Dual Use Research of Concern in the Life Sciences Current Issues and Controversies (2017) / Chapter Skim
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strategy for reducing biosecurity risks in life sciences research and considers mechanisms that would allow researchers to manage the dissemination of the results of research while mitigating the potential for harm to national security. There is a growing tension between a scientific culture based on transparency and the need for secrecy to protect national security.
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While one might think of dissemination in terms of publication, the committee, with encouragement from the project's sponsors, considered the management of dissemination as occurring along a spectrum from idea generation to the formal publication of research results in journals.5 The committee gathered information both at a public information gathering meeting on July 11-12, 2016, and at a public workshop on January 4, 2017. To assist in its deliberations, the committee commissioned papers on a range of topics including biosafety and biosecurity, international approaches to bio security, ethics, export controls, and current government policies on information control (these papers are available at https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24761 under the Resources tab)
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Scientific information is disseminated through a wide range of means including education, training, presentations and posters at conferences, preprint servers, informal communications, patents, and formal publication. The prevalence of digital information and online transmission and storage of information related to dual use research also makes information increasingly vulnerable to hacking.
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5. Federal policies on DURC reach only a portion of the individuals conducting life sciences research.
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7. The current policy focus and definition of DURC do not capture biosecurity concerns in all relevant areas of life sciences research, especially those that are emerging (e.g., synthetic and systems biology, computational modeling, genome editing, gene drives, neuroscience, the isolation of new micro-organisms and toxins)
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There is no systematic process through which journal editors and researchers outside federally funded institutions can seek guidance from U.S. government experts on the management of manuscripts or on research activities that raise potential biosecurity concerns.
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Expanding these programs beyond a focus solely on specific pathogens could increase the ability of the broader research community to take greater respon sibility for safeguarding dangerous information in ways that do not impede scientific advances.
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CONCLUSION Despite decades of effort, there is little national or international consensus with regard to appropriate policies for addressing issues associated with the conduct and dissemination of life sciences research that might qualify as DURC. The absence of an international commitment to addressing such issues; the lack of agreement regarding a framework for assessing risk, uncertainty, and benefit; and the difficulties the U.S.
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