A Strategic Vision for Biological Threat Reduction The U.S. Department of Defense and Beyond (2020) / Chapter Skim
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This report is another reexamination of DOD's international health security efforts in the context of further evolution of the broader security environment that now incorporates an emphasis on state-level threats. DOD international engagement in health-related activities has historically resulted in a direct benefit for the United States by advancing knowledge of infectious disease epidemiology and the development of medical countermeasures as well as fostering good will and trust with international partners.
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Because of the evolving landscape of biological threats, the broader set of tools used by BTRP is needed now more than ever, especially as BTRP is well suited to promote norms against theft and malicious exploitation of peaceful biological sciences, and against the development of offensive biological weapons capabilities. AMBIGUITIES AND FUNCTIONAL SIMILARITIES MAKE NATURAL, ACCIDENTAL, AND INTENTIONAL THREATS DIFFERENT MANIFESTATIONS OF THE SAME FAMILY OF CHALLENGES The National Security Strategy, the National Biodefense Strategy, and the Global Health Security Strategy include within the scope of biological threats naturally occurring, accidental, and intentional biological incidents, and also include the concept of interlinked human, animal, plant, and environmental health (called One Health)
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Global trends facilitate potential misuse of biology, including increased access to biological information, new techniques to manipulate pathogens that do not require sophisticated or expensive technology, and willingness to breach norms against misuse. Easier access to relevant knowledge and much more effective tools for previously unimagined biological research and technology capabilities can also set the stage for accidents.
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An integrated view of biological threats also prevents bureaucratic boundaries from interfering with partnerships and progress. DOD, including the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
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. Because the international landscape for addressing biological threats involves many nongovernmental, governmental, and intergovernmental actors, effective coordination and communication are critical to ensuring success of biological threat reduction programs (see Appendix C)
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government departments and agencies involved in global health security programs are primarily focused on health and biosafety challenges, and less on biosecurity. Moreover, in contrast to CDC and USAID programs, the mission of DOD's (but not necessarily the principle mission of BTRP's)
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BTRP establishes critical lines of communication about biological threats, from any origin, with foreign governments and responsible individuals; supports operational and situational awareness where it can operate; invests in building capacity that improves biosecurity; and generates information that ultimately provides additional security to the United States. The kind of engagement BTRP conducts promotes individual relationships of trust.
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For example, inadequate domestic clinical and research laboratory infrastructure or poor domestic public healthcare infrastructure, and inadequate numbers of subject-matter experts to prevent and respond to infectious diseases may allow an outbreak to occur where it may have otherwise been preventable. Effective disease surveillance must also be paired with sustained analytical efforts, allowing for the identification of opportunities to guide intervention prior to an outbreak.
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More rapid evolution and emergence of threats from infectious disease, and increased bureaucratic complexity at DOD, as at any large organization, led the committee to recommend greater geographic and programmatic flexibility for BTRP. This would enable BTRP to engage in a geographic region before a situation becomes critical and a response much more expensive -- and sometimes less effective -- than it would have been years or even months earlier.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF RECRUITING AND RETAINING THE MOST EFFECTIVE BTRP PROFESSIONALS Connections to people and their institutions are the common thread through all of BTRP's efforts, whether for biosurveillance, establishing norms, building laboratory capacity, strengthening biosafety and biosecurity rules and practices, or enabling rapid and effective response. While cooperative threat reduction programs have focused on technical solutions for the past 30 years, with some significant success, it is also clear that human relationships of trust developed through long-term engagements contribute both directly and indirectly to national security, and can even be deterrents to aberrant behavior.
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. By enabling BTRP to more effectively engage globally and be proactive in relevant activities, BTRP can provide DOD leadership with a perspective on biosecurity and disease threats from the ground level up.
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BTRP must establish working relationships within DOD before they are needed. Particularly, regular open and frank communication must be ongoing between BTRP and combatant commands; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy; various military medical research and development laboratories (to include sites Outside Contiguous United States)
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interests abroad, and the homeland, seeking to intervene and eliminate, reduce, or mitigate threats at the most opportune and effective stage of development. An effective mechanism will have greater geographic and programmatic flexibility and communication links; will demonstrate better awareness and prevention of threat development and more timely response; and will partner effectively within DOD, with other U.S.
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As a part of this forward assessment process, BTRP should identify opportunities to bolster local partner countries' capabilities to detect aberrations from the norm early in an event or outbreak in order to better anticipate events through improved disease surveillance and better analytical capacity.
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RECOMMENDATION 6: BTRP should acquire greater scientific expertise on its staff and proactively engage with the broader scientific community to better understand technical and scientific developments in emerging infectious diseases. This engagement can be accomplished by some combination of participating in important scientific meetings, contracting with scientific organizations, establishing a scientific advisory group, and/or working with individual experts.
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An effective interagency mechanism will avoid unnecessary duplication, identify and close gaps, and explore possible synergies. Likewise, it will allow for greater geographic flexibility, more effective communication links, and will demonstrate better awareness and prevention of threat development, and more timely response.
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