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5 Mitigation and Implementation
Pages 44-52

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From page 44...
... Aircraft operators represent an important potential source of data for an IASMS, but they will likely not support costly technical and infrastructure investments unless the safety benefits are worth the expense and as long as participating in an IASMS does not create a competitive disadvantage. This chapter identifies five key challenges and three high-priority research projects: • Challenges -- In-time Mitigation Techniques -- Unintended Consequences of IASMS Action -- Trust in IASMS Safety Assurance Actions -- System Verification, Validation, and Certification -- Operators' Costs and Benefits • Research Projects -- In-time Mitigation Techniques -- Trust in IASMS Safety Assurance Actions -- System Verification, Validation, and Certification 44
From page 45...
... At the time the instrument landing system's glide slope for the runway was out of service and so the flight crew was making a visual approach. The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable causes of the accident were the flight crew's mis­ anagement of the m airplane's descent during the visual approach, the unintentional deactivation of the automatic airspeed control by the pilot flying the aircraft, the flight crew's inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew's delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below the minimum acceptable altitude and airspeed for the glide path.
From page 46...
... Trust in IASMS Safety Assurance Actions Challenge Summary Statement: The efficacy of an IASMS will be degraded if it is built without regard to the factors that influence operators' trust in the system. Ensuring that operators develop trust in the safety assurance actions of an IASMS (e.g., system alerts, decision aids, and independent actions)
From page 47...
... An IASMS has the potential to draw conclusions and either recommend or initiate safety assurance actions that in some cases are unfamiliar, unexpected, and/or run counter to operators' prior training and experience. In some situations operators will have very little time to decide whether to trust the output of an IASMS, and in some of those situations it will be vital that the operator make the correct decision because the consequences of making a wrong decision could be catastrophic to the crew, their passengers, and to people on the ground.
From page 48...
... , and NASA, among others. In addition, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is developing standards for autonomous cars that are consistent with the risk assessment matrix in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.2)
From page 49...
... and Aviation Safety Action Program, can be implemented without new equipage. Many of the future data sources needed for the successful adoption of a fully functional IASMS, however, will require new and sophisticated aircraft equipage, such as upgraded avionics and sensors, as well as new ground infrastructure and data processing capabilities.
From page 50...
... Most risk mitigation techniques relevant to an IASMS that have been developed to date involve operators (primarily pilots and air traffic controllers) with some instrumentation support (e.g., collision avoidance systems)
From page 51...
... The examination of the above factors, however, will need to begin at a much earlier stage than typical change management processes to assist in shaping the CONOPS, design, and implementation of an IASMS. Additional background information related to this research project appears in the discussion of the corresponding challenge "Trust in IASMS Safety Assurance Actions," earlier in this chapter.
From page 52...
... Targeted tasks within this research project will include the following: • Review agile test methods that can be applied to ATM test beds. • Identify achievable and desirable target levels of safety for automated and agile test frameworks to validate.


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