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3 Domestic Chemical Supply Chain
Pages 37-72

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From page 37...
... or the limited development of retrospective assessment.43 In this report, the committee does not discuss the quantities of precursor chemicals moving throughout the domestic supply chains in detail. That information would not provide insight on mechanisms to restrict access given that the amounts of precursor chemicals required to make a person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIED)
From page 38...
... Thus, a strategy for reducing access to precursor chemicals could include a mix of mandatory and voluntary policy mechanisms, with or without new controls. the amounts contained throughout the commercial ­ upply chain.
From page 39...
... Details about the supply chains of individual precursor chemicals in Group A can be found in Appendix D For example, a company might document the planning and forecasting processes leading up to placing a purchase order.
From page 40...
... This includes all supply chains that ultimately service or employ distributors, wholesalers, retailers, resellers, or consumers. Throughout the study, the committee received data from industrial sources and trade groups on the supply, use, and consumption of precursor chemicals.
From page 41...
... , and are transformed into something else or consumed directly at green nodes. Purple indicates the possibility of e-commerce.
From page 42...
... Production and Input Nodes In Figure 3-1, blue nodes indicate where precursor chemicals enter the supply chain. These nodes include import, manufacture, and re-manufacture.
From page 43...
... Amateur Production The committee acknowledges that hobbyists and other members of the public can synthesize certain precursor chemicals themselves from readily available raw materials. An individual manufacturing precursor chemicals could ship or transfer them to another person through a carrier or other means; however, the committee does not have access to data to either confirm or deny that this occurs.
From page 44...
... Certain precursor chemicals that are transported by rail require specialized means of containment because of their corrosive nature (e.g., nitric acid and hydrogen peroxide) or physical properties.
From page 45...
... End User Nodes The green nodes in Figure 3-1 represent locations where precursor chemicals exit the domestic supply chain. This can be accomplished by export out of the domestic supply chain (see above)
From page 46...
... Noncommercial uses by the general public, range from personal hygiene and home care to pyrotechnic and rocketry hobbies, but are limited to personal needs.60 Internet Commerce E-commerce presents unique challenges to restricting access to precursor chemicals. The reach of the internet across municipal, state, and national borders can enable potential buyers to bypass local restrictions by purchasing from retailers in other jurisdictions, under different rules.
From page 47...
... One class of retailers separated out on the supply chain diagrams (Appendix D) is the chemical supply companies that typically sell directly to research institutions or companies, with limited, sometimes vetted, sales to individuals.62 More common retailers include internet-only retailers (e.g., Amazon)
From page 48...
... used to make them.67,68 This act was repealed after the war, then temporarily reinstated for the duration of World War II. Presently, many policy mechanisms are in place throughout the domestic chemical supply chain that could directly or indirectly contribute to security objectives.
From page 49...
... TRANSPORTATION FIGURE 3-2  The generalized supply chain from Figure 3-1, now overlaid with relevant controls and other measures or activities (black circles)
From page 50...
... . The absence of certain materials from the ATF explosives list also may not represent the physical properties of some precursor chemicals, a prominent example being AN, which is capable of detonation in a neat state as has been demonstrated historically.72-75 Although AN does not appear on the ATF explosives list, it is referenced as an "acceptor" subject to sympathetic detonation from the detonation of explosive materials stored nearby; AN is also considered a "donor" when it is stored within the sympathetic detonation distance of explosives or blasting agents, where distance is calculated using one-half the mass of AN to be included in the mass of the donor.76 A third DOJ agency that deals with precursors is the Drug Enforcement A ­ dministration (DEA)
From page 51...
... There are additional limits on the quantity that is available for purchase by a single person on a daily and monthly basis, and record keeping can be facilitated with national registries.84 DEA reports that, as a result of these laws, the amount of precursor chemi cals in the domestic supply chain has decreased significantly, as is reflected in the reduction in the number of operational methamphetamine labs.77 However, within that time frame, there has been a concomitant increase in trafficking from Mexico and small-batch domestic production to meet the same domestic demand for methamphetamine. Thus, while limiting access to the precursor chemicals might have decreased the production of methamphetamine in the United States, especially in labs, manufacturing has simply moved elsewhere or occurs by other means.
From page 52...
... For clarity, CFATS is not listed on the relevant supply chain diagrams at the port node, and the terminals are treated as a variant of a commercial distributor.
From page 53...
... MTSA does not directly regulate the precursor chemicals, but dictates the security procedures and precautions that all cargo must be subject to at ports, thus securing them indirectly. In addition to MTSA, USCG follows hazardous materials transportation regulations proffered by DOT (see below)
From page 54...
... CBP uses TSCA paperwork for imported chemicals before they are released from custody.100 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act The purpose of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) -- which is not, strictly speaking, a control -- is to provide local governments, first responders, and the public with information on the potentially hazardous materials in their communities and to facilitate emergency planning in the event of material release.101,102 This reporting may introduce an unintended security risk by providing malicious actors with information on the facilities that are storing precursor chemicals of interest.
From page 55...
... In some cases, close cooperation with local responders is required to maintain public safety. Because such regulations apply generally throughout the supply chain, individual supply chains (see Appendix D)
From page 56...
... Both shippers and carriers of hazardous materials must obtain a Hazardous Materials Registration issued by PHMSA to perform their specific transportation functions. Of the 520,000 truck carriers registered with the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Administration, 90,000 are authorized to transport hazardous materials.110 Carriers of hazardous materials are required to maintain certain minimum levels of financial responsibility for the cargo they transport in commerce; for example, interstate commerce transporters of oxidizers such as AN are required to maintain a minimum of $1,000,000 of coverage compared to a minimum of $5,000,000 for any quantity of Class 1, 2, and 3 explosive materials transported in interstate commerce, which also requires security plans for any quantity transported and routing plans for transporting quantities in excess of 55 lb.111,112 Some carriers are required to have a security plan for the transportation of a subclass of hazardous materials -- including AN, hydrogen ­ eroxide, nitric acid, and nitromethane -- if p they meet the specified threshold quantities.113 Security plans may include requirements for transfers and attendance by personnel, depending on transportation method.114 Department of Commerce The Department of Commerce's (DOC's)
From page 57...
... An example of the latter is that most states have incorporated DOT regulations on hazardous materials transport into their statutes. There are thousands of statutory jurisdictions within the United States, and the committee could not review all of their policies on precursor chemicals; however, at the state level, some existing regulations pertaining to AN provide an illustrative example of nonfederal controls.
From page 58...
... The representative noted that the number of outlets carrying AN in New York declined after the state introduced the regulation and discussed legal opportunities for farmers to obtain restricted chemicals from out-of-state and out-of-country distributors that might not apply similar protections. In general, state and local provisions may apply at any node within a precursor chemical's supply chain, for example, through business permits, transportation route planning, or fire codes.
From page 59...
... Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary private-public partnership authorized by the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 with the goal of improving commercial security.138,139 C-TPAT partners work with CBP to develop security plans that protect their supply chains both from the introduction of contraband and from theft.
From page 60...
... Responsible Care program has the stated goal of increasing the industrial performance of its members with r ­ egard to security and safety.145,146 Areas of focus for security include site, supply chain, and cyber aspects. Participation in the program is a requirement of joining ACC and requires both performance reporting and third-party verification.
From page 61...
... ATF has focused on educating and developing relationships with the fertilizer industry to limit illegitimate access to precursor chemicals such as AN by increasing voluntary reporting of suspicious activity involving the precursors and increasing
From page 62...
... The primary security concerns in the chemical supply chains are potential vulnerabilities to unexplained loss, diversion, and theft, any of which could lead to malicious actors having access to potentially danger
From page 63...
... . Unexplained Loss An unexplained loss, for the purpose of this report, is an amount of precursor chemical that disappears from the supply chain without knowledge of the cause.
From page 64...
... With some exceptions, namely industrial end users and agricultural retailers, visibility and oversight of precursor chemicals a ­ ppear to decline as precursor chemicals make their way through the supply chain. Because of this, the potential for misappropriation becomes more apparent at the later stages in the supply chain.
From page 65...
... Chemical Characteristics The danger of ET kits is of greater concern relative to other precursor sources because the precursor chemicals contained in them have been designed to produce a high explosive that is both detonable and requires minimized amounts of energy to be initiated. Additionally, unlike other products containing chemical precursors, no technical knowledge or expertise in chemistry is required to use the kits to produce an HME -- indeed, they are packaged with instructions on how to use the components to make an HME -- thus removing any barrier of use for would-be malicious actors.
From page 66...
... By including the two components in the optimal physical form for making an explosive, ET kits remove the need for malicious actors to process or refine the precursor chemicals to make a usable HME. Weight Ratio To make the most easily initiated binary explosive, the oxidizer and fuel components must be the proper particle sizes and be mixed in the proper proportions to ensure detonation (see the Detonability section below)
From page 67...
... Some ET kit manufacturers include FBI advisory, relevant ATF statutes, and prohibitions of use on certain federal lands on their websites. They also include instructions for persons to check for compliance with state and local laws.166 State In lieu of federal controls, a number of states address ET kits at the retail or consumer level of the supply chain.
From page 68...
... 189 -- have rendered the opinion that, when mixed, exploding targets are subject to existing statutes on explosives. Tennessee requires a license to manufacture explosives but does not issue such licenses, thus effectively banning the mixing and use, but not the purchase, of ET kits within the state.
From page 69...
... Businesses might maintain precursor chemicals below the threshold to avoid regulation, as with the example cited previously of industry reducing the concentration of hydrogen peroxide in products to fall below the CFATS threshold of 35%.55 Generally, the longer the supply chain and the smaller the deliverable quantity, the less visibility there is of the material. For most of the precursor chemicals, the total number of entities and affected parties for each type of node greatly proliferates as the precursor chemicals move down the supply chain.
From page 70...
... (≥8%) Nitric Acid 400 1,000T X 500 X† I, EX Group A (≥68%)
From page 71...
... , but does not apply to 4.2 aluminum powder, <20% nitric acid, non-fuming sulfuric acid, or farmers.
From page 72...
... 72 RESTRICTING ACCESS TO EXPLOSIVE PRECURSOR CHEMICALS FIGURE 3-5 A visualization of the supply chain nodes in terms of oversight and vulnerability. This chapter shows that the lack of uniformity of controls and mechanisms at the national and subnational levels has resulted in a regulatory environment that ranges from permissive to highly restrictive, depending on the precursor chemical, the supply chain node, and the location of purchase.


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