Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

Strategies for Identifying and Addressing Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology: Proceedings of a Workshop - in Brief
Pages 1-6

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 1...
... OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT Michael Imperiale, chair of the study committee, provided a brief overview of the report. The task given to the study committee was first to develop a strategic framework to guide the identification of potential security vulnerabilities associated with advances in biotechnology, with a particular emphasis on synthetic biology.
From page 2...
... High potency toxin molecules that can be produced through simple genetic pathways, of which there are many, are of greatest concern because they can be developed with modest resources and low organizational footprints. For modulation of human physiology, there may be novel ways to accomplish this, including inducing physiological changes in war fighters that differ from the typical effects of known pathogens and chemical agents.
From page 3...
... Another committee member noted that microbes introduced into the human gut may not only be pathogenic, but can also result in the transfer of antibiotic resistance and other undesirable traits from plasmids carried by the introduced organisms to the normal gut bacteria. HARNESSING COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY APPROACHES This session discussed the role of computation in synthetic biology, as well as potential opportunities computational tools might provide to mitigate concerns posed by misuse of synthetic biology capabilities through prevention, detection, attribution, or other opportunities to identify, monitor or constrain misuse.
From page 4...
... Reproduced with permission from: Douglas Densmore, Boston University; Ron Weiss, MIT, and Jacob Beal, Raytheon BBN Technologies. Constrain – systems to constrain design capabilities, and Screen – maintaining registries of known biological threats, are the next two areas described by Densmore.
From page 5...
... For example, Green described using microbiome signatures on pills in determining whether those pills were made by non-authorized companies that are introducing counterfeit drugs into the market. Microbial signatures can be used for this geospatial location where there is sufficient baseline information characterizing the background.
From page 6...
... Carr, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory; Douglas Densmore, Boston University; Diane DiEuliis, National Defense University; Andrew Ellington, The University of Texas at Austin; Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; Charles Haas, Drexel University; Joseph Kanabrocki, The University of Chicago; Kara Morgan, Quant Policy Strategies, LLC; Kristala Jones Prather, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Thomas Slezak, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Jill Taylor, New York State Department of Health; Marilee Shelton-Davenport (Study Director) , Katherine Bowman (Senior Program Officer)


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.