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3 Framework for Assessing Concern About Synthetic Biology Capabilities
Pages 23-36

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From page 23...
... It was determined that the framework needed to be flexible enough to be applied in a variety of circumstances and for a variety of purposes, such as: analyzing existing capabilities to evaluate the level of concern indicated at present; understanding how various capabilities compare to, interact with, or complement each other in terms of their level of concern; identifying key bottlenecks and barriers that, if removed, could lead to a change in the relative level of concern; evaluating the change in the level of concern warranted when new experimental results are reported or new technologies arise; and horizon-scanning to predict or prepare for potential future areas of concern. This chapter describes the development of the framework and how it was used to facilitate an expert-based qualitative ranking of capabilities based on a well-defined set of factors to capture relative levels of concern.
From page 24...
... that may provide generalizable features applicable to a broader set of technological dual-use concerns.1 Another framework approach, typically employed by security groups, is to use scenario-based assessments to identify potential vulnerabilities and the potential ways to mitigate them. Often referred to as "red-teaming," this approach uses vignettes to describe details of a hypothetical scenario such as specific agents, actors, and affected populations.
From page 25...
... Many of the factors and their descriptive elements are interdependent in that they capture ideas that are similar to or overlap with other factors and descriptive elements and are thus correlated with each other, requiring complex considerations for quantification. Instead, a qualitative approach was taken, using the factors and their descriptive elements to guide discussions and inform the assessment of relative level of concern for various synthetic biology capabilities.
From page 26...
... that are pushing the barriers to be broken. Major technological leaps have the potential to change synthetic biology quickly and open up new possibilities; for example, Gibson Assembly® (Gibson et al., 2009)
From page 27...
... and might include specific processes such as growing large amounts of an agent, milling it into a powder form, making the agent stable enough to be sprayed in a crop duster or withstand other means of mass dispersal, and testing its effectiveness in animal studies. These steps were considered significant barriers to the production of bioweapons in the Cold War era, in effect limiting bioweapons capabilities to a few well-resourced nation-states.
From page 28...
... for an individual actor to gain the necessary capabilities and knowledge to use a given capability to cause harm, a dedicated team might have the diversity of expertise necessary to enact the same plot much more quickly. When analyzing how the requirements of actors affect the level of concern about a given capability, it is useful to consider questions related to the expertise an actor would need to possess to effect a given attack, the accessibility of the required resources, and the organizational footprint and infrastructure that would be required.
From page 29...
... Organizational footprint also affects considerations related to the potential for mitigation, such as the ability to identify suspicious activity and prevent an attack or the ability to attribute an attack to the actor responsible (discussed further under Capability to Recognize an Attack and under Attribution Capabilities, below)
From page 30...
... One approach that has been used as a preventive measure is the establishment of regulatory and statutory safeguards that limit the ability to access particular pathogens or technologies and use them for harm. For example, by limiting access to certain pathogens, the Federal Select Agent Program is intended to reduce the likelihood of those pathogens falling into the hands of malicious actors who might seek to use them as a weapon.
From page 31...
... APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK IN THE ASSESSMENT OF CONCERN The framework was developed both to facilitate the analysis of synthetic biology–enabled capabilities presented in subsequent chapters of this report, as well as to aid others in their consideration of current and future synthetic biology capabilities. To support and inform the application of the framework by other parties, this section describes the approach taken to identify potential areas of concern, the steps used to apply the framework, and key considerations that guided the analysis.
From page 32...
... Steps Used to Apply the Framework The framework is designed to facilitate a thorough analysis of any particular capability by providing a set of key factors to consider and specific elements to consider for each factor. To inform decisions, however, it is useful to consider capabilities in relation to each other, that is, to assess areas of concern in relation to other potential concerns.
From page 33...
... To help translate these graphics into usable information, five categories were created along the x axis: high, medium-high, medium, medium-low, and low. These categories are intended to reflect relative levels of concern, FIGURE 3-3  Capability 1 and Capability 2 assessed with regard to usability of the technology.
From page 34...
... . Key Considerations That Guided the Assessment As described above, an expert-driven, qualitative, multiattribute methodology was used to develop the framework and apply it to assess concerns associated with synthetic biology capabilities.
From page 35...
... In placing synthetic biology capabilities on low-to-high scales for each framework factor, placement reflected the range of potential concerns for a given capability, with particular exceptions noted in the analyses presented in Chapters 4–6. Uncertainty and variability beyond notable exceptions were captured by varying the width of the bar (see Figures 3-2 to 3-4 for notional examples)


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