Public Transportation Passenger Security Inspections: A Guide for Policy Decision Makers (2007) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 40-66
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From page 40... ...
40 Introduction One of the important security decisions transit agencies face is whether to deploy PSIs as a countermeasure to protect their systems against terrorism. When used as a part of an overall systems security approach, PSIs can offer significant benefits that provide a more secure operating environment, even in the open access framework that typifies transit systems.
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41 • Intelligent video technology – Facial recognition – Gait/behavior detection (emerging) – Integrated with radiological detection (emerging)
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42 2. If inspections are to be instituted, establishing the policy and developing accompanying protocols; and 3.
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43 injuries or fatalities. Toxic fumes produced by burning fuel, oil, plastics, and some paints are a serious health threat and may cause death.
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44 Violent Confrontations/Hostage Situations Violent confrontations and hostage situations are common on transit systems throughout the world. These confrontations include assaults and robberies within transit vehicles or at transit facilities, which may result in casualties, property loss and damage, and hostage taking.
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45 a limited time, that agency may consider conducting PSIs in a limited range of stations for a limited period of time (as in Boston in 2004) .100 Following the initial risk assessment, the transit agency may determine that the risk to passenger-vulnerable assets is so low -- both currently and under any reasonably foreseeable future circumstances -- as to warrant no further action concerning PSIs.
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46 The PSI method to be used for primary inspections and the PSI method to be used for secondary inspections should be described in detail in the agency's policy and protocol. Primary and secondary inspections may or may not include PSI technologies.
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47 threat%20and%20vulnerability%20assessment/additional/ nipc_risk_management_process.pdf) • Jenkins, B
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48 • Medium level of risk -- Use of canine teams; behavioral assessments by trained security personnel and transit staff (e.g., token booth clerks, bus operators, and cleaners) ; intelligent video, including facial recognition; abandoned package recognition; and atypical behavior recognition.
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49 – Performance versus customer acceptance – Operational feasibility versus customer acceptance • Are there defined access points for the system at which inspection personnel or devices can be stationed? – Systems that operate on the honor method do not have turnstiles and could have difficulty implementing certain PSI methods.
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50 and evaluation of particular models before actual deployment, which may make it difficult to deploy those methodologies quickly. It is highly recommended that even technologies that are proven in airports and other environments be tested under the agency's specific operating conditions.
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51 – False acceptance rate – False alarm rate • Health issues – Whether equipment emits any radiation or in any way affects health of operators or persons inspected – Whether state law allows nonmedical use of radiation equipment on people – Whether state law requires licensing of technicians to operate the type of equipment being evaluated – Whether state law requires certification and subsequent inspections of the type of equipment being evaluated • Cost – Unit cost – Installation – Life cycle – Operation and maintenance – Labor – Training – Infrastructure modification • Maintenance requirements – Ease of use, including number of personnel required for operation and training required for proficiency Based on the parameter assessment and review of the operational ramifications of various PSI methods, the agency may then determine whether certain types of PSI methods should be eliminated from consideration. Such methods need not be subject to legal analysis, although it is recommended that the agency document its reasons for eliminating methods from consideration.
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52 Below, in "Legal Ramifications of PSI Methods," general potential legal liability for each potential PSI method and ways to mitigate such exposure are summarized. For each method, training on necessary protocols is likely to mitigate liability.
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53 Notice does not include divulging operational aspects of the program, such as precisely when inspections will take place or the standards the agency uses to set inspection intervals or locations. Even for suspicion-based inspections, tying the inspections to clearly articulated threats and limiting the scope of the inspection to the threat should serve to mitigate Fourth Amendment liability.
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54 initiated transaction, this kind of inspection should be considered minimally intrusive for Fourth Amendment purposes. • Tort -- Potentially basis for invasion of privacy claim, risk extremely low.
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55 not to read any material in passenger bags will minimize privacy claims as well as intrusiveness. Handheld trace detectors.
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56 • Tort -- Potentially basis for invasion of privacy claim; risk relatively low. Possible health risks.
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57 It is critical to note that the purpose need not be the actual apprehension of terrorists. The New York City Container Inspection Program (CIP)
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58 inspections and thereby enhance their constitutionality. These include the following: • Having a designated screening area -- a separate, but open, clearly visible area (courts should consider that such an arrangement reduces passengers' apprehension and the stigma of being searched)
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changing inspection locations and not leave that decision to the inspecting officers' discretion. Providing Adequate Notice/Opportunity to Avoid Inspection Notice of the inspection and opportunity to avoid it will enter into an assessment of the reasonableness of the inspection.
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60 • Specify training that could be delivered in a cost-effective way before the need to deploy inspection. Mitigation Measures As indicated above, in developing its protocols, the transit agency should consider measures that will mitigate any potential legal liability.
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61 such as precisely when inspections will take place or the standards the agency uses to set inspection intervals or locations. Deploying explosives detection canines also poses the risk that the canine may attack a passenger.
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62 Decision Makers (includes recommendations for putting together proposals for outsourcing canine teams and sample standards) 106 (http://www.trb.org/news/ blurb_detail.asp?
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63 • Availability (reliability) – Mean-time-between-failure and is calculated by using the following formula: uptime/(uptime + downtime)
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64 Physical inspections. NYCT and NJ TRANSIT have experience with measuring performance.
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65 • Verification to verify the performance of a deployed unit (it would be performed in the airport) ; • Monitoring to verify critical system parameters (monitoring would be done at specified intervals using test articles to ensure that unit performance is unchanged)
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66 presence of another dog. Once trained, the team will need to continue in-service training and also conduct training exercises to maintain proficiency and certification.
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