Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force (2016) / Chapter Skim
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3 Recommendations and Barriers to Implementation
3 Recommendations and Barriers to Implementation
Pages 23-48
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From page 23... ...
LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE It is clear that a strong sense of shared mission ownership, declared and upheld by senior leadership and shared down the chain of command, is critical to fostering quality program management and successful program outcomes. This section discusses leadership and cultural barriers to owning the technical baseline in Air Force acquisition programs.
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From page 24... ...
In addition, there has been a clear shift in recent years toward a risk-averse culture within the Air Force acquisition community. Over the past two decades the Air Force has adopted a culture of "just saying no," replacing the team-oriented culture of "here is a way to achieve the technical mission and objectives within our legal and ethical bounds."1 A key issue in the Air Force acquisition community is a persistent lack of continuity in the position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ)
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From page 25... ...
The risk-averse culture of Air Force acquisition is overned g primarily by process compliance, the cost of which is estimated to account for nearly 25 percent of every dollar spent.3 The high level of oversight4 in place 3 The Honorable Stan Soloway, President and CEO, Professional Services Council, interview with the committee on January 14, 2016. 4 The Under Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Frank Kendall said in his memorandum "Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0 -- Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence and Innovation," section "Streamline documentation and staff review" the following: "In [Better Buying Power]
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From page 26... ...
Engineers in the Air Force have a voice, but they often do not have a vote.7 These practices are in contrast to the acquisition era prior to TSPR, when engineers not only had a voice and a vote but often were the prime assessors of program technical risk and the associated cost, schedule, and performance risk. CONCLUSION 2: The current risk-averse culture, along with the gap in tech nical engineering expertise within Air Force acquisition programs, hinders program managers from making informed, timely, and independent decisions.
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From page 27... ...
WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT The following discussion of workforce management addresses the need to adequately staff technical positions within the Air Force, as well as the need for consistent and continuous management in key programmatic roles, sound career management practices to retain engineering and acquisition talent, and the use of appropriate contracting vehicles to support the technical workforce where neces sary. In addition, widely recognized best practices in both the federal agencies and industry are available for the Air Force to consider and employ.
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From page 28... ...
This gradual loss, as evident in Figure 3.2, in some cases led the Air Force to assign personnel who lack the necessary technical education or expertise to the role of PEO or PM, handing over control of the tech nical baseline to prime defense contractors.11 Accordingly, the duties of technically trained Air Force personnel have evolved -- once directly engaged in technical work, they now primarily monitor contractors doing that work. The Under Secretary of Defense's April 2015 memorandum to the Services on "Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0 -- Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence and Innovation," provides guidance to strengthen organic engineering capabilities.
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From page 29... ...
• Weapon System Cyber Resiliency 10,000 • Reestablish engineering & other • AF "owned the competencies – be the Lead System Technical Baseline" Integrator 20.0 • Strong Organic • Increased Modeling/Sim & Analysis Functional • Independent Technical & 5,000 Capability • Acquisition Downsizing/Lightning Bolts/Streamlining Programmatic Reviews • Owned Technical • OEM/Contractors "owned the Technical Baseline" • Product Support Integrator 10.0 Data • OEM – Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) • Cost Capability Analysis -- Portfolio • Product Support • Elimination of Mil Specs and Standards Affordability Trades Integrator • • ~$1B/year Contractor Support/Knowledge Based Service Reductions Multi-domain Integration 0 0.0 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 50% increase in program $ executed 47% decrease in professional LCM acquisition workforce FIGURE 3.2 Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC)
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From page 30... ...
Owing to the resource constraints and the fact that acquisition programs in the Air Force are in different stages of their development; have varying contract mechanisms and end products; and have various ranges of technical complexity, there is no "silver bullet" for fixing the issue of owning the technical baseline. CONCLUSION 3: The USAF is "over-programmed," and its organic technical workforce is critically understaffed.
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From page 31... ...
could easily fund the essential growth in numbers and retention of engineers and technical personnel necessary to regaining technical capabilities in the USAF workforce.22 CONCLUSION 4: The Air Force currently lacks personnel stability, driven by personnel rotation and lengths of assignments, in its program offices, thus impacting program knowledge management within the program office. RECOMMENDATION 4: The Air Force should review, and make appropri ate changes to, current assignment policies and practices for the acquisition workforce to reduce turnover and attrition and increase succession and transi 20 Douglas L
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From page 32... ...
We should also not expect a Program Manager with no technical education or experience in engineering to supervise a development program.23 The Air Force Officer Classification Directory24 (AFOCD) describes the Air Force's Acquisition Utilization Field25 as encompassing "staff and management functions peculiar to the Air Force acquisition life cycle." The directory continues as follows: It is desirable that entry into the career field be preceded by assignment in another utiliza tion field whenever possible.
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From page 33... ...
While the data presented above confirm the previously discussed decline in the number of Air Force 62XX and 63XX officers, they pertain only to the education levels of those officers and do not account for past technical experience. The com mittee heard anecdotal evidence that, until the 1980s, the desire for assignments in other utilization career fields prior to entry into the Acquisition Utilization Field (63XX)
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From page 34... ...
Academic education levels and experience in other assignments prior to enter ing acquisition career fields fail to account for experience outside of the Air Force. The Education with Industry (EWI)
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Additionally, a robust career path for USAF civilian engineers and program managers should be established that supports their critical importance to the successful execution of acquisition programs through ownership of the technical baseline. Program managers should generally be selected from the engineering and technical workforce.
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In a March 20, 2014, memorandum,34 the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) commander mandated the use within AFLCMC of the Engineering, Professional, and Administrative Support Services (EPASS)
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As discovered in both the OTB Workshop report and during the study inter views conducted by the committee, the authorities and accountabilities of the PM as they relate to the authorities and accountabilities of the contracting officer (CO) are currently causing dysfunctional, as opposed to creative, tension, which is negatively impacting government acquisition team effectiveness in the Air Force.
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From page 38... ...
Interviewees commented on how the Air Force contracting community's cur rent approach to technical acquisition has fostered an atmosphere of top-down intererence that increases the risk to program goals and objectives. Several PEOs f and retired executives38 commented on the historical and current state of the rela tionship between Air Force program managers and contracting officers, citing "egregious behavior" on the part of contracting teams, and questioning their com mitment to providing the best acquisition deal possible for the Air Force program.
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From page 39... ...
Lines of Authority DoD 5000.01 establishes a clear program management line of authority (PM LoA) that begins with the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE)
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From page 40... ...
NOTE: AFLCMC, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center; AFRCO, Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office; DRU, Direct Reporting Unit; HQ AFICA, Headquarters Air Force Installation Contracting Agency; MAJCOM, Major Command; SMC, Space and Missile Systems Center. within those boundaries.
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From page 41... ...
CONCLUSION 8: The Air Force does not currently possess an adequate pro gram management governance structure that specifies clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability for members of the government acquisition team. Additionally, Air Force PEOs and PMs are not mandatory participants in Business Clearance or Contract Clearance sessions, even though the negotia tion objectives, key contract terms and conditions, and the nature of the deal are largely set in these sessions.
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From page 42... ...
Additionally, the Air Force should revise the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to make it clear that Air Force program executive officers and PMs, or their designated representa tives, are mandatory participants in business clearance and contract clearance sessions. Program management and contracting personnel should be trained in implementation of the guidance.
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From page 43... ...
The above issues between program officers and contracting officers have con tributed to an ongoing erosion of trust and, in several cases, an adversarial relation ship between the PM and CO, which has proven highly detrimental both to the acquisition process and to meeting mission needs. Lowest Price, Technically Acceptable During the data-gathering meetings, the committee heard several examples of dissatisfaction with the indiscriminate use of the LPTA source selection as a contracting methodology.
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From page 44... ...
42 Under Secretary of Defense, "Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Effi ciency and Productivity in Defense Spending," Memorandum for Defense Acquisition Workforce, November 13, 2012, http://bbp.dau.mil/doc/USD-ATL%20Memo%2013Nov12%20-%20BBP%20 2.0%20Introduction.pdf, p.
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From page 45... ...
The committee heard evidence that the Air Force was already in the process of realigning funding for development of the acquisition workforce.43 The use of 43 Appendix D contains a memorandum from the Commander of AFLCMC to the study committee that highlights current activities at AFLCMC.
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From page 46... ...
Additionally, the Assis ant Secretary of the t Air Force for Acquisition should require program managers to include in their program financial plan such a budget, as necessary, to fully fund the in-house technical effort. The committee heard additional evidence of other Air Force efforts to address funding issues that relate to the Air Force's ability to own the technical baseline of its acquisition programs.
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From page 47... ...
Owning the technical baseline is a critical component of the Air Force's ability to regain and maintain acquisition excellence. There are definitely very professional PEOs and PMs who are performing well in spite of the barriers, but it is clear that the USAF needs to take immediate steps to emphasize the value of its acquisition professionals, ensure sustained leadership within the acquisition community, reinforce the PM's authority and accountability, clarify the role of the contracting officer vis-à-vis the PM, strengthen and expand the technical knowledge base and expertise of the acquisition workforce, and continue to eliminate barriers and avoid creating new ones.
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