Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals (2018) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix B: Risk and Risk Management
Appendix B: Risk and Risk Management
Pages 145-152
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From page 145... ...
240 and the Department of Transportation.241 DHS defines risk similarly as the "potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its 145
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From page 146... ...
A public safety officer might be interested in helping families to reduce the probability of fire by addressing the conditions under which the fire can occur. In this report, the committee is interested in identifying conditions under which terrorists can obtain chemicals to produce IEDs and means of reducing the odds that precursor chemicals fall into the wrong hands as fodder for a terror st i episode, which is the ultimate event of concern.
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From page 147... ...
(B-2) The national-security doctrine juxtaposes probability and severity in a risk matrix that can be used to evaluate the risk level of a particular hazard and i nform, if not establish, mitigation priorities; the doctrine addresses both severity and probability to distinguish, for example, the hundred-year storm, the tsunami, and seasonal flooding.
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From page 148... ...
However, the matrix, even with elaboration, cannot provide definitive guidance for establishing priorities, in part, because it is silent on the feasibility and costs of mitigation options. If relying only on the matrix, a policy maker might inadvertently ignore low-hanging fruit or suggest dedicating inordinate resources to the impossible; a low risk might have an easy and cheap fix whereas a medium risk might have no feasible or affordable remedy.
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From page 149... ...
Lundberg and Willis offer remarks on the imperfection of various analytical options:246 "While some articles have explored the reasons to be cautious about the use of qualitative risk assessment tools there are also reasons to be cautious about the use of quantitative estimates"; the latter point is further explored elsewhere.245 The decision to start or stop mitigating risk also requires consideration of risk tolerance and the acceptability of residual risk. The former refers to the level of risk below which a hazard does not warrant any expenditure of resources on mitigation, and the latter refers to the amount of risk that remains after mitigation.
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From page 150... ...
Absent a thorough understanding of the underlying reasons for a hazard, a policy maker might choose a risk mitigation strategy that does not improve conditions or makes them worse.247,248 The same can be said of attempts to control risk associated with precursor chemicals. Fortunately, the risk matrix is just one tool for managing risk, and nationalsecurity doctrine nests it in a continuous five-step risk-management process (Figure B-3)
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From page 151... ...
This meets the fourth principle of risk management, "apply risk management cyclically and continuously."32,33 In Figure B-3, steps 1 and 2 -- which include hazard identification and address causality, probability, and severity -- constitute risk assessment, and steps 3 through 5 constitute risk mitigation.247 From the national-security doctrine,32 Steps 3 through 5 are the essential follow-through actions to manage risk ef fectively. In these steps, leaders balance risk against costs and take appropriate actions to eliminate unnecessary risk and accept residual risk at the appropri ate level.
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