A Strategic Vision for Biological Threat Reduction The U.S. Department of Defense and Beyond (2020) / Chapter Skim
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2 The Changing Biothreat Landscape
2 The Changing Biothreat Landscape
Pages 35-68
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initiatives; what actions might BTRP take now to keep pace with these changes? • Because the international landscape for addressing biological threats involves many nongovernmental, governmental, and intergovernmental actors, effective coordination and communication are critical to ensuring success of biological threat reduction programs.
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FINDING 6.1: Preparing for and responding to existing and potential biosecurity threats requires an agile ability to consider traditional biological threats and the contributions of new research strategies and tools to understand the pathogenesis and epidemic potential of emerging pathogens. GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY The mailing of anthrax-laced letters just 1 month after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States (FBI)
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. Several subsequent outbreaks highlighted the need to stengthen capabilities for addressing biological events that could result in significant harm to human, animal, and plant health, economies, and society: the emergence of West Nile virus in the United States in 1999 (Roehrig, 2013)
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(2005) and GHSA incorporated a systems-based approach for proactively, rather than reactively, addressing these types of natural, accidental, and intentional biological threats.
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Not all countries have met these requirements, in significant part because of inadequate resources to implement assessment and capacity strengthening support at the country level. The Global Health Security Agenda The challenges that many countries faced in implementing IHR (2005)
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BTRP's recent efforts in promoting multilateral cooperation to address biological threats and sustainability by enhancing partner country capabilities to detect, monitor, and prevent biological threats aligns with the original and 2024 objectives of GHSA. BTRP's continued inclusion of experts from human and animal health, security, and scientific sectors in
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tool (WHO, 2016b) , which is a voluntary external assessment process that identifies gaps in capacity, determines a country's level of health security capacity; and measures progress toward a country's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases threats.
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In 2019, the U.S. government issued the Global Health Security Strategy (GHSS)
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• Enhance existing networks among ministries, such as the emerging infectious disease laboratory network, by including responsible biosafety officers from the public health and animal health sectors and from other related ministries.
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Although detailed descriptions of all efforts and entities involved in each of these categories is beyond the scope of this report, the diversity of actors is relevant to understanding the system in which BTRP is working to address biological threats. Several intergovernmental efforts and entities exist to address infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and/or plants, including the IHR (2005)
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Experts from academia and think tanks conduct a variety of activities (e.g., advocacy, global governance, and evaluation and metrics) to monitor and support progress toward achieving global health, health security, and security objectives.
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Support for the broad spectrum of global health security efforts is provided by an equally diverse group of funders, including private donors, philanthropic organizations, and government funding agencies. Funders of global health, national security, development, and scientific research support global health security activities.
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. Achieving the goals of biological threat reduction requires the capacity to safeguard samples that contain virulent strains of a pathogen.
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or African swine fever (ASF) , and diseases that only sporadically cause human disease such as highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
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requires collaboration between the human and animal health sectors, their institutions, and their professional staff in a One Health approach. Examples include the recent control of HPAI H7N9 infections in humans through vaccination of poultry (Wang, G.-L.
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human population density, increasing incursions of larger numbers of humans into pristine forest and other ecosystems, and environmental destruction that increases vector breeding) , it is the rapid and expanding global movement of people, animals, and international trade in agricultural products that is the primary contributor to the spread of infectious diseases that threaten national and regional security (Findlater and Bogoch, 2018)
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the introduction and spread of West Nile virus into the United States in 1999 (Roehrig, 2013)
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52 TABLE 2-1 Disease Impacts at the Human–Animal–Environment Interface Disease Situation Financial Health Human–Animal– Source Cost Burden Environment Interface Highly January 2004-January 2009, $20 billion 486 human Wild birds mixing with FAO, 2004; pathogenic Asia; human and animal health cases with backyard poultry; WHO, 2015 avian influenza service costs, compensation, 282 deaths agricultural production and revenue losses intensification without to the livestock sector; losses sufficient biosecurity; primarily to smallholder food security challenges producers in East Asia affecting livelihoods, trade opportunities, food and nutrition security and safety Antimicrobial Estimated cumulative impacts $100 trillion 10 million Agriculture/aquaculture Jonas et al., resistance by 2050 (up to $6.1 human contribute to direct 2017; Review on trillion/year in deaths transmission of resistant Antimicrobial high-impact annually strains and antimicrobial Resistance, 2014 scenario) dispersion; reduced efficacy threatens both health and food production Severe Acute November 2002-July 2003; $41.5 billion 8,500 cases, Bat–human contact World Bank, Respiratory trade and travel disrupted in 813 deaths facilitated disease 2012 Disease China; spread to 29 countries emergence; live markets (SARS)
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East Coast Annually for Kenya, Malawi, More than Tick-borne agricultural DFID and fever Tanzania, and Zambia, from $200 million disease (cattle, sheep, and GalvMED, endemic disease; death or goats) ; threat to 2010; Minjauw reduced growth and livelihood, food and and Mcleod, productivity nutrition security 2003 Schistosomiasis Based on estimated 14 percent 10 million Ecological changes from Torgerson and (zoonotic)
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taken from the vaccinia virus; and production of the live virus using a helper virus replicating system in tissue culture cells (Gryphon Scientic, 2019)
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In addition to synthesizing viruses and bacteria, the emergence of CRISPR-based genome editing tools has elicited concern about their potential use to create harmful pathogens. In 2016, genome editing was classified as a weapon of mass destruction in a report by the U.S.
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EMERGING BIOTECHNOLOGY Several significant changes and advances in biotechnology have occurred during the past decade, which have significant implications for the biological threat landscape and for medical progress. Although these changes do not encompass all advances in biotechnology, they do illustrate the need to account for different individuals, organizations, countries, and fields that could enable or limit threat reduction investments or enhance vulnerabilities and risk in partner countries.
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Further facilitating these efforts is the use of genome editing tools that enable precise genetic changes in an organism's DNA. Although genome editing tools are more advantageous for modifying plant, animal, and human cells than many bacteria, viruses, and yeast, for which established and robust engineering technologies exist, the growing awareness of the risks of genome editing tools to national and international security has elicited concern among security experts.
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Although the United States and its allies likely will continue innovating and advancing biology and biotechnology, they will not be the only voice internationally in setting norms for responsible science, a phenomenon currently being observed through the completed and proposed plans for editing of live, viable human embryos. Differences among countries' norms for ethical life sciences (including professional and behavioral norms against the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons, or the use of biotechnology for destructive purposes)
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Data and software provenance and integrity is extremely important for these biosurveillance efforts to help diagnostic and research scientists accurately identify and characterize pathogens circulating in wildlife and infecting animals and humans. Therefore, breaches of the information systems that generate, transmit, and store data and the software that is used to analyze data can compromise the results, which could alter detection of biological threats and determination of their origins (i.e., naturally occurring, accidental, or intentionally released)
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countries where biological threats exist; (2) countries that have poor infrastructure to address biological threats and risks; and (3)
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Box 2-2 provides the legal framework for BTRP by statute, the National Defense Strategy, the National Security Strategy, the National Biodefense Strategy, the National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, and the Global Health Security Strategy. FINDING 1.2: BTRP is constrained by both political and geographic requirements that inhibit its ability to respond nimbly to emergent threats.
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Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) is authorized by 50 U.S.
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The 2018 National Security Strategy calls for working with "other countries to detect and mitigate outbreaks early to prevent disease" caused by naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate biological threats. The strategy supports enhancing in-country efforts to strengthen healthcare systems and global health security to counter zoonotic threats, and working with partners to improve safety and security measures in laboratories that handle dangerous pathogens.
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and the 2018 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy expands the definition of biological threats to include naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate outbreaks. The National Biodefense Strategy highlights biological risk management as enabling activities that seek to prepare for, prevent, and respond to any biological threat.
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increase international support for global health security through bilateral, regional, and multilateral diplomatic, health, and security efforts and engagement with nongovernmental entities working to prevent, detect, or respond to biological threats; and (3) strengthen U.S.
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Two years earlier, NAS completed its study on metrics for DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction. This report highlighted key concepts, such as the need to clearly state the program's objectives and role in addressing biological threats and risks, jointly develop objectives with partner countries to enable buy-in and sustainability, prioritize and refine the metrics over time, and allow for independent evaluation.
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Developing activity- and goal-based evaluation approaches that can be used to support, complement, and coordinate with the JEE or another process increases the potential for partner country buy-in and sustainability of capabilities. FINDING 4.4: Measuring threat reduction from engagement programs is difficult.
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