Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (1994) / Chapter Skim
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Chapter 4: Declarations and Dismantlement
Chapter 4: Declarations and Dismantlement
Pages 87-110
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From page 87... ...
cooperative measures to confirm and clarify those declarations; 3. agreed, monitored subtractions from the stocks available for military use, including: · monitored warhead dismantlement, · commitments never again to use agreed quantities of fissile materials for weapons purposes, · safeguarded storage and long-term disposition of excess fissile material stocks, and 87
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From page 88... ...
and secure, safeguarded storage of excess fissile materials (discussed in the next chapter) , will be essential building blocks of this larger regime.
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From page 89... ...
But measures focused only on these excess stocks would leave the size and status of the other stocks unknown. Creating a broader regime covering the total stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials would make clear that this total stock was of legitimate interest to the world community and would have the following specific benefits: · Strengthening Current Arms Reduction Agreements: Measures to verifiably eliminate the warheads to be retired under recent arms agreements, monitor the resulting fissile material, and build confidence that there were not other large, unmonitored stocks of excess weapons and materials available would substantially strengthen the arms reduction regime, complementing the limits on launchers in the Strategic Arms Reduction treaties (START I and START II)
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From page 90... ...
Applying strict standards of security and accounting to excess fissile materials resulting from arms reductions could provide the base for setting similar standards for civilian fissile materials worldwide (see below)
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From page 91... ...
Secrecy in this area has affected not only security debates but environment, safety, and health (ES&H) discussions as well, since the United States and Russia have been reluctant to release ES&H information that might provide details of weapons or fissile material production.
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From page 92... ...
A regime based on cooperation in nuclear reductions, combined with appropriate incentives for accomplishing particular tasks (such as warhead dismantlement and secure management of warheads and fissile materials) could provide these organizations with a new and compelling mission to replace their old tasks and with the resources needed to carry it out.
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From page 93... ...
In May 1993 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Warren Christopher acknowledged that no action had yet been taken to implement the Biden Condition, but indicated that the administration intends to fill this gap. A In particular, a range of information related to the size and location of all parts of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, and information related to the weapons components-specifically the amount of fissile material they contain could be declassified as part of the regime proposed here.
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From page 94... ...
Russian officials have expressed differing views concerning the different parts of such a regime. On February 12, 1992, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, in a comprehensive statement to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, called for "a reciprocal exchange of data between all nuclear powers on the number and types of existing nuclear weapons, the amount of fissionable matenals, and on nuclear weapons production, storage, and elimination facilities." This proposal, however, was never pursued by either side, and officials at MINATOM and other agencies ~ To verify warhead dismantlement at existing facilities, a single perimeter-portal monitoring system would be needed in Me United States (at Pantex)
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From page 95... ...
IMPLEMENTING A BROAD REGIME Fissile materials and nuclear weapons have a complex life cycle including mining, milling, processing, and enrichment of uranium; production of plutonium in special reactors; separation of the plutonium from the highly radioactive "targets" from those reactors; fabrication of fissile material weapons components; assembly of nuclear weapons from these and other components; deployment of nuclear weapons; retirement and disassembly of nuclear weapons; and storage and eventual disposition of fissile matenals.~3 The regime envisioned in this report would apply a variety of measures to different parts of this life cycle. The measures involved should be seen as mutually reinforcing, working together to build confidence that the information exchanged was accurate and that the goals of the effort were being met.
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From page 96... ...
Consideration would have to be given to how and in what sequence the various categories of weapons and fissile materials should be addressed. In addition, declarations would include locations of stockpiles, as well as descriptions of plutonium production and uranium enrichment plants, facilities for fabricating fissile material weapons components, and nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facilities.
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From page 97... ...
Power consumption at enrichment facilities, heat output from production reactors, and similar data have helped round out the picture of fissile material production. Intelligence has also provided some information on which to base estimates of nuclear weapons production and deployment.
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From page 98... ...
Ultimately, while no combination of intelligence and examination of books and facilities could ever prove that declarations were complete, it could go a long way in building confidence and any effort to hide a large stockpile that was not very carefully prepared, so that all the false information provided matched the physical state of existing facilities in a consistent way, would stand a substantial probability of detection. There is also the possibility of secret facilities producing fissile materials or weapons.
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From page 99... ...
A Fissile Material Production Cutoff Similarly, if agreed transfers of fissile materials to civilian stocks are to be a useful arms control measure, it is important to ensure that new military fissile materials are not produced to replace them. Combined with the monitored transfer of large quantities of existing materials to peaceful purposes, cutting off production of fissile material for weapons would provide a demonstrable sign of progress in arms reduction, capping and reducing the total potential size of the nuclear arsenals that could be produced.
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From page 100... ...
Technical means are available to achieve this goal.~7 The committee is convinced that a cutoff of fissile material production could be monitored with relative ease by using a combination of national technical means of intelligence and inspections of fissile material facilities. Such facilities could be placed under IAEA safeguards comparable to those in place in non-nuclear-weapon states; this would allow a global cutoff agreement to be nondiscriminating.
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From page 101... ...
As the Clinton administration's September 27, 1993, statement on nonproliferation policy put it, world stocks of fissile materials should be "subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability." Declarations of weapons holdings should be made by all the declared nuclear-weapon states, while declarations of fissile material holdings should ultimately include all states.~9 Such universal reporting of stocks of fissile material, which should include information on all imports and exports of fissile materials, would complement the information that the non-nuclear-weapon parties to the NET are already required to give to the IAEA, providing a substantially firmer base for planning international fissile material management policy, which will remain an essential aspect of nonproliferation. Similarly, as additional states come to participate in nuclear arms reductions, arrangements comparable to those described in this chapter for monitoring subtractions from their stockpiles and committing excess fissile materials to non-weapons use or disposal should be put in place.
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From page 102... ...
Such a first step would go a long way toward limiting the potential for a nuclear arms race on the South Asian subcontinent. At the same time, the stringent standards of security and accounting that should be set for storage and processing of excess fissile materials from weapons (see Chapter 5)
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From page 103... ...
The weapons components resulting from dismantlement are either stored, destroyed, disposed of as waste, or processed to recover valuable materials. The plutonium weapons components, known as pits, are currently being placed in intermediate storage at Pantex, while the highly enriched uranium components are being shipped to the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where they can be stored or processed for use as nuclear fuel in naval or civilian reactors.
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From page 104... ...
24 Testimony of Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Senate Government Whirs Committee, February 24, 1993 (transcript, Federal News Service)
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From page 105... ...
funding of a fissile material storage site in Russia will both specify that the material involved must come from dismantled weapons (though measures to verify this will be limited or nonexistent)
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From page 106... ...
In principle, perimeter-portal monitoring could simply be imposed on such joint assembly and disassembly facilities, thereby monitoring both dismantlement and assembly at the same time. Both incoming and outgoing weapons could be counted, with the difference being credited as disassembled weapons; the fissile material content of the weapons components leaving the PPM enclosure and going into safeguarded storage could be assayed after exit; and nonfissile components could be brought into and out of the facility in opaque containers, with the 27 Under the INF treaty, the United States has a PPM installation at the Russian Votkinsk missile production facility, to ensure dlat prohibited SS-20 INF missiles are not produced there.
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From page 107... ...
Information concerning the design of weapons types to be retained in active service, for example, may be more sensitive than the design of weapons being retired. The problem of protecting sensitive information related to the nonfissile components flowing into the assembly operation would be reduced.
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From page 108... ...
DOE is making progress in setting up mechanisms to meet these needs. Nevertheless, public involvement is currently embryonic and in need of further developments RECOMMENDATIONS The committee has deliberately included consideration of both dismantle ment and declarations in a single chapter, since both are critical to the creation of a meaningful future control regime encompassing all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials.
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From page 109... ...
· Information concerning the total stockpiles of weapons and fissile materials, and those weapons characteristics necessary for external monitoring, should be declassified as part of this transparency regime. Appropriate reviews to prepare for such declassification should be initiated promptly.
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