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Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology (2018) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix B: Selected Prior Analyses Used to Inform the Framework
Pages 157-162

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From page 157...
... It is not intended to be a comprehensive compendium of all prior risk governance and biotechnology assessment approaches. CONSIDERATIONS FROM GLOBALIZATION, BIOSECURITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE LIFE SCIENCES The report Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences (also sometimes referred to as the "Lemon-Relman" report from the names of its committee co-chairs)
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From page 158...
... SOURCE: National Defense University, 2016. This model was used by National Defense University at a tabletop exercise to assess where gene editing technology (such as CRISPR/Cas)
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From page 159...
... Fink, which made the case that scientists have an "affirmative moral duty to avoid contributing to the advancement of biowarfare or bioterrorism." The Fink report highlights a list of specific experimental aims that that should trigger additional safety and security examination, even if performed for valid scientific reasons. These include experiments that would (1)
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From page 160...
... GRYPHON ANALYSES In a presentation to the committee, a representative from Gryphon Scientific described an approach for considering how advances in synthetic biology may change the landscape for acquisition of biological threat agents. For example, synthetic biology advances might enable particular threat agents to be synthesized or for a less pathogenic microorganism to be modified into a threat agent, in comparison to alternative acquisition routes such as culturing from clinical or environmental samples or theft.
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From page 161...
... Prior work by Gryphon Scientific, described in the presentation, also considered whether novel biotechnologies, including synthetic biology, have the potential to influence and streamline classical weaponization steps for biological agents. For example, the presenter noted that agents developed using synthetic biology might be developed with increased potency, increased ability to grow to larger numbers, enhanced environmental persistence, increased transmissibility, and the ability to overcome host resistance.
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From page 162...
... 2014. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual-Use Research of Concern.
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Key Terms

  • defense university
  • fink report
  • threat agent
  • biology applications
  • development pathway

  • gryphon scientific
  • alternative acquisition
  • societal risk
  • threat agents
  • biotechnology research

  • bioweapon development
  • using synthetic
  • risk evaluation
  • biological threat
  • states government

  • government policy
  • experimental aims
  • evaluation scheme
  • laboratory workers
  • study charge

  • phase asked
  • acquisition routes
  • gene editing
  • geneticist gerald
  • containment guidelines

  • classified emerging
  • malicious actor
  • health guidelines
  • sometimes referred
  • federal select


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