Dual Use Research of Concern in the Life Sciences Current Issues and Controversies (2017) / Chapter Skim
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 9-22
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strategy for reducing biosecurity risks in life sciences research and considers mechanisms that would allow researchers to manage the dissemination of the results of research while mitigating the potential for harm to national security.1 We begin this report by tracing the development of ideas about the dissemination of scientific information, broadly defined, in the United States. There is a growing tension between a scientific culture based on transparency and the need for secrecy to protect national security.
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While concerns about security risks arising from communication about scientific research fall within the realm of biosecurity, strong biosafety practices promote responsible research practices that provide a foundation for many elements of effective biosecurity. Moreover, research that raises significant biosafety issues may also prompt concerns about potential biosecurity risks.5 3 International Council for Science (ICSU)
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. By the time of the White House announcement in October 2014 of a pause in funding for certain GOF experiments, biosafety and biosecurity concerns were receiving equal weight: "Gain-of-function studies may entail biosafety and biosecurity risks; therefore, the risks and benefits of gain-of-function research must be evaluated, both in the context of recent U.S.
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During the Cold War, the United States and its NATO allies constructed national and international frameworks, including coordinated export control regimes, to prevent advances in Western science and technology from reaching the Soviet Union and its allies. By the late 1990s, incidents such as the bombing at the World Trade Center and the Aum Shinrikyo attacks on the Tokyo subway raised the specter of "mass casualty terrorism," including through the use of biological agents.8 The anthrax mailings in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, thrust bioterrorism into public awareness.
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Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, which became known as the Fink Report after study committee chair Gerald Fink, highlighted a concept of dual use research through its identification of the "dual use dilemma in which the same technologies can be used legitimately for human betterment and misused for bioterrorism." The concept of applying the results of research undertaken for one purpose to other, sometimes controversial, ends was not new. But life scientists were much less familiar with addressing security concerns than their colleagues in the physical sciences and engineering.13 The Fink Report argued for preparedness and made a series of recommendations on the oversight of research that raised potential security concerns.
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government established the National Science Advisory Board for Bio security (NSABB) to assist the federal government in assessing the potential risks of life sciences research and to offer advice to policymakers, research institutions, and researchers about the conduct, oversight, and communication of sensitive research.18 As almost all research in the life sciences could potentially be considered "dual use" and to underscore that only a small set of experiments raise significant issues, the NSABB created a new category of research it described as "dual use research of concern" (DURC)
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. The paper21 was then published with an accompanying editorial in Science, but without the textual changes recommended by the NSABB.22 Another controversial 2005 paper provided a mathematical model of a potential bioterror attack on the food supply through the introduction of otulinum toxin into the milk supply.23 The paper was approved for publicab tion in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS)
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M Tumpey et al., Characterization of September 2005 the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus J
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• s written, the findings described in the A Published in Vaccine manuscript may indeed meet the criterion for dual use research of concern. However, the NSABB noted significant scientific deficiencies with the methodology and with the interpretation of the results of the research, and concluded that if the scientific deficiencies were appropriately addressed, the manuscript would likely not raise significant dual use concerns.
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SOURCE: National Institutes of Health Office of Science Policy, July 1, 2016.
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• he U.S. Government should expeditiously T develop a mechanism to provide controlled access to sensitive scientific information.
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, publisher of multiple journals that seek to "advance the microbiological sciences" (see https://www.asm.org/index.php/journals) , reports that of the manuscripts submitted to the ASM journals Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy; Applied and Environmental Microbiology; Clinical and Vaccine Immunology; Infection and Immunity; Journal of Bacteriology; Journal of Clinical Microbiology; Journal of Virology; mBio; and Molecular and Cellular Biology, those that mention DURC agents are 0.04% annually.
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A small but knowledgeable group of biological and social scientists, policy and security experts, and lawyers in the United States and overseas has become expert in various policy options to address biosecurity. However, most of the biological research community is not aware of these discussions and has not been actively engaged in them.32 CHARGE TO THE COMMITTEE Our committee was charged with reviewing DURC policy and the management of DURC.
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The committee gathered information both at a public information gathering meeting on July 11-12, 2016, and at a public workshop on January 4, 2017. To assist in its deliberations, the committee commissioned papers on a range of topics including biosafety and biosecurity, international approaches to bio security, ethics, export controls, and current government policies on information control.
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