National Security Space Defense and Protection Public Report (2016) / Chapter Skim
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2 Selected Issues Related to National Security Space Defense and Protection
2 Selected Issues Related to National Security Space Defense and Protection
Pages 27-44
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From page 27... ...
and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellite imagery, plus mobile phone reports, to track the progress of the severe annual flooding and monsoon rains that caused so many casualties in the past.
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From page 28... ...
Unless otherwise noted, therefore, "space asset" refers to the entire system comprising the physical satellite, data uplink and downlink systems, ground stations, and information processing and distribution. Space assets are characterized as providing three broad categories of information service: commu 2 Speaking at a space policy forum, Bruce MacDonald of the United States Institute of Peace offered a useful analogy for thinking about the loss of space to U.S.
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From page 29... ...
security and how threats to it are characterized. A framework is then provided for evaluating space defense, which is necessary but not sufficient for space security.
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, Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Pursuant to Public Law 106-65, January 11, 2001. 5 Executive Office of the President, National Space Policy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., June 28, 2010.
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From page 31... ...
public perception and space security requirements is problematic in that it ob structs discussion and analysis of the practicalities of space defense, the costs and trade-offs involved, the implications of the loss of these systems and what to do, defensively and offensively, to protect them. This is not a trivial or solely political issue.
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From page 32... ...
Secrecy impedes robust professional debate and publication; inhibits public diplomacy; and degrades cross-domain synergies, such as between air and space programs. Unlike other crucial national security activities, such as the protection of submarine capabilities, space protection and defense activities necessarily involve the sharing of information and coordination of action with civil, commercial, and international actors.
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From page 33... ...
For example, the RAND National Space Launch Report breaks down communications services into wideband, protected, and narrowband, with a fourth group of data-relay satellites supporting each of these; it breaks down observation satel lites into those used for reconnaissance, for missile warning and defense, and for weather monitoring (F. McCartney, P.A.
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From page 34... ...
DEFENDING AND PROTECTING NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ASSETS: SPACE DEFENSE TRIAD The 2011 National Security Space Strategy calls for a "multi-layered approach to prevent and deter aggression" against space systems (Box 2-1) .11 The security objectives laid out in that strategy suggest a framework of three interrelated means of defending U.S.
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The second element comprises deterrence mes saging measures. The final element of the space defense triad is establishment of coalitions, and international space regimes and norms of behavior that impose Deterrence, Stimson Center, Washington., D.C., September 2013.)
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From page 36... ...
Of the three, system protection measures appear to have received the most attention and funding. As one component of a defense triad, system protection involves upgrading current systems where possible, and constructing future systems to be more survivable and thus less vulnerable to collision, interference, or attack.
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From page 37... ...
space systems either be cause there is no value in doing so or the actual or threatened cost of doing so is too high.14 It is served by both system protection measures and participation in the development of international regimes governing space. Importantly, the suc cess of deterrence measures against attacks on U.S.
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An adversary that does not fear being caught has much greater latitude for action. This requires that potential adversaries believe that the United States maintains the capacity to detect, track, and identify a full range of space objects and to distinguish hostile attack from system failures, space weather, or other natural phenomena.
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From page 39... ...
SSA requirements and capabil ity should not just feature space security policy but should also find their place in national security policy and implementing plans. Additional requirements for the credibility of deterrence messages are that potential adversaries believe that the deterrer has both the capability and the will to respond to an attack once identified.
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Communicating Deterrence Messages What is the deterrence objective with regard to space assets that the United States seeks to communicate?
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The point is, it is essential for national security decision makers to consider the "why" of adversary behavior when deterrent threats and possible responses to deterrence failure are developed.
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From page 42... ...
In par ticular, China and Russia might view the ability to deny the United States use of space as an important means of deterring U.S. conventional military operations, and as a force multiplier in the case that their deterrence efforts fail and they finds themselves in a military conflict with the United States.
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From page 43... ...
As noted, the United States space security actors enjoy partnerships with a wide array of players: commercial operations in the United States and elsewhere; multiple friendly states with substantial interests in peaceful operations in space that parallel our own; nongovernmental organizations, and others. These diverse capabilities support deterrence by providing multiple redundant pathways for the performance of vital space services, reducing the vulnerability of the United States.
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From page 44... ...
Indeed, the United States does not unilaterally decide questions about the future security of outer space: We surely have a voice -- arguably the most important single voice -- on those matters, but many stakeholders will participate, and will respond to our words and their own interpretations of our actions. Finally, the fact that the United States is un likely to be fighting alone against peer or near-peer adversaries is important when it considers appropriate space security strategies.
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