Securing the Vote Protecting American Democracy (2018) / Chapter Skim
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4 Analysis of Components of Elections
4 Analysis of Components of Elections
Pages 55-84
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From page 55... ...
The topics discussed are voter registration and voter registration lists, absentee voting, pollbooks, ballot design, voting technology, and voting system certification. Weaknesses in any component can undermine the integrity of elections.
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From page 56... ...
These state lists act as the official record of eligible voters for federal elections. HAVA requires regular maintenance of the lists for accuracy and completeness and stipulates that state or local officials should provide "adequate technological security measures to prevent the unauthorized access to the computerized" voter registration list.2 The Act requires that a unique identifier be assigned to each legally registered voter in the state's voter registration list.3 It states that applications for voter registration may not be accepted or processed by states without either a driver's license number, the last four digits of the applicant's Social Security number, or state-issued identification4 and requires that those who register by mail present identifying information at the polls on Election Day the first time they vote (or with their mail-in ballots if voting by mail)
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From page 57... ...
. a registered voter in the jurisdiction in which the individual desires to vote; and" is "eligible to vote in that election."8 Federal law also requires states to establish a program "that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters" from official voter registration lists.9 States may use information supplied by the U.S.
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From page 58... ...
Voter registration lists are used for many purposes other than establishing the eligibility of an individual to vote in an election. Voter registration lists are used, for example, by candidates and political parties to identify and contact potential voters.15 At the local level, they are used to estimate how many people will vote, which helps guide election administrators as they prepare polling places for Election Day.
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From page 59... ...
and the Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck System.18,19,20 HAVA provides some criteria for developing and maintaining voter registration databases, and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
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From page 60... ...
Supreme Court on June 11, 2018 upheld an Ohio law that allows the state to strike voters from the registration rolls if they fail to return a mailed address confirmation form and then do not vote for 4 years or two federal election cycles.24 Lower courts had ruled that the law violated the National Voter Registration Act, which states that individuals may not be purged from the voter rolls because of a 21 See HAVA, Section 303 and U.S. Election Assistance Commission, "Checklist for Secur Voter Registration Data," October 23, 2017, available at: https://www.eac.gov/ ing documents/2017/10/23/checklist-for-securing-voter-registration-data/.
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From page 61... ...
Sophisticated tools used in other industries may provide better record matching.28 ERIC is one organization that attempts to make high-quality industry matching tools available to state election officials, but the existence of ERIC does not preclude states from exploring other record matching tools. Electronic voter registration databases, like all electronic systems, are vulnerable to cyberattacks.
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From page 62... ...
Driver's license numbers and Social Security numbers, for example, could be used for identity theft or for the purpose of requesting absentee ballots.29 Attacks that alter voter registration data could be used to introduce fake or illegitimate voters, to remove valid voters from voter registration databases, or to force provisional voting on Election Day. The latter would likely be detected but could, nevertheless, cause long lines and other disruptions at polling sites.
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From page 63... ...
The ballot is then mailed to the appropriate elections office or deposited at a designated dropoff location.31 To be counted, absentee ballots must be postmarked, deposited, or received by a deadline that is generally estab 30 In at least 22 states, certain elections may be conducted entirely by mail. See http://www.
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From page 64... ...
Election Assistance Commission, presentation to the com mittee, April 5, 2017, Washington, DC. See also "2016 Election Administration and Voting Survey" (EAVS)
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From page 65... ...
38 See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, "Tips for Helping UOCAVA Voters and their Families," p.
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From page 66... ...
deliver the request for an absentee ballot from the voter to the local jurisdiction; (2) deliver the unmarked ballot from 46 See Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A
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From page 67... ...
There are services available to election officials to facilitate the use of this data, including products like Ballot Scout, Ballot Tracks, and Ballot Trace.55 Concerns over the speed and reliability of the USPS have led to the replacement of the mails with electronic means, particularly the Internet, in the administration of voting by mail in many jurisdictions. While there are administrative gains to be had by moving to the electronic transmission of absentee ballot requests, and the transmission of unmarked ballots to voters, this practice comes with many of the cybersecurity vulnerabilities discussed in Chapter 5 of this report.
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From page 68... ...
Few marked ballots are currently transmitted electronically. The electronic transmission of absentee ballots -- via fax, email, or web portal -- is most often reserved for voters who fall under UOCAVA "as these voters often face unique challenges in obtaining and returning absentee ballots within state deadlines."56 Three states, Arizona, Missouri, and North Dakota, allow some voters to return marked ballots using a web-based portal, but Missouri only offers electronic ballot return for military voters serving in a "hostile zone."57 In North Dakota and Arizona, any UOCAVA voter may use the web option.58 The singular importance of the marked ballot may help explain why few marked ballots are currently transmitted electronically.
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From page 69... ...
Election jurisdictions are increasingly adopting programs that allow officials and voters to track the location of mail ballots. All-mail elections may slow down the vote counting process, especially if ballots are accepted according to postmark date (and thus may be received and counted days or weeks after the election)
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From page 70... ...
The procedures for when to issue and count provisional ballots are established by individual states.60 While most jurisdictions (81.8 percent) still use preprinted paper registration lists to check in voters, between the 2012 to 2016 federal elections, there was a 75 percent increase in the use of electronic pollbooks (e- ollbooks)
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From page 71... ...
Others leave testing or audits up to individual counties or provide no backup system.69 The static nature of printed pollbooks presents several problems, because voter registration recruitment continues until the registration deadline.70 Voter registration offices may not be able to finish entering registrant data into voter registration databases before pollbooks must be printed for distribution to polling places. In light of this, some voter registration offices create supplemental lists for distribution to election judges immediately prior to an election.
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From page 72... ...
Voter registration offices can focus on data entry through the early voting period -- and even up to Election Day -- since data entry need not be completed to meet the cut-off time for the printing and delivery of paper pollbooks. Findings Eligible voters may be denied the opportunity to vote a regular ballot if pollbooks are inaccurate.
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From page 73... ...
Initiatives are accompanied by short explanatory text which further extends the length of the ballot. Poor ballot design can occur when election administrators fail to incorporate proven design principles or are constrained from doing so by voting technology features or local laws and regulations.
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From page 74... ...
The design directly contributed to an increased number of miscast votes in the election.71 The 2006 general election ballot from Sarasota County illustrates how poor electronic ballot design (see Figure 4-2) may have caused many voters to overlook a congressional race.
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From page 75... ...
The congressional race does not have such a heading. SOURCE: Jefferson, David, "What Happened in Sarasota County?
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From page 76... ...
, good, accessibility focused electronic ballot design is as critical as good physical paper ballot design. A poorly designed audio ballot can be more confusing than a poorly designed printed ballot.
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From page 77... ...
auditability. The post-2000 modernization of voting technologies sought to redress deficiencies associated with ballot designs, eliminate punch card systems in which recounts had been plagued by hanging chad, and complete the phase-out of long-obsolete mechanical voting machines.
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From page 78... ...
Early in their existence, DREs were attractive to some election administrators because they provided a modern, reliable upgrade from mechanical lever machines. DREs seemed convenient to use, because they provided instant tabulation at the close of the polls, and because they eliminated the need to preprint the correct number of paper ballots for all the voters in each precinct.
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From page 79... ...
Completed ballots are returned via mail, at designated collection points, or, in certain instances, by fax or via the Internet. Well designed, voter-marked paper ballots are the standard for usability for voters without disabilities.
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From page 80... ...
Election Assistance Commission, "Testing & Certification Program Manual, Version 2.0," available at: https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Cert_Manual_7_8_15_FINAL.pdf.
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From page 81... ...
Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia rely on the federal testing and certification program, at least to some extent.78 This can range from requiring that systems be tested to federal standards to requiring that systems be tested in federally approved laboratories. The remaining states do not require federal testing or certification per se, but in most cases rely on the federal certification program to guide their own state certification regimes.
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From page 82... ...
82 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, "VVSG Version 2.0: Scope and Structure," avail able at: https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/VVSGv_2_0_Scope-Structure(DRAFTv_8)
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From page 83... ...
uthorize and fund the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to a develop voluntary certification standards for voter registration databases, electronic pollbooks, chain-of-custody procedures, and auditing; and b.
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