Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology (2018) / Chapter Skim
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9 Moving Forward: Conclusions and Recommendations
9 Moving Forward: Conclusions and Recommendations
Pages 115-128
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From page 115... ...
While there is considerable disagreement among experts about why misuse of biology has been rare, or if it is likely to always remain rare, synthetic biology has the potential to change the likelihood and consequences of misuse. Though important for myriad beneficial applications, synthetic biology and related biotechnologies change the defense landscape by making possible new modes of attack and by lowering the barriers to developing and using biological weapons (and to some extent chemical weapons)
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From page 116... ...
Synthetic biology also increases the overlap between biological and chemical weapons by enabling the use of biological components to make or deliver chemical agents. In determining how to plan for and respond to these evolving capabilities, defense and public health agencies are challenged to consider these newer threats alongside other risks such as traditional biological weapons threats, threats to national security and stability from naturally occurring biological threats (such as pandemics)
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From page 117... ...
, this assessment is based on a holistic view of the factors and capabilities assessed and is not a formulaic approach. Table 9-1 summarizes the assessment of the specific factors considered when analyzing the individual capabilities and Figure 9-2 shows the relative concern for each capability, organized by factor.
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From page 118... ...
There was no attempt to quantify the relative levels of concern; as such, the dividing lines within Figure 9-1 are not intended to indicate that one capability poses twice (or any numerical multiple of) the level of concern compared to the capability below it.
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From page 119... ...
Capabilities posing a moderate relative level of concern include manufacturing chemicals or biochemicals by creating novel metabolic pathways, efforts to modify the human microbiome to cause harm, efforts to modify the human immune system, and efforts to modify the human genome. Although conceivable, these capabilities are more futuristic -- likely limited by available knowledge and technology, as described in Chapters 5 and 6.
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From page 120... ...
Assessment of Specific Types of Capabilities The assessment of overall concerns draws upon the analysis of each of the 12 specific capabilities considered. In addition to conclusions related to the relative assessment of concerns, underlying themes and conclusions emerged when each individual capability was examined in the context of other capabilities in the same category (e.g., when assessing all approaches that involve pathogens)
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From page 121... ...
Rapid advances in DNA synthesis technology have made it possible to obtain a pathogen without direct access to the infectious agent itself. Today, any viral genome can be synthesized based on published sequences, and booting that sequence into a replicating form is also feasible for most viruses.
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From page 122... ...
Production of Chemicals or Biochemicals As discussed in Chapter 5, engineering organisms to produce chemicals or biochemicals is becoming more feasible as researchers learn more about the natural pathways used to produce these substances and as better tools are developed to build predictable synthetic pathways. Just as drug resistance can be engineered into bacteria, so can simple or even complex biosynthetic pathways.
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From page 123... ...
handling larger DNA constructs Booting Demonstrations of booting bacteria with synthesized genomes Making existing viruses more Constraints on viral genome Increased knowledge of viral genome organization and/ dangerous (Chapter 4) organization or demonstration of combinatorial approaches capable of facilitating larger-scale modifications to viral genome Engineering complex viral Increased knowledge of determinants of complex viral traits, traits as well as how to engineer pathways to produce them Making existing bacteria more Engineering complex bacterial Advances in combinatorial approaches and/or increased dangerous (Chapter 4)
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From page 124... ...
Engineering enzyme activity Increased knowledge of how to modify enzymatic functions to make specific products Limited knowledge of Improvements in directed evolution and/or increased requirements for designing knowledge of how to build pathways from disparate organisms novel pathways Challenges to large-scale Improvements in intracellular and industrial productivity production Making biochemicals via in Limited understanding of Improvements in knowledge related to microbiome situ synthesis (Chapter 5) microbiome colonization of host, in situ horizontal transfer of genetic elements, and other relationships between microbiome organisms and host processes Modifying the human Limited understanding of Improvements in knowledge related to microbiome microbiome (Chapter 6)
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From page 125... ...
These barriers include knowledge barriers, as is the case for building a novel pathogen, or technological barriers, as in engineering complex biosynthetic pathways into bacteria or re-creating known bacterial pathogens. It is important to continue to monitor advances in biotechnology that may lower these barriers.
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From page 126... ...
On the other hand, the nation's experience preparing for naturally occurring diseases provides a strong foundation to build upon in developing strategies to prevent and respond to emerging biological threats and biologically–enabled chemical threats. While this study does not constitute a threat assessment and does not make specific recommendations regarding addressing current vulnerabilities, several areas were identified that warrant attention as the nation seeks to bolster its preparedness and defense capabilities.
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From page 127... ...
, and synthetic biology is part of this dilemma. Although dual-use research is going to remain a challenge for scientists and for the nation's defense, there is reason for optimism that, with continued monitoring of biotechnology capabilities and strategic biodefense investments, the United States can foster fruitful scientific and technological advances while minimizing the risk that these same advances will be used for harm.
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