Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation's Electricity System (2017) / Chapter Skim
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4 Strategies to Prepare for and Mitigate Large-Area, Long-Duration Blackouts
4 Strategies to Prepare for and Mitigate Large-Area, Long-Duration Blackouts
Pages 70-93
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From page 70... ...
However, improved resilience also involves tion of large-area, long-duration outages.1 Although this consideration of the system as a whole, including not just report is predominantly concerned with large-scale outages, the electric infrastructure itself, but also the interdependent many of the preventative approaches described in this chap- infrastructures such as natural gas infrastructure, support ter also decrease the likelihood of small localized outages infrastructure for the supply of other key inputs, and the comand can help limit the spread and impact of small disruptions mercial communications systems used in operating the grid. before major recovery efforts (see Chapter 6)
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From page 71... ...
SOURCE: Courtesy of the Electric Power Research Institute. Graphic reproduced by permission from the Electric Power Research Institute from presentation by Rich Lordan to the NCSL-NARUC Energy Risk & Critical Infrastructure Protection Workshop, Transmission Resiliency & Security: Response to High Impact Low Frequency Threats.
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From page 72... ...
There are, however, many legacy of transmission lines were implemented. However, the veg- facilities located in high hazard areas.
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From page 73... ...
of outage experienced. NOTE: AMI, advanced metering infrastructure.
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From page 74... ...
installed cracked bushings, pre-failure of a capacitor vacuum switch, significant distribution automation technology with a $111 fault-induced conductor slap (in which a fault current in the million grant from the Department of Energy (DOE) through distribution circuit induces magnetic forces in another locaits Smart Grid Investment Grant program (authorized by tion, causing the conductors to slap together)
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From page 75... ...
although growth is concentrated in a few areas and dominated by lithium-ion chemistries. NOTE: CAISO, California Independent System Operator; ERCOT, Electric Reliability Council of Texas.
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From page 76... ...
. October 2015 Aliso Canyon Storage Facility Closure A major gas leak was detected in the Aliso Canyon natural gas storage facility in October 2015, resulting in the facility's closing in early 2016.
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From page 77... ...
. Modeling and simulation occur running the grid (e.g., when implementing adaptive islanding on time frames ranging from real time, in the case of operaor intelligent load shedding schemes)
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From page 78... ...
risk-assessment framework for study of power grid earth quake vulnerabilities. Finding: Enhancing power grid resilience requires being While there has been some progress in creating synthetic able to accurately simulate the impact of a wide variety of models for the physical side of the electric grid, there has severe physical events and malicious cyber attacks on the been very little progress in creating realistic models for power grid.
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From page 79... ...
Finding: A key objective for research and development of are mandatory for operators of the bulk electricity system) simulation tools for improved resilience is shareable access require that the transmission system have enough redundant to realistic models of large-scale electric grids, considering paths to withstand an outage by one major line or other both the grid's physical and cyber infrastructure and, equally important component (NERC, 2005)
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From page 80... ...
of better measurement (advanced metering infrastructure, Although the generation planning criterion of the LOLP distribution management systems, and phasor measurement being 1 day in 10 years assures that the available genera- units) and communication (fiber optics)
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From page 81... ...
This preemptive analysis (and Recommendation 4.5: The Department of Energy, workconfiguring the system to avoid conditions where cascading ing with the utility industry, should develop use cases and failure is a credible outcome) is particularly important because perform research on strategies for intelligent load shedding the speed of cascading failure sequences can often exceed the based on advanced metering infrastructure and customer capability of automatic control responses, especially when technologies like smart circuit breakers.
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From page 82... ...
cyber resilience approaches, distribution system interface with distributed energy resources, supply chain survivability, Commercial Communications Infrastructure intelligent load shedding, and adaptive islanding schemes. Another example of coupled infrastructure is telecom munications.
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From page 83... ...
Any consideration of improved Emergency Response Team website.7 Another good source power grid resilience requires a consideration of improving of information is the Energy Sector Control Systems Workthe resilience of the grid's cyber infrastructure. ing Group's Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Over the past decade, much attention has rightly been Cyber Security (ESCSWG, 2011)
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From page 84... ...
that are resilient to cyber attacks are needed to support It is now, however, becoming apparent that protection cyber resilience. Work during the past decade has resulted alone as a mechanism to achieve cybersecurity is insufficient in "cybersecurity architectures" for the power grid cyber and can never be made perfect.
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From page 85... ...
. States along the hurricane-prone southeastern tunity for continuing federal grants (e.g., the Smart Grid coast are more likely to allow alternative mechanisms to Investment Grant provided to Chattanooga Electric Power finance such investments, including the addition of "riders" Board)
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From page 86... ...
with sufficient warning time to allow system operators to preemptively position the system to be more robust and able to respond to emerging conditions. This often involves curOPERATIONS tailing any avoidable outages that might be caused by main Much can be done in the area of real-time electric grid tenance or other activities, deploying additional reserves to operations to enhance physical and cyber resilience.
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From page 87... ...
That ter monitoring and control of the grid. The design of such is, smart grids could include automatic sectionalizing, smart large-scale, wide-area controllers should be done with islanding to prevent cascading failures, the ability to oper- cyber resilience in mind.
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From page 88... ...
these time frames is the underlying power system dynamics, Understanding of the system is complicated by the fact including the time constants associated with thermal heat- that when a monitor signals a problem, it is unclear whether ing on transmission lines and transformers, the operation of the problem is with the component or sub-system that is load-tap-changing transformers, protective relaying time con- being monitored or with the monitor itself (particularly if stants, and other system limits. Another reason would be the malicious actions might cause erroneous monitor data)
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From page 89... ...
grid's cyber components is less understood. Furthermore, resilience response mechanisms must be scal Human operators will continue to play a key role in able, in order to account for the unique physical and cyber grid operations for decades to come, and they can certainly complexity of the grid and the large volume of monitor data help in the fusion of information.
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From page 90... ...
of control centers. Thus, the health of the control and commu nications systems should also be continuously monitored by Finding: Bulk electric grids are not only some of the world's these control centers.
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From page 91... ...
In operations, the time requirements for both accidental faults and malicious attacks. Best practices response to maintain resilience range from a few millisec- from the dependable computing community and the emergonds (e.g., for protective relays controlling circuit breakers ing cyber resilience community could be employed and that clear faults)
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From page 92... ...
2016. Aliso Canyon Action Plan Energy Risk & Critical Infrastructure Protection Workshop, May 25, to Preserve Gas and Electric Reliability for the Los Angeles Basin.
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From page 93... ...
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. for Smart Grid Cyber Security.
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