Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (1994) / Chapter Skim
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Chapter 7: Recommendations
Chapter 7: Recommendations
Pages 223-230
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From page 223... ...
The committee recommends that the United States and Russia pursue long-term plutonium disposition options that: (a) minimize the time during which the plutonium is stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons; 223
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From page 224... ...
The committee recommends that the United States pursue new international arrangements to improve safeguards and physical security over all forms of plutonium and HEU worldwide. In particular, new cooperative efforts to improve security and accounting for all fissile materials in the former Soviet Union should be an urgent priority.
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From page 225... ...
· The United States should continue providing assistance for a Russian fissile material storage facility, which should be designed to consolidate all excess weapons materials at a single site, to facilitate security and international momtorlng. · Plutonium from dismantled weapons should continue to be stored as intact pits for now.
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From page 226... ...
· Disposition options beyond storage should be pursued only if they reduce overall security risks compared to leaving the material in storage, considering both the final form of the material and the risks of the various processes re
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From page 227... ...
· The United States and Russia should begin discussions with the aim of agreeing that whatever disposition options are chosen, an agreed, stringent standard of accounting, monitoring, and security will be maintained throughout the process-coming as close as practicable to meeting the standard of security and accounting applied to intact nuclear weapons. · Disposition options should be designed to transform the weapons plutonium into a physical form that is at least as inaccessible for weapons use as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium that exists in spent fuel from commercial nuclear reactors.
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From page 228... ...
3. Advanced reactors should not be specifically developed or built for transforming weapons plutonium into spent fuel, because that aim can be achieved more rapidly, less expensively, and more surely using existing or evolutionary reactor types.
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From page 229... ...
The committee recommends a comprehensive approach at a significantly higher level of funding, with an emphasis on cooperation in addressing the most immediate risks. Western countries, including the United States, should press Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to take a number of steps urgently, and should be willing to provide necessary equipment and funds for these purposes.
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From page 230... ...
. security for fissile materials in the United States and Russia should set a standard for a regime for improved management of such materials in civilian use throughout the world.
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