The Role of Experimentation Campaigns in the Air Force Innovation Life Cycle (2016) / Chapter Skim
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3 Experimentation for Innovation: Current Air Force Practice
3 Experimentation for Innovation: Current Air Force Practice
Pages 48-59
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From page 48... ...
The committee discovered a very clear valley of death problem in the USAF, but when it came to finding the combination of push and pull needed to cross the valley, the committee found a situation that differs importantly from the highly innovative organizations it had studied. In a nutshell, the committee found some examples of the pull needed to get innovations across the valley of death, but it also found evidence of pushback from a powerful normal production organization.
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From page 49... ...
When an acquisition program seeks to keep to its schedule, or a logistics center works to the drumbeat of production, these are both examples of the programmatic imperative at work in what has been labeled the normal production organization. While it often takes the combined efforts of push and pull to get a technology across the valley of death, research has consistently shown that forces like those associated with the programmatic imperative at work in the normal production organization are often more likely to push back against new technological solu tions than to assist in pulling it across the valley of death.1 This is especially true of the more disruptive innovations, because, by definition, disruptive innovations place at risk the ability of the organization to fulfill its programmatic imperative.2 The combination of push and pull is present when innovations are being of fered as solutions to the operational or economic imperative; advocates of the new solution find ready partners in those looking for better operational or economic solutions.
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From page 50... ...
To underscore USAF support of experimentation campaigns as well as future develop ment planning efforts, including future ECCTs, the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force signed the Charter for Air Force Capability Development on June 2, 2016 (see Appendix D, a complete reprint of the Air Force charter)
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From page 51... ...
office to oversee experimentation activities and a 3-star-level Capability Development Council (CDC) to identify Air Force capability development focus areas and direct SDPE activities to find agile and affordable solutions to identified challenge areas.4 No one thinks the experimentation campaigns described above will supply the scale and scope of experimentation and innovation needed for the USAF overall.
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From page 52... ...
However, in its efforts to avoid these failures, the organization has too often failed to distinguish between them and Edisons. But Edisons are fundamental to scientific progress -- that is why so many innovative organizations operate with the mantra "fail fast." If the USAF is going to achieve the level of experimentation and innovation its leaders' desire, it must learn to distinguish between the two types of failures and encourage Edisons as the one best hope of avoiding Edsels.
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From page 53... ...
EXPERIMENTATION LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION In its research on best practices, the committee discovered that highly inno vative organizations are very consistent in having individuals assigned to the role the committee is calling the "Innovation Catalyst." In short, the essential require ments of an effective Innovation Catalyst include strong and clearly identified ownership, with a sense of personal responsibility for driving experimentation and innovation, and a direct reporting line to the senior leadership. In its research on current practices in the USAF, the committee found indi viduals acting as Innovation Catalysts only in isolated pockets such as Special Operations Forces Acquisition Technology and Logistics and the Rapid Capabilities Office.
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From page 54... ...
EXPERIMENTATION PROCESSES AND TOOLS Just as it had when it looked for leaders playing the role of Innovation Catalysts, when it looked for the experimentation processes and tools it had found in highly innovative organizations, the committee found only isolated pockets of excellence. But, these are not enough to deliver the level of innovation the Air Force needs or desires.
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From page 55... ...
Other tools for rapid innovation intended to improve SBIR transition are the following: • The Air Force Rapid Innovation Fund is a congressionally mandated initiative to stimu late innovative technology from small businesses that will transition into defense acquisition programs to resolve operational challenges and address critical national security needs. • The Commercialization Readiness Program is authorized by an amendment in Sec.
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From page 56... ...
Rather than open processes where all interested personnel are invited to participate, participation in the CHOP Shop examples is heavily filtered, allowing only a small number of competitively selected junior personnel to partici pate, and at the end of the competition or activity, those personnel are sent back to their respective units, where they resume business as usual. The once-in-a-lifetime nature of these efforts is a stark contrast to the type of ongoing, enterprise-wide in novation culture that is found in the other highly innovative organizations studied by the committee.
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From page 57... ...
Arguably, require ments and contract deliverables in an early-stage investigative program cannot be the same as in a mature development program, but the same contracting processes and requirements are often applied to both. Contracting and acquisition obviously affect technological innovation, but the committee's interviews pointed to the Air Force's human resource system as having the single strongest negative impact on innovation (Box 3-2)
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From page 58... ...
This may all seem obvious, but in the interviews the committee heard, it was stated on multiple occasions that the Air Force culture does not embrace mavericks, it rejects them. When highly innovative organizations find the rebels who have an innovative, maverick spirit, they manage them as a special, even cherished, resource. In contrast, the Air Force's HR function often stands very much in the way of experimentation and innovation, treating innovators as just one more member of the masses to be processed through the system.
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From page 59... ...
E x p e r i m e n tat i o n for I n n o v a t i o n : C u r r e n t A i r F o r ce P r a c t i ce 59 tors. As explained by one young airman, "If you want us to be more innovative, a good place to start would be to stop finding ways to punish us when we try to do something different." This sentiment is a good lead in to the next chapter, in which the committee considers other steps the Air Force could take to close the gap between best prac tices in highly innovative organizations and current practices in today's Air Force.
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