Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals (2018) / Chapter Skim
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6 Potential Approaches to Restricting Malicious Actors' Access to Precursor Chemicals: Conclusions and Recommendations
6 Potential Approaches to Restricting Malicious Actors' Access to Precursor Chemicals: Conclusions and Recommendations
Pages 113-126
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From page 113... ...
, the challenges of restricting malicious actors' access to precursor chemicals as they move through the supply chain from manufacturers to end users, and the relative merits of different approaches to addressing vulnerabilities without undermining legitimate commerce and use. Responsive to the statement of task, this chapter provides recommendations that draw from the findings and conclusions of previous chapters.
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From page 114... ...
ecent attacks targeting pedestrians, shoppers, and others with knives, firearms, R and vehicles in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere suggest a range of viable options for inciting terror. RECOMMENDATIONS Pursuant to the primary goal of reducing the threat of IED attacks by restricting access to precursor chemicals, and cognizant of the need to preserve legitimate commerce and use, the committee details six recommended courses of action and four research areas meriting future attention.
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From page 115... ...
However, as shown in Chapter 2, PBIEDs represent a substantial proportion of IED attacks, both domestically and internationally, and can inflict substantial casualties when deployed near crowds of people. The committee concluded that any effort seeking ultimately to reduce the threat of IED attacks should account for precursor chemicals used in PBIEDs along with those used in VBIEDs.
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From page 116... ...
, hydrogen peroxide, nitric acid, nitromethane, potassium chlorate, potassium perchlorate, sodium chlorate, and urea ammonium nitrate (UAN) solution; Group B consists of calcium nitrate, hydrochloric acid, potassium nitrate, potassium permanganate, sodium nitrate, sodium nitrite, sulfur, sulfuric acid, urea, and zinc (powder)
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From page 117... ...
. The committee found a pronounced lack of visibility and oversight in retaillevel transactions, especially those involving e-commerce, suggesting ample oppor unity for malicious actors to acquire precursor chemicals for making t HMEs.
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From page 118... ...
The options for controls are outlined here for the specific case of retail-level transactions and, while potentially providing a means of categorizing options at other levels of the supply chain, may or may not apply to those levels in their current forms. The potential for application elsewhere in the supply chain would require additional and separate consideration given the different nature of the commerce and actors at those locations.
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From page 119... ...
Separating commercial and noncommercial users could be challenging, as evidenced by the EU's experience, and would require additional analysis to determine whether it would require any new credentialing and to assess the associated benefits, costs, and uncertainties. Recommendation 4: Federal, state, local, and private-sector entities should explore strategies for harmonizing oversight of the sale and use of commercially available kits that contain precursor chemicals that are specifically designed to be combined to produce homemade explosives.
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From page 120... ...
DHS should engage in a more comprehensive, detailed, and rigorous analysis of specific provisions for proposed man datory and voluntary policy mechanisms to restrict access to precursor chemicals by malicious actors. Consideration of potential control strategies should not end with this report.
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From page 121... ...
Ideally, a more rigorous and more detailed analysis of options would enable executive and legislative branch officials to more deliberately consider a wide range of tradeoffs and would help build consensus about the benefits and costs of different control strategies. Voluntary Measures, Activities, and Programs Recommendation 6: The federal government should provide additional support for voluntary measures, activities, and programs that can con tribute to restricting access by malicious actors to precursor chemicals used to manufacture IEDs.
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From page 122... ...
More specifically, ATF has focused on educating and developing relationships with the agribusiness industry to limit illegitimate access to precursor chemicals such as AN by increasing voluntary reporting of suspicious activity. FBI has engaged in efforts targeting retailers (e.g., pool and spa and beautician suppliers carrying hydrogen peroxide)
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From page 123... ...
Trade associations and some federal agencies already conduct inspections, either announced or unannounced, on facilities that store precursor chemicals, and in the EU mystery shop ping has been used to provide feedback to retailers and regulatory agen cies on program implementation. PRIORITY RESEARCH AREAS In addition to the aforementioned recommendations, the committee identified several areas of research that could provide additional pathways for limiting ccess to precursor chemicals or designing appropriate policy mechanisms.
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From page 124... ...
The cited thresholds listed by the various agencies may create unnecessary confusion for legitimate commerce and may still not prevent malicious actors from purchasing the precursor chemical at the quantity or quality needed to manufacture HMEs. For example, while CFATS cites a ydrogen peroxide threshold concentration of 35%, lower compositions can be h used to synthesize triacetone triperoxide (TATP)
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From page 125... ...
In addition, the committee stresses the importance of periodically reevaluating and reprioritizing the precursor chemicals that it considered in this report and of building in means of harvesting and leveraging experience and data to strengthen policy over time. Restricting access to precursor chemicals may help to reduce the threat of IED attacks as terrorist tactics change, but only if policy can change, too.
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