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1 Introduction
Pages 9-22

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From page 9...
... as explosives produced from precursor chemicals either physically blended or combined in a chemical reaction. The United States has not experienced an attack with a large-scale IED since the truck bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 and the Alfred P
From page 10...
... p ­ yrotechnic filler, resulted in three deaths and more than 260 injuries, and millions of dollars in economic losses.4 Twenty years after the Oklahoma City bombing, the ingredients, components, and instructions for producing IEDs remain accessible to terrorists, violent extremists, and criminals -- collectively referred to in this report as malicious actors -- who are intent on inflicting casualties,5 damaging critical infrastructure,6 and eliciting fear. Instructional videos and how-to guides for making IEDs are readily available and transmitted via the internet and in-person meetings between would-be bombers and their mentors are facilitated using modern telecommunications and global travel.7 Precursor chemicals can be obtained legally from brick-and-mortar retailers (e.g., hardware, drug, and garden supply stores)
From page 11...
... , the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (the National Academies) assembled an ad hoc committee to identify and prioritize a list of precursor chemicals that have been used or are susceptible for use in IEDs in the United States or internationally; to analyze the movement of priority precursor chemicals through commercial supply chains and identify potential vulnerabilities; and to suggest control strategies, in light of current U.S.
From page 12...
... STUDY ORIGINS Shortly after the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, Congress mandated a broad study of issues related to detecting, rendering inert, and licensing precursor chemicals and explosives, which was undertaken by the Academies' Committee on Marking, Rendering Inert, and Licensing of Explosive Materials.13,14 That effort, which focused on precursor chemicals used pri­ arily m to produce HMEs for the main charges in large-scale IEDs, consistent with those attacks, yielded the following results that are of particular relevance to the present study:
From page 13...
... program, which identifies and regulates highrisk chemical facilities to ensure they have security measures in place to guard against theft and public health hazards.17,18 CFATS focuses entirely on facilities and storage and does not cover chemicals in transport. Some of the precursor chemicals that are controlled under CFATS, and the justification for their presence, resulted from the inclusion of the chemicals on the short list that was recommended by the 1998 committee.14 In 2008, Congress mandated the expansion of security controls to ammonium nitrate (AN)
From page 14...
... report on explosives incidents indicates use of -- or intent to use -- military explosives, commercial blasting agents, commercial pyro­ technics and propellants, and a variety of HMEs (Box 1-4) .3 AN is just one of several precursor chemicals that have been used in IEDs.
From page 15...
... While beyond the scope of this report, identifying and understanding the network's structure and behavior, particularly its potential responses to policy interventions, is a primary step to understanding and countering the IED threat (see Appendix G)
From page 16...
... -- = -- Singapore I EPC Regulations Countering the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices * Germany I RamStein Plot Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Australia I Code of Practice *
From page 17...
... The charge to the committee appears to flow naturally from past events and policy developments, both in the United States and internationally. Although the statement of task focuses on a single dimension of the threat of IED attacks, namely access to precursor chemicals, it does so comprehensively, seemingly reflective of past and ongoing efforts to increase security.
From page 18...
... yield less desirable outcomes than policy making based on slower-paced deliberative thinking.29,30 The former tends to be myopic, to operate rapidly, automatically, and effortlessly, and to emphasize simple associations, including emotional reactions, recent past experience, and simple decision rules. The latter allocates attention to effortful and intentional mental activities, in which indi­ iduals weigh v tradeoffs and recognize relevance, interconnectedness, and the need for coordination, and focuses on long-term strategies for coping with extreme events.
From page 19...
... It starts, in Chapter 2, with a winnowing process by which the committee identified a short list of precursor chemicals of particular concern. After grouping the list of chemicals by priority, it then, in Chapters 3–5, does the following: • constructs supply chains for the highest priority precursor chemicals; • characterizes the policy mechanisms pertaining to those chemicals and analogous policies; • maps out the policy mechanisms in relation to the supply chains to iden tify potential vulnerabilities; • examines the design and implementation of international policies on pre cursor chemicals for insight to possible control strategies; and • identifies and assesses the tradeoffs among potential control strategies.
From page 20...
... It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components."1,2 The committee defined homemade explosives (HMEs) as explosives produced from precursor chemicals either physically blended or combined in a chemical reaction.
From page 21...
... The committee uses the term control strategy to refer to a package of policy mechanisms that can consist of different combinations of new controls, existing controls, and additional measures and activities, each as defined above. On that basis, a strategy for restricting access to precursor chemicals and reducing the likelihood that terrorists will gain access to them would include some form of control, be it a new control, existing controls, or both, but it could take a hybrid approach, by also including a mix of additional mandatory and voluntary policy mechanisms.
From page 22...
... A strategy could include a new control, as defined, or it could supplement existing controls with other measures and activities, subject to varying degrees of government involvement and oversight. Chapter 5 considers the tradeoffs among strategies qualitatively, largely in terms of potential benefits and costs, relative to specific policy objectives, namely restricting access to precursor chemicals, gathering information, and minimizing burdens on legitimate commerce and use.


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