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5 Strategies for Reducing the Harmful Consequences from Loss of Grid Power
Pages 94-109

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From page 94...
... As introduced ures is a problem of imagination and incentives. in Chapter 3, the exact form of that planning depends on For shorter-duration outages, electricity users have an the causes of grid failure, because those causes may affect incentive to make their own preparations for resilience.
From page 95...
... Consequently, nuclear sites ety, and government may be needed to anticipate and plan for have multiple redundant sources of backup power, and, in large-scale grid outages. Such a perspective helps to expose the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Nuclear the areas where failures to prepare are most likely -- because Regulatory Commission has required additional investments the incentives to ensure resilience are weakest -- and where in on-site power.2 By contrast, the failure rates at start-up of additional policy action may be needed.
From page 96...
... Microgrids, especially the larger systems, are designed to allow for islanding in the event of macrogrid Recommendation 5.1: State emergency planning authori- failure, although in practice very few actually operate or are ties should oversee a more regular and systematic testing even tested in that mode. Many microgrids embed renewable of backup power generation equipment at critical facilities, power generation systems -- notably solar photovoltaics -- such as hospitals and fire stations, and ensure that public and the financial case for larger microgrids typically hinges safety officials include information related to electrical safety on the integration of natural gas-fired small turbines that and responses to long-duration power outages in their public utilize the waste heat for local heating and cooling.
From page 97...
... If technological systems are actually designed for that purpose and none can improvements make it possible to install much larger systems supply power for periods of several days. Instead, these sys- then such batteries could be material to improving resilience tems are sized to move small amounts of power -- t­ pically y to long-duration grid outages.
From page 98...
... By contrast, when the intervene to encourage additional planning and investment market fails -- for example, when users are unaware of their around responses to grid failure raise many fundamental exposure to grid failure, unaware of the synergistic conse- questions about the proper role of government. If governquences of grid failure, or unable themselves to afford or ment stands ready to provide support in the case of a longrecoup the benefits of actions that could improve resilience duration grid failure, then the well-known "moral hazard" if low probability events occur -- then there may be a need problems could undermine the incentive for users of electric for policy intervention.
From page 99...
... The committee believes that the larg- to such decision making, considerations of broader social est challenges in creating resilience against the full effects disruptions and of equity are also important. Some private of large-area, long-duration grid failures may lie with the actors may be willing to pay considerable amounts to assure system-wide consequences and interactions.
From page 100...
... Only during emergencies -- events one important element of planning includes evacuation -- in that politically and organizationally focus minds -- does effect deciding that it may be more feasible to move popula- some semblance of more unified and strategic focus emerge, tions in some areas than to provide emergency provisions. such as through the creation of joint field offices that unify While characterizing the real risks of grid failure will the coordinating structures discussed in more detail in be difficult, an even more complex planning task involves Chapter 6.
From page 101...
... of Treasury         S   S           Dept. of Veteran     S     S S S         Agency for International Development               S S       Administrative Resource Center         S P   S     S   Environmental Protection Agency     S S S     S   P S   Federal Communications Commission   S                     Federal Emergency Management Agency S S   S P S S S P   S   Government Services Agency S S     S S P S     S   Natl.
From page 102...
... in turn, magnify the humanitarian crises that result from State and local emergency management organizations the original storm event. Those difficulties compound into may not have sufficient understanding of electric power additional stresses on hospitals and public safety that con- systems, which can slow down emergency power provisume their resources and make it more difficult to restore sion to critical facilities.
From page 103...
... how the country responds to existing grid failures, a topic explored in more detail in Chapter 6. That said, a great deal Finding: Technologies that allow for intelligent, adaptive of the effort needed to imagine and plan for the effects of islanding of the distribution system create new needs for long-duration outages sits outside the power industry in planners to envision which feeders and users should be ener- other organizations -- such as the operators of water supply gized under different circumstances.
From page 104...
... These existing approaches should be practiced such resources can augment federal emergency power operaand improved. Most backup power systems rely on small tions that rely on conventional mobile generators.
From page 105...
... But it is a small step to extend that logic to integra- Earthquakes that affect the power grid can also disrupt tion of electric infrastructure that is located on a customer's natural gas supplies. Extreme cold associated with premises -- for example, an intelligent microgrid that can ice storms can spike other demands for gas, such as island from or reconnect to the larger system as conditions heating, and leave less gas for power generation.
From page 106...
... A highly decentralized and automated grid system electronic devices called inverters that convert the direct curthat is still controlled by central authorities could prove to be rent output from many of these devices into alternating cura highly effective means of assuring resilient energy services rent. Integrating these resources into the grid has presented even in the face of macrogrid failure.
From page 107...
... customers during power outages, consequently increasing While it is not yet deployed at significant scale, technol- the resilience of the grid. A potential advantage of facilitating ogy is readily available to allow inverters to power local the development of privately owned and operated microgrids loads following automatic grid disconnection, making is that this could considerably speed the pace of innovation limited local power available to run refrigerators, freezers, (in much the way innovation was spurred after deregulation and other critical loads.6 In addition to increasing resilience in the telecom industry)
From page 108...
... If work with the manufacturers of plug-in hybrid electric and utilities undertake a similar approach for distribution systems fuel cell vehicles to study how such vehicles might be used and implement smart meters and micro-phasor measurement as distributed sources of emergency power. units in distribution systems, or at least at the points of interconnection of DGs/microgrids, they can identify energized lines during outages and isolate them to ensure line crew REFERENCES safety, while serving critical loads.
From page 109...
... Regional Emergency Fuel Coordination Meeting." http://www.naseo. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency)


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