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2 Understanding the Threat Landscape
Pages 11-28

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From page 11...
... Speakers examined the role and context of computing and communications technology in the electric grid; addressed the imperative to improve grid security from a national security perspective; and considered what constitutes grid resiliency and its cyber, physical, and human components. Panelists also addressed natural and man-made threats from electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
From page 12...
... Existing reports, standards, and regulations in this area provide valuable guidance for resiliency protection protocols; examples include the Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity1 and requirements from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
From page 13...
... He highlighted risks posed to the grid's key physical infrastructure in today's multithreat landscape and described CISA's perspective on the convergence between physical security and cybersecurity. Harrell said that it is CISA's view that the next major attack on critical infrastructure will likely have an insider component, whether from unintended information leaks or from radicalized personnel.
From page 14...
... Second, he argued that supporting career transitions between government and industry would help to transfer knowledge and practices between these sectors and create a workforce that is better equipped to understand and address the threats at hand. Michael Hyland, American Public Power Association APPA represents more than 2,000 municipal utilities, from large cities to small towns.
From page 15...
... cooperative agreement, based on physical mutual aid agreements, is intended to help protect and reinforce physical infrastructure, while the Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) agreement is aimed at bolstering protections on the cyber side.
From page 16...
... On the positive side, however, Lee noted that effective defensive cybersecurity mechanisms are available and, when implemented properly, they work well. Lee noted that, in contrast to decades past, security expertise today is concentrated in the private sector rather than in the government, a shift he attributed to cooperation and partnership between government, which was focused on cyber security earlier than industry, and the private sector over the years.
From page 17...
... Hyland replied that more education and preparation is needed, and Harrell stressed that grid failure exercises including cyber threats are a valuable learning exercise for these efforts. Tools and Models Mark Lauby, NERC, asked about the status of efforts to build simulation tools, models, and risk assessments.
From page 18...
... , asked what, specifically, PPPs should be studying. Lee suggested that they deemphasize things that industry is good at, such as incident response, and focus instead on broader needs, such as supply chain security.
From page 19...
... Speakers included John Kappenman, Storm Analysis Consultants; Mark Lauby, NERC; and Randy Horton, EPRI. John Kappenman, Storm Analysis Consultants John Kappenman, founder of Storm Analysis Consultants, emphasized the vulnerability of today's grid to GMD and E3-EMP events (E3-EMP, the slow pulse component of EMP, is similar to naturally occurring GMD events)
From page 20...
... . By comparison, the E1-EMP pulse field strength can be as high as 50,000 V/m, a level that would not only disrupt sensitive control system operation but that is also likely to cause widespread permanent damage to many of these electronic-based systems and hamper the ability to rapidly restore critical infrastructures necessary to sustain lifeline services to the population.
From page 21...
... Their findings indicated that some equipment, such as relays, were fairly resilient to a free field E1 HEMP pulse, but conducted surges -- for example, the voltage and current surges that can be generated by the coupling of the E1 HEMP pulse into a control cable -- pose a greater threat. Using low-voltage surge protection 6 Electric Power Research Institute, 2019, High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse and the Bulk Power System: Potential Impacts and Mitigation Strategies, EPRI Technical Report 3002014979, Palo Alto, Calif.
From page 22...
... EMP Research Needs Recognizing that it is impossible to fully defend against EMP attacks, Kappenman suggested that future work should focus on building better protective spaces, based on better design standards, that incorporate visionary approaches such as shielding concrete. Lauby stated that better EMP protection will come from more reliable wavefront information.
From page 23...
... Cynthia Hsu, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) , asked about the lifespan of existing GMD detection infrastructure in space and whether additional or replacement monitoring satellites are needed.
From page 24...
... "We also know that nation-states understand and continue to get better insight into the importance of our nation's infrastructure to our national security and our economic security." To better protect our electric power grid and design systems that are secure, resilient, integrated, and modern, Durkovich outlined her vision for a central "belly button" in the federal government that would be responsible for establishing an overarching strategy and the corresponding policies, authorities, and regulations to achieve it. While the private sector owns and operates the assets within this critical infrastructure, she asserted that the federal government should have a role in creating a roadmap for a modern infrastructure system, and that public-private partnerships could be a valuable mechanism for building security and resilience into electric power infrastructure from the beginning.
From page 25...
... Stockton added that another often overlooked area of potential vulner­ ability is the nation's ability to conduct blackstart power restoration -- that is, to restart electricity generation from within a blacked-out area, rather than by importing power from outside the area to restart generation assets. Utilities responsible for blackstart must comply with rigorous 7 Office of the Press Secretary, 2013, Presidential Policy Directive 21 -- Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, The White House, Washington, D.C.
From page 26...
... The government, Batz suggested, can support infrastructure security by providing faster, better, and more scalable mechanisms for information sharing; creating incentives for defense-critical security installations; and detailing response plans for when adversaries probe systems. Funding is also a challenge.
From page 27...
... Securing the Supply Chain Jeffery Dagle, PNNL, asked how cybersecurity supply chain vulnerabilities could be reduced. Batz answered that securing the supply chain will require a complete risk management overhaul, with multiple components that enable operators to understand the potential threats at every layer.
From page 28...
... John Kappenman, Storm Analysis Consultants, noted that the grid's dependency on natural gas, especially for a blackstart, has fallen through the cracks, and emphasized the need to find a different fuel source or create a national policy regarding fuel reserves during a crisis. Batz agreed that such an investment would improve resilience, as would creating a fully realized catastrophe plan that ensures sufficient reserves and reduces utilities' dependence on "just in time" inventory.


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