencies in various geographic regions of the United States, Conducting case studies, • Seeking and receiving input from industry experts, and • Analyzing National Transit Database (NTD) security • and incident data.
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9 National Transit Database Security and Incident Data NTD security and incident data were analyzed for the years 2002 to 2007, although much of the analysis results were not incorporated into the report because of concerns about the reliability and accuracy of the data. REPORT ORGANIZATION This report is organized into seven chapters, including this introductory chapter.
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10 CHAPTER TWO PASSENGER PERCEPTION OF CRIME AND TERRORISM Within transit systems, both serious and minor crimes affect passenger perceptions of security. Serious crimes are exaggerated by the media and intensify passenger fears.
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11 Risk of attack -- although terrorism risk and deterrence level are difficult to calculate, testing the security system can determine the decrease in the detection rate after the measure or system is installed; for locations with many incidents of a certain type, the pre- and postimplementation assessment can determine whether and to what extent a specific security measure succeeds in meeting its security objectives. Cost-related performance is important in demonstrating the cost-effectiveness and cost-related benefits of security investments (Campbell 2008)
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12 exceeding $25,000, an evacuation owing to life safety reasons, or a mainline derailment. Although homicide is always considered a major incident, other Part I and Part II offenses may or may not be "major" depending on the severity of the offense.
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13 Sabotage -- sabotage or tampering with transit facili-• ties' assets may be a means to achieve any of the above events, such as starting a fire or spreading an airborne chemical agent, or it may be a stand-alone act, such as tampering with track to induce derailment. CRIME TRENDS The general U.S.
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14 tion, crime data analysts and researchers believe that although homicide statistics are the most accurate and well-reported of all crime data, issues with the other crime statistics include crime categorization and changes in reporting rates. National Transit Database Issues The results of detailed analysis performed for this study revealed abnormalities and inconsistencies in the NTD data, and did not reflect the experiences of some transit agencies.
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15 of vehicles; contact information for personnel; public comments; accident data; and landscaping information. Although crime mapping is not performed by many agencies, crime trend analysis by location (e.g., transit station or stop)
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16 CHAPTER THREE SECURITY MEASURES Before September 11, 2001, transit agencies were focused on crime along with quality-of-life issues. Since then, transit agencies have been challenged with countering terrorism as well.
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17 Chemical/Biological Program for Mass Transit• Explosives Testing and Assessment of Rail Car • Vulnerability Mass Transit Tunnels Entry Denial Systems• Rapid Response to Extreme Events in Tunnels.• The measures intended to deter one type of threat address others as well. The indicators of an incident and the required response, however, may vary significantly based on the threat (Batelle, TotalSecurity US, and Transportation Research Associates 2006)
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18 centralized identity management combined with access control. Transit agencies issue some type of employee ID card; as smart cards, they may also be used for other purposes such as fare payment.
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19 figuration strategies can be used to slow vehicular traffic in areas surrounding a transit station or facility. CPTED strategies for security of facilities are discussed in the Station/ Terminal and Transit Facility sections later in this chapter.
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20 Passenger alarm buttons with a voice link to train – operators on rail cars; Silent alarms for train operators linked to control – center, dispatch, or police; and Public address systems with battery backup. – Improve visibility:• Use bright lighting, colors, and materials; – Eliminate potential hiding spaces; – Help train operator see inside the rail cars (video or – mirrors)
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21 Install Drive Cams (event-triggered cameras – focused on drivers)
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22 existing security resources, provide deterrent presence and detection capabilities, and introduce elements of randomness and unpredictability to disrupt potential terrorist planning activities. To enhance the effectiveness of VIPR teams, TSA and the representatives of the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group worked cooperatively to improve coordination, preparation, planning, execution, and after-action review of VIPR deployments in mass transit and passenger rail systems.
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23 ogy is easier to network and integrate with other technologies (see Figure 4)
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24 Audio analysis is able to detect gunshots and screaming and to estimate the location of a shooting or some other incident through triangulation techniques; it is now being used in some urban crime response and prevention applications. Transit agencies may consider the combined use of both video and audio analytics for an even more effective surveillance solution.
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25 and training of the team through other sources that meet the TSA standard. Highly trained and certified canine teams continue to be one of the more effective and highly mobile explosives-detection methods in the mass transit and passenger rail environment.
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26 such as enhanced surveillance and detection capabilities, antiterrorism operational teams integrating dedicated law enforcement officers with explosives-detection canine patrols for enhanced deterrence, and bolstered detection capabilities through antiterrorism training, drills, and exercises and multimedia public awareness activities. In New York City, security checkpoints have been created at MTA and Port Authority Bridge and Tunnel crossings where vehicles are randomly inspected.
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27 operations, storage, and emergency response procedures for different types of emergencies involving natural gas (Murphy 2005)
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28 platform for first responder agencies; and enhance public safety communications technology within the PATH system ("$34 Million for NYC Metro Area" 2008)
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29 CHAPTER FOUR SECURITY PRACTICES however, practices varied across agencies because of differing agency policies, TVA results, needs and constraints, and operating environments. SECURITY AND POLICING MANAGEMENT The "Broken Windows" theory links minor crimes, disorder, and quality-of-life problems with more serious crime.
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30 disorder and minor crimes are prevented or mitigated and serious crimes are deterred by enforcing these rules (Kelling and Coles 1997a)
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31 REGIONAL COORDINATION, COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS, AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION Actionable information such as who will be carrying out an attack and intended target(s) is essential for agencies to formulate an effective counterterrorism strategy.
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32 Transit employees and customers are important sources of intelligence, typically in the form of threat information, but the information can be variable in terms of timeliness and accuracy. As noted in TCRP Report 86, Volume 1, preincident indicators such as propaganda, vandalism, direct threats, thefts, and surveillance attempts should be identified, closely monitored, and shared with other agencies on a frequent basis (TRB 2002)
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33 The agencies do not incur additional expense to participate in the program. TSA funds the cost of the public awareness materials distributed during the joint campaigns.
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34 Metro case study (see chapter six)
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35 The CDTA in Albany, New York, has engaged in a collaborative effort with one of the major school districts and police agencies in its service area to prevent juvenile crime and disorder. The CDTA worked with the schools to establish the idea that CDTA buses are extension of the classroom; and, thus, students who violate either CDTA's code of conduct or the school's code of conduct are subject to suspension from school and CDTA bus service and its facilities for a period of time.
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36 FERRY SECURITY Ferries outside of the United States have been targets of attacks, and U.S. ferry systems have been cased by suspected terrorists.
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37 CHAPTER FIVE CONFLICT MITIGATION STRATEGIES ultimately, such fear and stress may damage the reputation of the transit agency. Recognizing the warning signs of a volatile or emotionally disturbed individual, understanding what to do to defuse potentially violent situations, and knowing how to respond if violence does occur will make transit employees feel safer both physically and emotionally.
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38 Exchange of money• Delivery of passengers, goods, or services• Working alone or in isolated locations• Working late at night or during early morning hours• Working in high-crime areas• Responsible for property of interest to terrorists or • criminals. TECHNIQUES Conflict mitigation techniques can be broken down into the following categories.
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39 A description of unacceptable behaviors,• A request to change that behavior, • An explanation of the consequences that will occur if • the behavior does not change, and A question that gives the customer a choice.• Countering nonverbal intimidation: A transit worker can change his or her physical position relative to the attacker by standing at an angle or side-by-side to counter physical intimidation and diminish confrontation. At the same time, it is important not to move into their space.
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40 CHAPTER SIX CASE STUDIES The objectives of the case studies were to obtain an in-depth coverage of both crime and terrorism-related security challenges faced by the selected transit agencies, examine their security practices and measures, and learn how they are holistically integrated and utilized by the agencies to address the challenges. The case study question categories included post-9/11 changes in security, policing, policy, and practices; security-related technologies and other implemented security measures; changes in crime, incident, and suspicious activity trends; training and personnel issues; security data collection and analysis practices and concerns; and other information relevant to the study.
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41 MBTA Interactive Crime Statistics Map The MBTA Transit Police Department issues crime data in a timely and innovative manner. Annual statistics are provided for each station on MBTA's heavy rail and light rail systems as well as its Silver Line.
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42 these measures generally has been positive, with many passengers expressing a desire to see even more security within their transit system. Many of these measures such as High Visibility Patrols and Train Order Maintenance Sweeps not only deter terrorism but also prevent and detect ordinary crime, as well as increase customer perceptions of security, and therefore are viewed as highly efficient as well as effective.
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43 HazMat Officer The MBTA Transit police department has an officer specially trained to handle hazardous materials (HazMat) and who will respond to HazMat emergencies.
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44 bution of cocaine. MBTA's 2007 Crime Statistics indicate that Part I offenses have decreased by 10%, whereas Part II offenses have increased by 12%.
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45 ship of approximately 350,000. BART's service area spans four counties (Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco, and San Mateo)
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46 Victimization Rates Rates of Part 1 Crime Victimization on the MBTA system Typical Week day Ridership Average Weekday Partt I Rate of a I Crime Line -Unlinked Crime occurring per 100,000 (FY 2006)
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47 FIGURE 21 BART system map (Courtesy: BART)
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48 the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, and a command officer is designated as the department's mutual-aid, counterterrorism, and homeland security liaison. All of the BART Police Department's canines are highly trained and certified to detect explosives.
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49 Cross-trained police canines in explosives detection• Included WMD scenarios as part of regularly sched-• uled emergency drills Enhanced access control through smart-card • technology Formed partnerships with national labs on vulnerabil-• ity to explosives blasts and air distribution in underground areas Held security meetings with other in-house depart-• ments and general management; Created a threat-assessment matrix for police and tran-• sit operations. To further ensure the personal safety of BART riders, pay phones and emergency call boxes in parking lots connect directly to the BART police 9-1-1 communications center.
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50 FIGURE 25 BART Average Emergency Response Time quarterly statistics (Courtesy: BART)
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51 In general, BART police presence and extra security measures are welcomed by passengers. A few customers have complained that the presence of military personnel is excessive and unnecessary.
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52 BART-commissioned threat assessment completed – in January 2002, FTA security readiness assessment completed in – July 2002, Participated in the FTA transit security and emer- – gency management planning technical assistance project that began in January 2003, and Participating in an Office of Domestic Preparedness – risk assessment project that began in August 2004 (ongoing)
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53 FIGURE 28 CDTA bus and train station (Courtesy: CDTA)
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54 Post-9/11 Security Measures The height of passenger and employee awareness as indicated by the number of reports of suspicious objects or activity (about one per month for the first year) came immediately after the 9/11 attacks.
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55 FIGURE 29 CDTA emergency preparedness meeting at the Rensselaer Train Station (Courtesy: CDTA)
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56 Capital Metro is a small system with a small security staff (three full-time equivalents) , which contracts out much of the security work.
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57 an open system with no turnstiles. There are plans for future expansion of the system (see Figure 33)
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58 WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY (WASHINGTON, D.C.) Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA or Metro)
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59 Regional public safety officials recognize that it would be beneficial for specialized agencies like Transit Police to be notified immediately and seamlessly when an incident occurs within their jurisdiction or when it affect their operations. A rapid flow of information between and among police, fire, and traffic management control centers would allow for limited disruptions for commuters and ease congestion around incidents.
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60 CHAPTER SEVEN CONCLUSIONS Research results indicate that integration of security continues to occur holistically on many levels within transit agencies, including daily transit operations, training and education, customer outreach, capital budgeting and resource allocation decisions, and planning and procurement processes. This finding supports the FTA's Security and Emergency Management Technical Assistance Program (SEMTAP)
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61 engage in careful planning and an extensive target selection process and are deterred by changes in expected conditions of the system, such as the unexpected presence of officers. Therefore, random checks and other unscheduled security measures may be strong deterrents.
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62 tion with FTA and other public and private security partners, developed and published the Mass Transit Security Training Program. This program, presented on TSA's website, provides detailed guidelines for mass transit and passenger rail agencies to facilitate development and implementation of security training programs, and specifies the subject areas in which particular categories of employees should receive training.
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63 tems, expanding the agencies' capabilities to implement random, unpredictable security activities to deter both terrorism and crime. Video Technology Video is considered to be effective in deterring and detecting crime and terrorism.
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64 coordination of deployment and effectiveness of the security augmentation operations. Products resulting from this effort provide guidance on planning, preparation, coordination, execution, and after-action review of VIPR deployments and describe the capabilities of each component of a VIPR team with recommendations on their most effective use.
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65 Cross-Functional Training As the transportation security community takes on an allhazards approach, and to ensure the success of convergence efforts, cooperation among multiple functions and divisions within the transit agency is needed, including the police force or security unit, IT, human resources, operations planning, customer service, marketing, and others. There is, therefore, a foreseeable need for communications and crossfunctional experience and training for transit employees in these areas.
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66 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADA Americans with Disabilities Act AFSD Assistant Federal Security Director AVL Automatic Vehicle Location BART Bay Area Rapid Transit District (San Francisco) BASE Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosive CCTV Closed-circuit television CDTA Capital District Transportation Authority CERT Community Emergency Response Team COG Council of Governments COOP Continuity of Operations CPR cardiopulmonary resuscitation CPTED Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design CTA Chicago Transit Authority DHS Department of Homeland Security DHS/S&T DHS Science and Technology Directorate DMZ Demilitarized zone DOT Department of transportation EOC Emergency operations center EOP Emergency operating procedure ETD Explosives trace detection FAMSAC Federal Air Marshals Special Agent in Charge FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FOIA Freedom of Information Act FRAWG Federal Risk Assessment Working Group GIS Geographic information system HAZMAT Hazardous materials HSIN Homeland Security Information Network HSIN-PT Homeland Security Information Nework -- Public Transit HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System HVAC Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning IAs Immediate actions ICS Incident command system IDEA Innovations Deserving Exploratory Analysis IED Improvised explosives device IP Internet Protocol IT Information technology JHU Johns Hopkins University JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force MARTA Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority MBTA Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTA Metropolitan Transportation Authority MTPD Metro Transit Police Department Muni San Francisco Municipal Railway NBC Nuclear/Biological/Chemical NCTC National Counterterrorism Center NEDCTP National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program NFTA Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority NIMS National incident management system NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan NJT New Jersey Transit NRP National Response Plan NTD National Transit Database NTI National Transit Institute NYCT New York City Transit OCC Operations control center OGT Office of Grants and Training PATH Port Authority Trans–Hudson Corporation PC Personal computer
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67 PCAC Permanent Citizens Advisory Committee PIV Personal Identity Verification POST Peace Officers Standards and Training PSI Passenger security inspection ROW Right-of-way SCP Situational Crime Prevention SEMTAP Security and Emergency Management Technical Assistance Program SEPTA Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority SOP Standard operating procedure SOT Special operations team STISAC Surface Transportation–Information Sharing and Analysis Center SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics TAG Together Against Graffiti TCO Total cost of ownership TOMs Train Order Maintenance Sweeps TSNM Transportation Sector Network Management TS-SSP Transportation Systems–Sector Security Plan TVA Threat and Vulnerability Analysis TWIC Transportation worker identification card UCR Uniform Crime Reporting UHF Ultrahigh frequency VIPR Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response WMD Weapons of mass destruction WTC World Trade Center
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68 REFERENCES Bacal, R., Defusing Hostile Customers Workbook, Institute for Cooperative Communication, Winnipeg, Canada, 1998.
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69 Kelling, G
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70 "Security Manpower Planning Model," Federal Transit Administration, Washington, D.C., May 2008 [Online]
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71 BIBLIOGRAPHY Acohido, B., "Theft of Personal Data More Than Triples This Year," USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 2007 [Online]
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72 FEMA 427 -- Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003. "Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification, Version 2.1T," National Institute of Standards and Technology [Online]
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73 Taylor, B., et al., "Responding to Security Threats in the Post9/11 Era: A Portrait of U.S. Urban Public Transit," Public Works Management & Policy, Vol.
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74 GLOSSARY TRANSIT SECURITY TERMS Source: Transit security glossary definitions are primarily derived from Transit Safety & Security Statistics & Analysis 2003 Annual Report; National Infrastructure Protection Plan (July 2006) or the National Response Plan (December 2004)
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75 Unauthorized modification or destruction of computer • programming codes, computer network databases, stored information or computer capabilities; and Manipulation of computer or telecommunications • services resulting from fraud, financial loss, or other criminal violations. Derailment/Bus Going Off Road A noncollision incident in which either one or more wheels of a transit vehicle unintentionally leaves the rails, a bus leaves the roadway, or there is a rollover.
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76 Hijacking Seizing control of a transit vehicle by force. Homicide The killing of one or more human beings by another, including the following: Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter: The willful • (nonnegligent)
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77 Other An individual who is neither a transit passenger, transit facility occupant, employee/other worker at a transit agency, or a trespasser. Other Assault An unlawful attack or attempt by one person upon another in which no weapon was used or that did not result in serious or aggravated injury to the victim.
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78 greater than the rewards. The four key categories of SCP techniques as cited by Clarke and Homel are increasing perceived effort, increasing perceived risks, reducing anticipated rewards, and inducing guilt or shame.
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79 CYBER SECURITY TERMS Source: These cyber security terms are from National Cyber Security Alliance Glossary (http://staysafeonline.org/basics/ glossary.html)
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80 Cookie Cookies are pieces of information generated by a Web server and stored in the user's computer, ready for future access. Cookies are embedded in the HTML information flowing back and forth between the user's computer and the servers.
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81 Flooding Type of incident involving insertion of a large volume of data resulting in denial of service. Gateway A bridge between two networks.
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82 Remote Access The hookup of a remote computing device via communication lines such as ordinary phone lines or wide area networks to access network applications and information. Replicator Any program that acts to produce copies of itself.
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83 Vulnerability A weakness in automated system security procedures, technical controls, environmental controls, administrative controls, internal controls, and so on that could be used as an entry point to gain unauthorized access to information or disrupt critical processing. Web Bugs Web bugs are HTML elements, often in the form of image tags that retrieve information from a remote website.
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