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6 Key Findings and Recommendations
Pages 125-136

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From page 125...
... The findings lead to seven recommendations intended to position BTRP to adapt to new realities, to sharpen its focus, and to have the greatest positive impact on reducing threats and risks to deployed U.S. military forces, U.S.
From page 126...
... As a result, BTRP is unable to keep pace with the speed at which science and technology are changing the biological risk landscape, reducing its ability to preclude or mitigate potential threats as they emerge. FINDING 1.3: At its best, BTRP activities improve facilities, procedures, and practices and establish strong, trusted relationships with laboratories and laboratory personnel in complex political and technical settings around the world, and by doing so provide unique functions for improved local and U.S.
From page 127...
... RECOMMENDATION 1: The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy should seek a global determination from Congress, which would give BTRP authority and flexibility to work when and where national biosecurity needs–and diplomatic opportunities–are identified or reasonably anticipated. Mission and Engagement Flexibility Knowledge and understanding of local partner capabilities in several key areas are essential to guiding biological threat reduction investments, including: (1)
From page 128...
... BTRP IN-COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT Personal Relationships Are Key to Successful Engagements Engagements in collaborative biological threat reduction programs are first and foremost about humans. Science, health issues, technologies, procedures, and research on pathogens are tools for good, or sometimes for harm.
From page 129...
... In this context BTRP should not engage an international partner just because it can. The transportation, communication, and computational revolutions have provided an enhanced capacity to identify hot spots for emerging new risks and threats with a greater degree of accuracy than ever before.
From page 130...
... FINDING 4.2: Sample and data sharing are critical to early detection of transboundary outbreaks, but access to this information may be limited because of strict sample and data-sharing policies in partner countries. Delays in data access could delay reporting to international health organizations, alerting neighboring countries to the potential threat, and initiating emergency response activities in a timely manner, including development of field ready diagnostic tests, and planning of clinical trials of countermeasures, including therapeutics and vaccines.
From page 131...
... As a part of this forward assessment process, BTRP should identify opportunities to bolster local partner countries' capabilities to detect aberrations from the norm early in an event or outbreak in order to better anticipate events through improved disease surveillance and better analytical capacity. CONNECTING BTRP WITH OTHERS ON BIOLOGICAL THREAT REDUCTION Build and Leverage Networks It is as clear that BTRP cannot address every biological threat as it is axiomatic that funds should be used in a manner that can efficiently produce the best outcomes.
From page 132...
... These risks could result in significant health, social, political, and economic consequences leading directly to political and civil unrest–especially in countries with pre-existing marginal or unstable governmental systems and weak infrastructure. FINDING 5.3: Inadequate provision for fundamental needs, such as food and clean water, enables transmission of environmental pathogens into the human population and increases opportunities for conflict, which present a different type of security risk.
From page 133...
... FINDING 6.1: Preparing for and responding to existing and potential biosecurity threats requires an agile ability to consider traditional biological threats and the contributions of new research strategies and tools to understand the pathogenesis and epidemic potential of emerging pathogens. FINDING 6.2: The biological sciences and biotechnology are advancing at a pace that far exceeds current security assessments.
From page 134...
... RECOMMENDATION 6: BTRP should acquire greater scientific expertise on its staff and proactively engage with the broader scientific community to better understand technical and scientific developments in emerging infectious diseases. This engagement can be accomplished by some combination of participating in important scientific meetings, contracting with scientific organizations, establishing a scientific advisory group, and/or working with individual experts.
From page 135...
... government programs conducting health security engagement, both the strategic vision and success of biosecurity programs rely on actions by the U.S. government as a whole, host governments, and international partners.
From page 136...
... RECOMMENDATION 7b: Over the next 5 years, BTRP, working with its many DOD partners, should encourage, engage, support, co-lead, and help drive the U.S. government's development of a durable interagency mechanism that draws on medical, military, diplomatic, scientific, and other expertise to address natural, accidental, and intentional biological threats and risks to the deployed force and to the nation.


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