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From page 56... ... 56 Chapter 4 Transportation Operations Cyber Systems Introduction Along with other sectors of the nation's critical infrastructure, over the past three decades the surface transportation sector has gradually added various operations technologies that augment – and in many cases interoperate with – existing back office enterprise data systems and also newer customer-focused internet applications. Some of these technologies, such as rail crossing signals, were adapted from earlier Industrial Control System (ICS) Read the entire page →
From page 57... ... 57 computing architectures (i.e., mainframe, client/server, Web 1.0 to Web 4.0 and mobile) and at least two generations of control system architectures (i.e., analog and digital) Read the entire page →
From page 58... ... 58 Two conclusions derived from this discussion offer essential cautions: 1. No "one-size-fits-all" cybersecurity program, technology or training exists or can ever be developed; each agency must determine, deploy and operate countermeasures unique to its local circumstance. Read the entire page →
From page 59... ... 59 process or required by regulation. Loss of data confidentiality (i.e., cyber theft) Read the entire page →
From page 60... ... 60 persistent data for subsequent post-storm analysis and modeling. Another hybrid application uses smartphones as smart keys working with smart locks installed in vehicles and buildings. Read the entire page →
From page 61... ... 61 cascading interdependencies that inadvertently increase the attack surface of both systems; • Role/responsibility, knowledge/skill/training and other gaps/overlaps between the IT and ICS communities are emerging creating cultural/procedural conflicts Unlike IT systems, where possible incidents may result in disrupted business operations or loss of information, ICS may face the following incidents: • Blocked or delayed flow of information through ICS networks, which could disrupt ICS operation; • Unauthorized changes to instructions, commands, or alarm thresholds, which could damage, disable, or shut down equipment, create environmental impacts, and/or endanger human life; • Inaccurate information sent to system operators, either to disguise unauthorized changes, or to cause the operators to initiate inappropriate actions, which could have various negative effects; • ICS software or configuration settings modified, or ICS software infected with malware, which could have various negative effects; • Interference with the operation of equipment protection systems, which could endanger costly and difficult-to-replace equipment and imperil maintenance staff; • Interference with the operation of safety systems, which could endanger human life. (NIST Special Pub 800-82, Revision 2, Draft 2015) Read the entire page →
From page 62... ... 62 delays while the risk impacts for ICS systems are regulatory non-compliance, environmental impacts and loss of life or equipment. For ICS, field devices are a particular cybersecurity concern as many of them are installed in publically accessible locations with little or no physical protection from malicious actions, natural disasters, or from the effects of exposure to the harsh environment of the roadside or roadway. Read the entire page →
From page 63... ... 63 Table 4: Differences Between IT vs. ICS (Source: NIST SP-800-82 Rev 2 Draft, 2015) Read the entire page →
From page 64... ... 64 System Operation Systems are designed for use with typical operating systems Upgrades are straightforward with the availability of automated deployment tools Differing and possibly proprietary operating systems, often without security capabilities built in Software changes must be carefully made, usually by the component manufacturer because of the specialized control algorithms and perhaps the modified hardware and software involved Resource Constraints Systems are specified with enough resources to support the addition of third-party applications such as security solutions Systems are designed to support the intended industrial process and may not have enough memory or computing resources to support the addition of security capabilities Communications Standard communications protocols Primarily wired networks with some localized wireless capabilities Typical IT networking practices Many proprietary and standard communication protocols Several types of communications media used including dedicated wire and wireless (radio and satellite) Networks are complex and sometimes require the expertise of control or signal engineers Change Management Software changes are applied in a timely fashion in the presence of good security policy and procedures. Read the entire page →
From page 65... ... 65 cybersecurity profiles. The following table outlines key differences between IT and ICS cybersecurity aspects. Read the entire page →
From page 66... ... 66 Highways Operational Systems Beginning with the 1986 USDOT Intelligent Vehicle Highway System initiative - later recast in the 1991 ISTEA legislation as Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) - the USDOT and its stakeholder partners in government and industry have aggressively pursued the deployment of "electronic and IT applications" to improve transportation safety, enhance mobility and promote environmental sustainability. Read the entire page →
From page 67... ... 67 Figure 12: National ITS Architecture 7.1 - Transportation Layer+ . Source: USDOT ITS Joint Program Office Figure 13: ITS Security Architecture. Read the entire page →
From page 68... ... 68 1. Information (i.e., Data) Read the entire page →
From page 69... ... 69 • Unauthorized physical entry. In addition, physical design of the TMC and TMC policies (such as allowing public tours) Read the entire page →
From page 70... ... 70 This section presents certain Transit Operational Systems including Control and Communications Systems. Readers are cautioned that the information provided is of a general nature and may not apply to all installations. Read the entire page →
From page 71... ... 71 • emergency notification • emergency ventilation systems • fare sales/collection • fire detection/alarms/fire suppression • grade crossings • lighting • passenger information systems • people-moving systems (elevators, escalators, people movers) • police dispatch • pumping systems • signals and train control • ticketing systems • traction power • vertical lift devices (elevators, escalators) Read the entire page →
From page 72... ... 72 Typically, central office (control center) equipment offers supervision, monitoring and dispatch functions; train controllers manage train movement and schedules; and field equipment supplies logic controls. Read the entire page →
From page 73... ... 73 Surface radio systems allow surface communications with maintenance and other nonrevenue vehicles. Surface vehicle radio systems allow communications between vehicle operators and the control center. Read the entire page →
From page 74... ... 74 Fare collection systems are used not only for revenue collection purposes but for ridership counts as well. These systems can include the following equipment and technologies: fare boxes, automated passenger counters, fare validators, entry/exit gates, handicapped-accessible gates, emergency gates, GPS, radio systems, ticket vending machines, ticket office machines, and parking machines. Read the entire page →
From page 75... ... 75 these systems as they are interconnected and serve many users. System Boundaries and Interfaces All system boundaries and interfaces to other systems should be identified, catalogued, and secured. Read the entire page →
From page 76... ... 76 • Dynamic Mobility Applications Environment • AERIS • Road Weather Applications Fifty billion connected vehicles are anticipated to be on the road within a decade. Accompanying these vehicles will be Machine to Machine (M2M) Read the entire page →
From page 77... ... 77 Warning. (Robert Sheehan, Connected Vehicle Research Program Presentation, ITSJPO, USDOT) Read the entire page →
From page 78... ... 78 can mitigate these issues. The public transportation, freight carriers, taxis, and emergency responders use fleet management systems, automated vehicle location (AVL) Read the entire page →
From page 79... ... 79 critical systems and therefore availability and integrity are paramount. While legacy OT was isolated, next generation OT is not. Read the entire page →
From page 80... ... 80 individual financial data and location-based data to hackers. Also, compromised data can result in no or incorrect maintenance alerts being issued to drivers and vehicle owners. Read the entire page →

From page 56...

... 56 Chapter 4 Transportation Operations Cyber Systems Introduction Along with other sectors of the nation's critical infrastructure, over the past three decades the surface transportation sector has gradually added various operations technologies that augment – and in many cases interoperate with – existing back office enterprise data systems and also newer customer-focused internet applications. Some of these technologies, such as rail crossing signals, were adapted from earlier Industrial Control System (ICS)