Exploring Encryption and Potential Mechanisms for Authorized Government Access to Plaintext Proceedings of a Workshop (2016) / Chapter Skim
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7 Wrap-Up Session
7 Wrap-Up Session
Pages 39-48
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From page 39... ...
Matt Blaze agreed with Bankston's comments from a technical perspective and posited that the costs of an exceptional access mandate would be enormous. He pointed to the 1990s, when a tremendous amount of effort spent trying to resolve this debate served as a distraction and discouraged the development of critical security infrastructure that could have prevented a large fraction of the digital crimes seen today.
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From page 40... ...
He added that it is critically important to national security and to our public safety that the government not discourage, but instead encourage, the use of the most robust security technology for our increasingly digital world. Daniel Kahn Gillmor echoed Blaze's sentiment on the significant downside of exceptional access.
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From page 41... ...
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF ENCRYPTION AND ACCESS MECHANISMS Kerr referred to earlier comments made by Chris Inglis and James Baker, who said that some form of international coordination about how to approach exceptional access mandates is necessary to make such strategies even remotely effective. He noted that this requirement significantly raises the level of difficulty of the task, making a solution even more unlikely.
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From page 42... ...
For example, the device encryption issue is primarily, but not exclusively, a criminal law issue at the federal, state, and local levels more than a national security issue. Commenting on the recommendation to increase FBI funding for technical capabilities, specifically computer network exploitation, James Burrell reminded attendees that computer network exploitation is by no means a singular solution to this challenge.
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From page 43... ...
He also said it was "pleasantly surprising" to hear more from government attendees regarding the issues of collective security versus individual security, instead of framing the issue as being about choices in business models. Sherman pointed to a blog post by Columbia University computer scientist Steve Bellovin in July 2014, "What Spies Do,"2 that summarizes some of the differences between the law enforcement sector and the national security sector, including places where behavior that is acceptable in one sector is totally unacceptable in the other because of differences in function, levels of proof required, and so forth.
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From page 44... ...
Telemetry data should also be part of the conversation about access to data, and what types of exceptional access there should be to certain types of data. "The way we think about data that is part of the relationship between the user and service providers, for example, is getting increasingly more complex," he said, noting that labeling all these types of data as metadata glosses over categories of data that may be useful or sometimes a bad thing, in a collective environment.
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From page 45... ...
In closing, Cate noted the exceptional collection of people who participated in the workshop: senior representatives from the FBI, senior representatives from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, senior representatives from industry, and many of the leading lights in academia. Remarking that the workshop represented an extraordinarily important moment, he expressed his hope that it was just the beginning of a longer process.
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From page 47... ...
Appendixes
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