Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology (2018) / Chapter Skim
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 9-14
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From page 9... ...
Statements and reports issued over the past several years have come to different conclusions regarding the national security threats posed by emerging biotechnologies and the level of concern that is warranted. Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, in his 2016 annual threat assessment to Congress, grouped concerns about genome editing, an example of synthetic biology technology, under discussion of weapons of mass destruction (Clapper, 2016)
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From page 10... ...
a framework to guide an assessment of the security concerns related to advances in the life sciences in the "age of synthetic biology," to assess the level of concern warranted for various advances, identify areas of potential vulnerability, and provide ideas for options that could be considered to help mitigate potential vulnerabilities. To aid decision making in agencies across the biodefense enterprise, including the U.S.
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From page 11... ...
This report takes a broad view of the field and does not attempt to narrowly define the term synthetic biology or to precisely separate it from other kinds of biotechnology. The concepts, approaches, and tools developed to advance synthetic biology will continue to be integrated more broadly into the life sciences toolkit and applied toward many biological research and biotechnology activities.
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From page 12... ...
While the report presents a framework for assessment of potential biodefense concerns and describes how that framework was applied to analyze synthetic biology–enabled capabilities, it is important to emphasize that this study is not a threat assessment. The study did not access intelligence or military information on potential actors, who may range from an individual to a dedicated team to a government body who may seek to misuse life sciences or their specific intent or specific capacity to undertake such misuse.
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From page 13... ...
However, because it was outside of the study's scope to consider all of the mitigation options available to the defense enterprise, the report does not make comprehensive, explicit recommendations regarding mitigation approaches. STUDY APPROACH To carry out the task, the National Academies appointed a committee including members with expertise in such areas as synthetic biology, microbiology, computational tool development and bioinformatics, biosafety, public health, and risk assessment (see Appendix D for biographical information)
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From page 14... ...
Chapter 8 discusses, from a broad perspective, some current approaches for mitigating concerns related to the malicious use of biotechnology, how synthetic biology may challenge those approaches, and conversely, how synthetic biology may help address challenges or bolster mitigation approaches. Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the relative concerns posed by the analyzed synthetic biology–enabled capabilities, highlights examples of key bottlenecks and barriers to monitor, and provides the report's conclusions and recommendations.
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